“Insurance Doesn’t Care About the Patient”: An Institutional Ethnography of the Influence of Professional Autonomy on the Provision Care for Medicaid Dental Patients with Disabilities by Lau, Stephanie
Virginia Commonwealth University 
VCU Scholars Compass 
Theses and Dissertations Graduate School 
2021 
“Insurance Doesn’t Care About the Patient”: An Institutional 
Ethnography of the Influence of Professional Autonomy on the 
Provision Care for Medicaid Dental Patients with Disabilities 
Stephanie Lau 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd 
 Part of the Health Policy Commons, and the Public Policy Commons 
 
© Stephanie J. Lau 
Downloaded from 
https://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd/6548 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at VCU Scholars Compass. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of VCU Scholars 
Compass. For more information, please contact libcompass@vcu.edu. 
PROFESSIONAL AUTONOMY AND MEDICAID PWD  
“Insurance Doesn’t Care About the Patient”: An Institutional Ethnography of the Influence of 




Submitted to the  
L. Douglas Wilder School of Government and Public Affairs 
of Virginia Commonwealth University  
in Partial Fulfillment of 
the Requirements for the Degree  
of Doctor of Philosophy  
in 
Public Policy and Administration 
 
 




In terms of unmet needs for people with disabilities (PWD), dental care is number three behind 
residential care and employment (Fisher, 2012). Regardless of disability, oral healthcare traverses 
all disability diagnoses and can be a significant factor in quality of life (Deckler, 2011; Griffin et 
al., 2007; Norwood & Slayton, 2013). When attempting to secure oral healthcare, people with 
disabilities face many challenges, including lack of access, lack of provider education on proper 
care of PWD, and difficulty finding a willing dental provider (Deckler, 2011; Fisher, 2012; 
Kennedy, 2009).  
The purpose of this study was to investigate professional practices and decisions that 
affect provision of care for patients with disabilities. Research has clearly identified many 
barriers that preclude dental professionals from providing adequate care, such as lack of physical 
accommodations or reluctance to participate in state Medicaid programs (Deckler, 2011; Fisher, 
2012; Kennedy, 2009). This study sought to understand the interoffice decision-making 
processes regarding participation in Medicaid, how to treat or accommodate patients with 
disabilities, and the extent to which market factors influenced these decisions.  
Using the paradigm of institutional ethnography, this research provides insight into 
factors that providers considered when making decisions about patient care, and how local office 
decisions are connected to larger institutions and policies. A qualitative design was conducted 
and included open-ended interviews, observations, and textual analysis at two dental offices in 
the Richmond, Virginia, area.  
 
Keywords: disabilities, dental, oral health, institutional ethnography, professional 
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction and Literature Review 
In this chapter, I outline the importance of oral healthcare to people with disabilities 
(PWD); ways in which oral health is linked to and affected by their primary diagnosis; and ways 
in which access to care, dental education, insurance, and accessibility affect provision of care. I 
also introduce the problematic, a key concept within institutional ethnography, at the center of 
this research question and how it is analyzed.  
According to the 2007 United Nations Convention on the Rights of People with 
Disabilities (CRPD), PWD deserve the right to the highest attainable standard of health. As one 
of the 155 signatory nations, the United States should consider the needs and best methods of 
providing the highest attainable standard of health to PWD (Silvers & Francis, 2013). Providing 
adequate dental care to PWD is essential for achieving this goal because dental care and oral 
hygiene affect overall quality of life. Oral hygiene and disease are linked to ear and sinus 
infections, weakened immune systems, and systemic illness. Furthermore, untreated dental 
conditions become painful and eventually affect an individual’s speech and social development 
(Decker, 2011; Griffin et al., 2007; Norwood & Slayton, 2013). In terms of unmet needs, dental 
care is number three behind residential care and employment (Fisher, 2012).  
Unfortunately, oral healthcare is often secondary to other primary health concerns related 
to a disability and may be neglected by caregivers and healthcare providers. Advances in 
medicine have allowed for individuals with significant disabilities to live longer lives. In fact, it 
is estimated that the number of adults aged 60 or older with developmental disabilities will 
increase threefold over the next 20 years (Waldman et al., 2006). A decline in oral health can 
dramatically affect the quality of life of PWD regardless of how well their primary disability is 
treated. Medical care should not be limited to addressing primary disability ailments; we now 
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understand that it is also necessary to consider continued care that affects quality of life. Poor 
oral health for PWD may be the result of the disability itself, medical treatment of the disability, 
or a combination of the two.  
Poor Oral Health as a Comorbidity  
Adequate oral healthcare is a concern for all individuals regardless of disability status. By 
studying oral health, the proposed research study is not limited to health access concerns for any 
particular disability diagnosis. Oral health is a concern for all patients whether their primary 
diagnosis is physical, intellectual, or developmental. However, disability diagnosis can vary in 
how it affects both oral health and oral health maintenance. 
Worldwide, studies have shown that dental caries (commonly known as cavities) are the 
most prevalent comorbid disease and unattended health need among individuals with intellectual 
or developmental disabilities (I/DD) (Fisher, 2012). Often, physical or cognitive challenges 
contribute to inadequate self-care, such as unwillingness to brush, biting down on the toothbrush, 
not opening the mouth wide enough to effectively brush, reliance on caregiver for oral care, and 
inadequate clearance of foods from the mouth (Fisher, 2012; Norwood & Slayton, 2013).  
Primary medical issues, medication, or the disability itself exacerbate some oral 
problems. For example, there is an inherent risk that individuals with Down’s syndrome can have 
decreased saliva secretion because of their tendency to mouth breathe. Decreased salvia 
production or xerostomia can lead to increased caries, swallowing difficulties, and chronic mouth 
burning (Fisher, 2012). Individuals with physical disabilities may have oral dysphagia and 
pocket foods and fluids in their mouth that lead to increased caries. Foods prepared for 
individuals with physical disabilities are often pureed, which adhere more to teeth. In addition, 
severe motor impairments can lead to hyperactive bite and gag reflexes that expose teeth to 
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acidic gastric contents that further erode dental enamel (Norwood & Slayton, 2013). 
Individuals with I/DD are more likely to be prescribed medication in syrup form with a 
higher sugar content that increases the risk of caries (Fisher, 2012). Seizure management 
medication can contribute to gingival overgrowth, and medications such as glycopyrrolate, 
trihexphenidyl, amphetamine, and datomoxetine can result in xerostomia and increased risk of 
caries (Norwood & Slayton, 2013). 
Even when the importance of oral healthcare is acknowledged for PWD, patients can 
encounter barriers to care. The following section details some of the specific provision and 
access concerns that affect adequate oral healthcare for PWD. 
Provision and Care 
Class-action legislation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) has led to 
increased deinstitutionalization of PWD and closure of many state-run facilities. At the end of 
the last century, the number of institutionalized individuals had decreased 75 percent (Waldman 
et al., 2006). Though deinstitutionalization is positively associated with progressive social 
policies, it has also been correlated to a worsening of oral healthcare for PWD (Fisher, 2012; 
Norwood & Slayton, 2013; Waldman et al., 2009). By moving away from institutional-based 
care for PWD, individuals have lost access to institutional-based dental providers and must now 
rely on community-based providers. Even community-based residential facilities report 
inadequate access to dental care as a significant issue plaguing their residents. Based on a study 
in North Carolina, individuals with I/DD were significantly more likely than individuals without 
a disability to have never had their teeth cleaned or to have not had their teeth cleaned in the last 
5 years (Fisher, 2012). The 2001 National Survey of Children with Special Health Care Needs 
estimated that 76 percent of parents reported the need for dental care in the prior 12 months, and 
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that 13 percent of individuals did not receive the care they needed (as cited in Fisher, 2012).  
Behavioral conditions can also make it difficult to seek and provide care in traditional 
settings. Parents or caregivers may be reluctant to take a child with a behavioral problem to the 
dentist, and providers may not feel comfortable providing care. Depending on cognitive 
impairment or high salience to stimuli, a PWD could be uncooperative during dental exams. 
Individuals who are uncooperative or demonstrate an oral aversion may need to be sedated for 
the dentist to provide an adequate exam and treatment (Norwood & Slayton, 2013). 
Proper dental education and disability awareness could mitigate concerns caregivers and 
providers have about providing care in traditional settings. However, dental care providers do not 
receive the necessary training to address the special needs of this population, as I discuss next.  
Dental Education 
 The American Dental Association has stated that dental schools are providing minimal 
training and clinical experience in caring for PWD. This lack of training contributes to providers’ 
hesitancy to treat and provide services. For example, PWD may have exaggerated or 
unpredictable responses to anesthesia, and it is highly recommended that dentists consult with an 
individual’s primary care physician before using local or general anesthesia in addition to 
consulting sedation guidelines developed collaboratively between the American Academy of 
Pediatrics and the American Academy of Pediatric Dentistry (Norwood & Slayton, 2013). Such 
increased coordination demonstrates higher client service time spent on PWD that may not be 
reimbursable (Decker, 2011; Kennedy, 2009; Waldman & Perlman, 2002). 
On average, United States programs provide only five or fewer hours of instruction on 
the treatment of vulnerable populations. For example, from a sample of 640 dental graduates 
from 1992 to 2004, 51 percent of the respondents reported receiving no training in this area. 
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Graduates who did receive training indicated that previous experience of treating PWD in school 
had a positive effect on their willingness to provide care to PWD (Fisher, 2012). 
Education and disability awareness are not the only factors that can contribute to a dental 
provider’s decision to accept PWD patients. Potential patients’ insurance can often be a deciding 
factor; this factor is further complicated when the patient relies on public insurance such as 
Medicaid or Medicare. 
Private vs. Public Insurance 
 Whereas 80 percent of individuals without a disability have private health insurance, it is 
estimated that only 44 percent of individuals with significant disabilities have private insurance 
(Fisher, 2012). Healthcare expenditures are disproportionally large for PWD, and they are more 
likely to depend on public programs like Medicaid and Medicare. It is estimated that 75 percent 
of individuals with I/DD rely on government funding for health and dental services. Though 
coverage for dental services is mandatory for children covered by Medicaid, unlike adults—even 
those with a disability—states have wide latitude in setting payment rates for providers (Decker, 
2011). Low rates have often been cited as a reason that providers choose not to participate in 
Medicaid, and research has found that a positive correlation exists between state Medicaid fees 
and the number of private providers who will treat Medicaid patients (Decker, 2011).  
 An evaluation of first dental visits for newly enrolled children with and without a 
disability who receive Medicaid indicated that they had more difficulty accessing a dental care 
provider than did their counterparts enrolled in State Children’s Health Insurance Programs 
(SCHIPs) (Chi et al., 2011). Simply providing a child with Medicaid coverage does not address 
the issue of providing access to a willing dental care provider. A 1996 report of the Health and 
Human Services Inspector General estimated that only 20 percent of Medicaid-eligible children 
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receive preventative dental care (as cited in Griffin et al., 2007). 
Dental care providers cite low reimbursement rates and increased administrative 
requirements as reasons that make treatment of Medicaid patients exceptionally burdensome and 
undesirable (Decker, 2011; Kennedy, 2009). Providers also complained of slow payment and 
unreasonable denial of payment in addition to the low reimbursement (Kennedy, 2009). These 
reasons coupled with lack of education regarding care for PWD make it extremely difficult for 
PWD to find willing and adequate dental care. Furthermore, Medicaid typically only provides 
preventative dental care for children; dental care may not be provided for adults using Medicaid 
except when deemed medically necessary and is usually limited to extractions (Waldman & 
Perlman, 2002). State coverage of adult benefits varies from state to state. As of 2019, only 19 
states provide extensive or comprehensive adult coverage (CHCS, 2019). 
Compensation considerations contribute significantly to access as well. A secondary 
analysis of dental providers from 2000 to 2008 revealed that children covered by Medicaid were 
less likely to have been seen by a dentist in the last 6 months than children who were covered by 
private insurance. There was also a positive correlation between increases in state Medicaid 
payment and overall improvements to dental care access for children covered by Medicaid; a 
logit model revealed that a $10 increase in Medicaid payments was associated with a 
3.92 percent increase in the chance that a child covered by Medicaid had seen a dental provider 
(Decker, 2011). Quality of care may also be dependent on disability diagnosis; individuals with 
mild learning disabilities are more likely to receive restorative dental treatments, whereas 
individuals with profound learning disabilities are more likely to receive dental extractions 
(Stanfield et al., 2003). This difference in care points to varying levels of social expectations for 
PWD. 
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Medicaid. The high utilization of Medicaid by PWD means that an analysis of the 
problem of access would not be complete without further investigation into what factors 
influence professional participation in Medicaid programs. Despite provider claims that 
reimbursement influences participation in Medicaid (Deckler, 2011), a series of weighted 
generalized least squares models reveals that the supply of dental services is relatively inelastic 
or does not increase proportionally to increases in rates or service demands (Scheffler et al., 
1996). This insensitivity indicates that there may be additional factors (economic and 
noneconomic) that maintain a high marginal cost and prevent dental providers’ participation in 
Medicaid. If increased reimbursement payments alone will not increase access, then policy 
makers need to identify what affects program participation satisfaction. From a professional 
perspective, what factors into cost-benefit decisions to apply and continue to participate in 
Medicaid programs? 
Accessibility. Beyond a limited number of providers with adequate knowledge and 
compensation concerns, accessibility difficulties can also hinder access to dental care (Norwood 
& Slayton, 2013). Frequently missed appointments and the administrative time required for 
coordination of care between primary care physicians and PWD caregivers are also cited by 
dental providers as barriers to delivering adequate care to PWD and Medicaid recipients (Decker, 
2011; Kennedy, 2009). It is likely that transportation difficulties and complex medical regimes 
and schedules increase the likelihood of missed appointments. Also, although the ADA requires 
that structural facilities be accessible, it does not address the treatment environment, including 
tables and equipment (Silvers & Francis, 2013). For individuals with physical limitations, access 
barriers may include finding a dental care provider with the necessary equipment in addition to 
knowledge to provide adequate care. 
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Title 3 of the ADA defines a private dental office as a place of public accommodation, 
requiring dental practitioners to serve patients with disabilities. However, dentists are not 
obligated to make accommodations if the disability is not discernible and if the patient does not 
disclose their disability. ADA requires dentists to treat a PWD as they would a person without a 
disability, including referrals for further treatment if necessary. Reasonable modifications must 
also be made to office facilities to increase access unless it can be shown that these modifications 
would cause an “undue burden,” and PWD are not allowed to be charged for additional auxiliary 
fees, such as interpreters for the deaf and hearing impaired. According to the law, a dentist is 
allowed to refuse treatment if the patient poses a “direct threat” to the health and safety of others 
(ADA, 1990).  
There are legal limitations, however, to what a dentist may consider a “direct threat.” For 
example, the United States Department of Justice identifies a dentist who categorically refuses to 
treat all persons with HIV/AIDS as an example of discrimination; this exact example was upheld 
in the Supreme Court Case Bragdon v. Abbott. However, a healthcare provider is not required to 
treat a person who is seeking or requiring treatment outside of the provider’s area of expertise 
(U.S. Department of Justice, 2012). What is considered to be beyond a provider’s expertise is a 
gray area; it can be interpreted to mean their general discomfort or lack of knowledge working 
with an individual with a disability.  
In fact, pediatric dentists rather than adult general dentists treat the majority of adults 
with disabilities (Waldman et al., 2009). This pattern is the result of limited dental education and 
clinical time spent on the care of PWD and mandatory dental services for children under the 
Early Periodic Screening Diagnosis and Treatment (EPSDT) Medicaid program. In 2005, only 
seven states included comprehensive adult dental care as part of their Medicaid program 
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(Waldman et al., 2009). However, as of 2013, there were only 5,000 practicing pediatric dentists 
(Norwood & Slayton, 2013). This number, not even considering distribution, is inadequate to 
treat the population of children and adults with disabilities. The estimate of children with special 
needs alone is 11.2 million in the United States (Norwood & Slayton, 2013).  
Statement of the Problem 
Adequate dental care is an important factor of overall health; the importance of oral 
health should not be overlooked in PWD in favor of narrowly treating the biological basis of the 
disability. Oral health not only contributes to overall physical health but also contributes to social 
and emotional wellbeing. However, many features of our healthcare delivery system, including 
lack of proper education, inadequate compensation, and meaningful access, prevent appropriate 
care and treatment. Most difficult though is the role of attempting to reconcile expectations of 
equitable access and care with individualized providers in a market-based institution. Within a 
market-based healthcare system, what are the incentives to provide care to a population with 
exceptional health expenditures? This research study seeks to use institutional ethnography as a 
constructive framework to understand the decision-making process of dental providers and 
influential institutional factors. The question is guided by the problematic, which can be 
described as the experiences of people at the center of the issue, in this case, dentists and dental 
professionals. 
Identifying the Problematic 
 In institutional ethnography, identifying the problematic means to focus on a particular 
issue in someone’s lived experience; it is not the research question itself but rather a starting 
point to begin to unravel the best approach for conducting an institutional ethnography 
(Campbell & Gregor, 2004). For example, in Campbell’s (2000) Institutional Ethnography study 
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on healthcare experiences of people with disabilities, she began not with a hypothesis but with 
recruitment of volunteers to share their experiences. The goal was to use this preliminary data to 
identify what would be studied in the second phase. The gathered information led her to 
investigate the social organization of healthcare interactions.  
Starting with a specific perspective is meant to reveal the connections between people 
and institutions that are to be studied. These connections serve as the object of analysis as they 
can be stretched beyond an individual account. It is an analysis of these links that can be 
generalized and used to demonstrate how ruling relations direct individuals’ actions. The 
emphasis looks beyond the existence of ruling relationships to better analyze and understand 
how ruling relations are performed and perpetuated (Norstedt & Breimo, 2016). 
In preparation for the proposed study, two interviews were conducted with dental 
professionals. The conversation with these professionals suggested that dentists exercise degrees 
of professional autonomy in how they structure their practice and restrict potential patients. This 
professional autonomy is, however, limited by maintaining a viable and profitable business and 
by dental education. For example, it was shared that a pediatric dentist may treat a special needs 
child using Medicaid but likely not treat a patient who has qualified for Medicaid based on 
economic status. This decision was highly influenced by the fact that dental treatment for minors 
is mandatory through Medicaid but only “medical” treatments are reimbursed for adults 
(Deckler, 2011). Hence, the decision to limit Medicaid patients is greatly determined by the 
reimbursement structure of Medicaid that varies from state to state.  
One dental professional also shared that because Medicaid may set limits on what is 
reimbursed, it is not uncommon for a dentist to perform a procedure that is not covered but bill 
for another procedure to secure some reimbursement. In Nevada, for example, Medicaid covers 
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silver amalgam fillings only and does not cover resin composite fillings. If the affected tooth is 
visible, a dentist may choose to use resin composite, bill for silver, and absorb the difference in 
cost. Here, there is the potential for policy to limit the quality of service provided to a Medicaid 
patient. Furthermore, it was shared that there is no reimbursement code for cognitive care or 
preventative care with adult patients. Any time spent with a patient discussing oral hygiene is 
nonreimbursable time for the dentist. Given the specific and individual needs of a patient with a 
disability, this could potentially be a large amount of time the dentist forfeits that could be 
otherwise spent on more lucrative procedures.  
In an interview with an independent dental practice owner, the dentist explained why the 
office declined to become a Medicaid provider. As a small business owner, he had to make 
decisions to ensure that his practice is solvent. Part of these decisions included which insurances 
to accept. In addition to Medicaid, he has chosen not to be in network with two other insurance 
companies who offered him lower negotiated fees than other insurances. The dentist shared his 
frustration that insurance does not care about a patient and that sometimes overreliance on 
insurance plans can be detrimental to care.  
These preliminary interviews reveal the disjuncture between different versions of reality 
(Campbell & Gregor, 2004). Campbell (2000) analyzed the perception of care provided to PWD 
from their own perspective. In the case of this study, an analysis of the provider perspective 
reveals how larger social relations govern how care is provided and what decisions are made to 
maintain or disrupt the egalitarian mode of delivery that often fails to meet the specific needs of 
PWD. Professional autonomy allows a dentist to select patients, decide on acceptable methods of 
payment, and choose whether or not to be a Medicaid participant (Deckler, 2011). These 
decisions are often influenced by market factors and quality of care factors (Fisher, 2012). My 
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observation that the disjuncture that dentists often experience when providing care for PWD is 
the conflict between cultural competency, limited resources, and levels of care. The professional 
autonomy granted to dentists gives them some leeway in whether they err more on the side of 
quality or profit. The question at the center of the problematic that I hope to unravel is: How 
does dental professional autonomy in a market-based system affect provision of care for 
Medicaid patients with disabilities? Specifically, how do dental providers arrive at the decision to 
become Medicaid providers, and what factors influence their decision to treat and the type of 
care to provide to patients with disabilities?  
Chapter 2 will review the conceptual framework that structures this research study and 
demonstrate how Michel Foucault’s postmodern conception of power and knowledge, insights 
from Jürgen Habermas’s communicative action, the biological model versus the social model of 
disability, and institutional ethnography will guide the inquiry and analysis.  
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CHAPTER 2: Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework for this research study is based on two primary theories: Foucault’s 
conception of power and knowledge and Habermas’s concept of communicative action theory. 
These theoretical frameworks represent simultaneously the synergistic and conflicting nature of 
dental professional autonomy and the market context within which they operate. For example, 
professional autonomy grants a dental professional a measure of market control and competition, 
but it does not ameliorate the fee-for-service commodification of the insurance market. 
Institutional ethnography, as a mode of inquiry, supplies the lens through which these theories 
are filtered and, in particular, reveals how everyday problems are connected to institutional 
policies and the ways in which daily actions reproduce institutional modes of thinking. The 
social construction of disability, specifically within the medical field, is outlined to reveal how 
disability as a concept is also affected by regimes of power and knowledge and communicative 
action. 
 Professional autonomy is conceptualized as ideas related to professional training, 
experience, gatekeeping, accessibility, and care of patients with disabilities (Freidson, 1989; 
Starr, 1982). Market control is conceptualized as ideas related to market viability, private and 
public insurances, Medicaid, coding, fee for procedures, and healthcare expenditures. The lens of 
institutional ethnography maps how local settings are connected to societal institutions when 
using key concepts from Foucault and critical theory to interpret data collected through 
observation and conversation. Figure 1 provides a visual representation of how these concepts 
are anticipated to connect and relate to one another in this research project.  




1 Visual Representation of Conceptual Framework 
 
Institutional Ethnography 
For the purposes of this study, institutional ethnography is used as described by Canadian 
sociologist, Dorothy E. Smith, to explain the links between everyday life, organizations, and 
translocal administrative and governance processes. Smith (1999) defines the complex field of 
links as “ruling relations” and “texts” as forms of coordination. An individual’s actions at the 
local setting are shaped by external organizational powers, and texts become the means by which 
those organizational powers are communicated to the individual. Within the context of this 
research study, emphasis is placed on understanding how local dental offices are inextricably 
linked to state and federal government, private insurance businesses, and other institutional 
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organizations whose policies trickle down to affect everyday decisions of dentists and dental 
staff. The role of texts, and specifically the activation of texts, as described by institutional 
ethnography, is key to understanding how ruling relations trickle down and are perpetuated at the 
local level. “The notion of activation expresses the human involvement in the capacity of texts to 
coordinate action and get things done in specific ways” (Campbell & Gregor, 2004, p. 33). 
Often, ruling relations take the form of policies that are reproduced as replicable written text. The 
use, adherence to, and replication of texts become part of the action or work of individuals at the 
local level. For example, how do Medicaid policies, viewed as texts, become part of the act of 
providing dental services? At what point does dental care become defined by the reproducible 
text, and does this text contradict or redefine care from a medical perspective? As a text of 
replicable policies and rules, Medicaid billing directly links the local action of the dentist to state 
and federal guidelines. “Drawing texts into the scope of ethnographic investigation is an essential 
step in exploring the translocal organization of the everyday” (Smith, 2006, p. 66). 
Originally, institutional ethnography was described as a combination of Karl Marx’s 
materialist method, Harold Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology, and feminist insights of 
consciousness-raising (Smith, 2006). Institutional ethnography directly addresses unequal social 
power relations by connecting people’s everyday experiences to institutions, bureaucracies, 
media, and discourse, which Smith conceptualizes as the ruling relations that constitute and 
maintain social networks and inequalities in power (Smith, 1987). The power of institutional 
ethnography is its ability to connect the micro problems and everyday lives of individuals to the 
macro institutions in which one works or exists by highlighting how the institution itself shapes 
what may be observed as personal problems. This feat is accomplished by moving away from the 
administrative level of observation to “[take] the standpoint of those who are being ruled” 
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(Campbell & Gregor, 2004, p. 15). This approach challenges the dominant ruling relations by 
exposing how standard concepts of knowledge and understanding often fail to account for the 
diverse array of experiences of the population it governs. The inattentiveness of rulers and the 
perpetuation of ruling relations (re)produce social injustices that institutional ethnography can 
help reveal. 
Institutional ethnography is particularly well suited to the study of bureaucratic work 
settings because it “draws on local experiences in confronting and analyzing how people’s lives 
come to be dominated and shaped by forces outside of them and their purposes” by focusing on 
the texts that shape that organization (Campbell & Gregor, 2004, p. 12). Organizational texts like 
intake forms, patient records, and billing that mediate decision making will likely reflect 
institutional interests over individual interests. Campbell and Gregor (2004) have demonstrated 
the efficacy of this methodological approach in healthcare settings; in their examples, nurses rely 
on texts like patient records to simultaneously translate their nursing knowledge and view their 
work in the terms supplied to them by their organization. For example, institutions and 
professionals determine via texts, such as applications and intake forms, who is eligible to 
receive health services, who is mentally ill, and who should receive welfare services. Texts are 
the tangible accountability record that makes visible the coordination of multiple institutions. In 
use, texts are read selectively for different purposes and, by this means, become part of the action 
or work performed (Smith 2006). By “mapping” these social relationships, institutional 
ethnography makes visible the normally invisible social organization of people’s daily lives.  
As described in Campbell and Gregor (2004), Roxana Ng’s research on employment 
supports for immigrant women demonstrated how provision of services was affected by 
government funding. Ng’s research argued that funding accountability and recordkeeping 
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directed how services were provided, redefined success in terms mediated by state agencies, and 
ultimately revealed as false the assumption that a state operates in the interest of all citizens 
(Campbell & Gregor, 2004). Ng’s research demonstrates how text-mediated decisions can 
redirect the focus of an agency from the lived experiences of clients to institutional 
categorization and funding streams. Similarly, this research seeks to evaluate how market factors 
and Medicaid reimbursements affect provision of care. Similar to Ng’s research, institutional 
ethnography is an appropriate lens to investigate how funding can dictate the creation and use of 
texts in institutional organizations.  
Campbell (2000) has used institutional ethnography to explore the healthcare experiences 
of PWD by mapping the social organization of the delivery of services. The goal of the study 
was to problematize the relationship between the services provided and the actual experience of 
the individual; the experiences as told by PWD illuminated the question of what is “health” and 
the disparities of that definition that existed between health provision and personal autonomy or 
experience. Campbell’s (2000) study showcases how PWD “disrupt the cultural homogeneity of 
a population” (p. 142) and how uniform policy decisions designed for efficiency and consistency 
are likely to ignore rather than respond to individualized needs. The delivery of services as 
dictated by institutional text organize social relationships between professionals and PWD in a 
bureaucratic power dyad.  
Dental offices can be viewed as organizations with set policies and rules that maintain 
economic viability and provide standards of care. Like Ng’s employment agency, dental offices 
will consider funding and revenue streams in order to remain profitable and continue to provide 
care. Dental professionals are then passive gatekeepers or advocates of PWD regarding access. 
Furthermore, professional autonomy gives dental professionals the ability to select patients and 
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create personal operating procedures within the confines of professional and economic 
constraints (Deckler, 2011). Conducting an institutional ethnography in a dental office identifies 
the use of texts and types of texts that coordinate professional action in the setting. For example, 
how do billing documents, insurance authorizations, and insurance benefits dictate provision of 
care? Are new patient forms used to determine patient acceptance or type of care provided? Do 
dental staff use documents to record patient care that then reinterpret how care is defined? In this 
age of technology, how are online new patient inquiries, documentation, or electronic records 
changing the translocal administrative processes? 
Dental offices operate within a larger social and economic context, and an institutional 
ethnography reveals the specific dimensions of this context. Foucault’s concept of power and 
knowledge will be key to analyzing concepts related to professional training, autonomy, and 
patient selection.  
Power and Knowledge 
The French philosopher, Michel Foucault, wrote extensively on the concept of power and 
its manifestations. Power in social institutions and relationships could be described as extensions 
of “discourses” pervasive in all aspects of society and everyday life. Foucault describes units of 
discourse as “…those groupings that we normally accept before any examination, those links 
whose validity is recognized from the outset” (Foucault, 1971/1972, p. 22). Foucault (1972) 
further posits that “…discourse is not the majestically unfolding manifestation of a thinking, 
knowing, speaking subject, but, on the contrary, a totality…” (p. 55). In his interview, Truth and 
Power, Foucault details how concepts of truth and knowledge are produced and maintained via 
discourses that are themselves not rooted in objective truth but rather socially constructed 
through particular practices dominated by those with power. Concepts of knowledge are thus 
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indicative of the contextual history and the current power regime. 
According to Foucault, relationships demonstrate a power dynamic: One individual 
dominates while the other is subordinate. Examples would include the employer-employee, 
teacher-student, and doctor-patient dyads. Within these dyadic relationships, the dominant 
individual would control the economic and ideological conditions that dictate knowledge. The 
combination of power and knowledge allow the dominant individual to inscribe their view of 
truth or reality onto those they influence. Mechanisms of control operate within institutions such 
as prisons, hospitals, schools, and asylums (Erickson & Murphy, 2003). However, relations of 
power must expand beyond notions of repression in order to be productive and reproductive. 
“What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn’t only 
weigh on us as a force that says no; it also traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, 
forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network that 
runs through the whole social body…” (Foucault, 1976/2003, p. 307). 
This conceptualization of power, knowledge, and truth removes the objective quality of 
truth; knowledge can now be viewed as a means of ordering and explaining the world according 
to the powerful. The perpetuation of a specific truth does not necessitate the objectivity of that 
thought rather the perpetuation of the legitimacy of the powerful, often through institutions. 
However, the conceptualization of power should not be limited to judicial notions of law and 
prohibition or power is reduced to being solely in the hands of the sovereign. To quote Foucault, 
“we need to cut off the king’s head” (1976/2003, p. 309). Here, notions of power and truth can 
be related to an institutional ethnography framework. Institutional organizations directly 
influence individual lives by perpetuating and reproducing ruling relations through power and 
knowledge. An individual willingly submits to or participates in a power dyad, just as individuals 
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voluntarily engage in social relations per institutional ethnography. 
Professional Autonomy 
Foucault’s conceptualization of power and knowledge is key to understanding the 
cultural authority of the professional. The professional is one whose expertise is legitimatized by 
institutions of power; he or she is an expert because the powerful say so, and we believe it. 
Sociologist Paul Starr describes the role the profession has in society and assesses that the 
profession “has been able to turn its authority into social privilege, economic power, and political 
influence” (1982, p. 5). Indeed, a sudden onslaught of discoveries and changes in ways of 
speaking and understanding is indicative of a regime change (Foucault, 1976/2003). As outlined 
by Starr (1982), changes in medical knowledge are linked to the professionalization of medical 
doctors at the expense of midwifery. To Starr, the roots of a profession’s authority are based on 
“dependence” and “legitimacy.” The subordinate submits to the “legitimate” authority of the 
powerful to gain access to knowledge held by them. In this fashion, the powerful are gatekeepers 
to those who depend on them (Freidson, 1989; Starr, 1982). Doctors are the gatekeepers to 
health; social workers, the gatekeepers to benefits; teachers, the gatekeepers to education. 
Professional legitimacy is based not on the authority of the individual but on the authority 
bestowed by the community of professionals who have validated their proficiency (Starr, 1982).  
Oral health for PWD is predicated on access to a dental professional. To examine the role 
of dental professional autonomy in a market system, it is first imperative to understand the 
definition of a professional and the power they hold in the exercise of their professional duties. 
Abbot (1988) describes professions as “exclusive occupational groups applying somewhat 
abstract knowledge to particular cases” (p. 8). The concept of abstract knowledge is key in that it 
is through this abstraction to application of practical technique that a professional group controls 
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and protects their occupation from competition (Abbott, 1998). Initially it may appear that the 
profession is simply linked to an occupational role, but it is the exclusivity and required training 
of that occupational group that are key factors in how one earned the status of professional. 
Furthermore, abstraction of occupational knowledge grants professionals power over 
occupational territory (Abbot, 1988). For example, if one were to recall a recent trip to the 
dentist, most likely the majority of their time was spent in the presence of a dental hygienist. 
Often it is the hygienist who flags potential cavities or oral health concerns, but the visit is not 
complete until the dentist confirms the hygienist’s observations. Through abstraction, dentists 
hold authority over hygienists and protect their occupational territory. 
The power of abstraction is what sets professionals apart from any other vocation that 
requires a licensure to practice, like a beautician or electrician. Based on this definition, the 
relationship between knowledge and control of knowledge is at the root of professional authority 
and autonomy. 
Accessibility 
In terms of accessibility to dental care of patients with disabilities, professional autonomy 
and personal attitudes can affect observed healthcare disparities. Unconscious biases and 
stereotypes of healthcare professionals regarding patients or socioeconomic factors have been 
shown to result in differences in care (Meade et al., 2015). This unconscious bias is important to 
consider because dental professionals and their staff can be considered street-level bureaucrats as 
described by Lipsky (2010). These street-level bureaucrats have a critical role in access to 
entitlements like public safety, education, and health. In fact, Lipsky (2010) argues that the 
influence of a street-level bureaucrat is proportional to the need of an individual. A PWD of low 
social economic status using Medicaid as their primary insurance would have multiple layers of 
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gatekeepers between themselves and oral healthcare. This could include their caretaker, case 
manager, social worker, social security benefits advisor, and health administrator. One way in 
which dentists can manifest their unconscious bias is through selective insurance participation 
and geographic location. As previously described, transportation difficulties can affect a PWD’s 
ability to access care in the community (Norwood & Slayton, 2013). There is also no 
requirement that dentists purchase potentially expensive specialized equipment needed to treat 
patients with disabilities and, in fact, such a requirement would impinge on their professional 
autonomy and control. While it would be considered discrimination to refuse care to a patient on 
the basis of disability, it is possible to decline care if specific treatment is incompatible with prior 
professional education or experience (Fisher, 2012). Professional autonomy that does not give 
consideration to the care of specific populations creates problems with access, and control of 
occupational territory means that there are no other viable options for patients. Dentists have a 
monopoly on oral healthcare.  
Professional autonomy and occupational control grant professionals the opportunity to 
increase market viability. According to Starr (1982), occupational control is gained through three 
distinct claims to legitimacy: Knowledge and training validated by the professional community; 
knowledge and training based on rational, scientific grounds; and professional goals based on 
substantive values, primarily service rather than profit. The occupation deserves to exist because 
it serves a great purpose and has been vetted by rigorous scientific training. Using occupational 
control, the profession is able to convert authority into market control and economic power over 
both its services and the organizations that govern the profession (Starr, 1982). Indeed, dental 
schools, medical suppliers, dental business consultations, and insurance companies stand to make 
a profit on the professional authority of dentists. The provision and quality of care for PWD must 
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be evaluated in this economic context. 
Professional Autonomy and Economic Power  
Economic power is based on a standardized professional product and producer; it limits 
market entrance by clearly identifying those who have a claim to the profession based on 
requisite knowledge gained through approved institutions. The rank of a professional can only be 
attained by those who hold certificates or licenses that validate both the content and source of 
their knowledge (Freidson, 1989; Starr, 1982). Limiting market entrance also justifies the 
professional ideal that places the profession above the realm of the market. The sovereignty of 
the consumer is replaced by the sovereignty of the professional (and the community of 
professionals who recognize them) (Starr, 1982).  
Starr and Freidson agree that professional sovereignty is rooted in control of competition 
and product control (both the professional and their service). In this fashion, institutional 
licensing combats the two threats to professional power: Competition and control (Starr, 1982). 
However, Freidson (1982) points out a professional paradox that limits professional control. 
Professionals possess technical autonomy in the performance of their work, but the work is 
limited by resource allocation; they must still work within the economic constraints of the 
organization that employs them. This paradox not only threatens professional control but also 
causes tension between the profession and the institutions that control these resources.  
Habermas: Colonization of Dental Healthcare 
The United States healthcare system can be called a paradox of excess and deprivation. 
Bodenheimer and Grumbach (2012) describe it as a system in which some receive too little care 
and some too much, and the determinants of who receives care and who does not are largely 
based on who has adequate insurance coverage. Medical care and the financing of care are the 
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economic context in which dental professionals must work, and it is a big business. The original 
method of paying or bartering directly for medical treatment has been replaced by payment via 
insurance company. The use of insurance can be viewed as a mass financing system that is 
supposed to ensure that medical professionals are paid and that individuals can obtain the 
medical care they need, regardless of their ability to afford a specific procedure. This system 
removed the need for a doctor to consider a patient’s financial status from provision of care and 
was part of the process of legitimizing the accountability and authority of the professional 
(Stone, 1997). However, the private business context in which insurance operates means there is 
a push toward profitability and the managed care models of healthcare are “treated more and 
more like commodities” (Christiansen, 2017, p. 84). This emphasis on profitability means that 
insurance companies have an economic incentive in denying coverage or care and encouraging 
excessive medication, tests, and procedures to maximize insurance payouts; the bottom line runs 
counter to the access and provision of care (Christiansen, 2017). In line with critical theorists, the 
product of healthcare is manufactured primarily on its value and potential profitability not on its 
ability to satisfy human needs (Held, 1980).  
In an ironic turn, the actions of the medical professionals to safeguard professional 
autonomy through insurance medical financing turned them into highly trained laborers. As 
described by Marx and Friedrich Engels (1888), “these laborers, who must sell themselves 
piecemeal, are a commodity, like every other article of commerce, and are consequently exposed 
to the vicissitudes of competition, to all the fluctuations of the market” (in Erickson & Murphy, 
2001, p. 20). This study will use Habermas’s concept of critical theory, specifically his theory of 
communicative action to evaluate how insurance, as an economic-based system, has colonized 
and destabilized the lifeworld or culture of dental care.  
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Habermas (1987) argues that society can be conceived as two distinct domains: A 
lifeworld and a system. A system, composed of economic and political patterns, does not 
function under individual autonomy, rather its main purpose is the production and circulation of 
goods and services. In fact, the system will often guide people to act in ways of which they are 
unaware, much like institutional ethnography’s concept of social relation. In contrast, the 
lifeworld consists of the marketless areas of social life like family and culture. It is within the 
lifeworld that communicative action takes place and symbolic reproduction, shared social norms, 
morals, and understanding are created (Habermas, 1987). The lifeworld and the system operate 
in mutually constituent and supporting tandem with one another to hold society together 
(Finlayson, 2005). For example, standards of dental health and cosmetic beauty reach a 
consensus in the lifeworld through communicative action, and the system provides a market for 
advertisements and procedures.  
Within the lifeworld, communicative action is constantly taking place and social norms 
are perpetually being (re)created or replaced. Though the system relies on these norms to 
operate, it can intrude or even take over the lifeworld (Finlayson, 2005). Habermas (1987) 
describes this development as colonization of the lifeworld. When this happens, the system takes 
over the social cohesion function of the lifeworld, value making is replaced by various aspects of 
formal rationality, and people become the means of political or economic ends that are not in 
their interest (Habermas, 1987). Medical financing as a system can be viewed as colonizing and 
reinterpreting the communicative action of healthcare. The system emphasizes the role of 
healthcare professionals as the economic producers of healthcare. 
Medical Financing 
Insurance in the United States healthcare system can be divided into public insurance 
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programs like Medicaid and Medicare and two different types of private insurance programs: 
The nonprofit Blue Cross Blue Shield, which uses community ratings to determine participant 
premiums, and for-profit insurances, which use experience premium ratings (Bodenheimer & 
Grumbach, 2012). The problem with experience ratings is that the sick, elderly, and disabled are 
often priced out of insurance participation. Experience rating has undermined any basis of 
distributive justice in insurance participation (Conrad & Leiter, 2013). Public insurance was 
created as a means of combating the problem created by experience rating and, in 1965, 
Medicaid and Medicare were added as amendments to the Social Security Act (Bodenheimer & 
Grumbach, 2012). However, the creation of Medicaid and Medicare did not create 100 percent 
insurability of the United States population and did create a new problem in which the insurance 
companies that acted as intermediaries could increase cost and profitability. The 1970s saw a 
slew of overcrowded nursing homes and Medicaid mills (Conrad & Leiter, 2013). Recent trends 
toward a managed care model of Medicaid have been an attempt to combat rising costs, but it has 
also eroded physician autonomy and influenced the trend toward physicians as businessmen 
(Stone, 1997).  
Medicaid and PWD 
 The use of Medicaid as a public financing option to ameliorate disparate care only 
creates a dual healthcare system; a public payer for the poor and a private-provider model for the 
rich. This system does not create a truly rights-based healthcare system (Christiansen, 2017). 
Medicaid eligibility is categorical. Three main groups are covered: Low-income parents and 
children, elderly, and PWD (Schneider et al., 2002). These three groups typically find themselves 
priced out of private insurance participation, either because their care is so expensive or because 
they cannot afford the premiums. Furthermore, the inclusion of marginalized patients through 
PROFESSIONAL AUTONOMY AND MEDICAID PWD 27 
 
 
Medicaid places a “democratizing pressure in opposition to performativity” (Campbell, 2000, 
p. 133). Anna Yeatman’s theory of the postmodern state demonstrates how policy legitimacy is 
challenged through the inclusion of previously excluded populations. “No such reduction of 
difference as modern liberalism effects, where all individuals come to instantiate a market-
oriented possessive individual, is possible when all human beings have to be encompassed in a 
conception of individualized rights” (Yeatman, 2000, p. 1505). This is especially true when one 
considers that Medicaid is often the primary insurance of PWD. Our dominant biomedical model 
of disease constructs the concept of health as a body free of disease. Within this model, PWD 
will never exist in a body free of disease. This implies that there is something inherently wrong 
with PWD, something which must be fixed (Morris, 2000). Yet, these bodies exist in a market 
context where there is no incentive to spend the additional cost to provide more than basic care 
to a body that cannot be “fixed.” Cost effectiveness does not register or operationalize quality of 
life or human rights. 
Medical Construction of Disability 
Because the focus of this research inquiry is on how dental professionals provide care for 
PWD, it is necessary to also discuss the social construction of disability. Historically, disability 
has been conceptualized within a biomedical model that focuses on the medical diagnosis or 
disability itself (Smart, 2006). The care and services provided to PWD are based on a deficit 
model in which something needs to be cured, fixed, or ameliorated as close to normal as 
possible. This construction of disability and healthcare services for PWD can be directly linked 
to the conceptual framework used in this paper to describe professional autonomy and market 
factors in oral healthcare.  
Related to Foucault’s conception of power and knowledge, the diagnosis of an 
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individual’s disability is reliant on a physician’s medical gaze or use of a codified system of 
measurements to connect groups of symptoms with particular diseases (Krogh & Johnson, 2005). 
This medical gaze legitimizes the professional role and authority of the physician and medical 
profession and their ability to categorize bodies as either aberrant or normal. Once categorized, 
PWD are exposed to continual assessment of their disability in multiple institutions that affect 
their daily life; this includes education, employment, and medical treatment. Within these 
institutions, accommodations and treatment are dependent on a disability diagnosis, disclosure, 
and assessment of necessity. The medical gaze has become an administrative gaze that continues 
to abstract, measure, and classify the disabled body until the individual has been reduced to their 
disability (Krogh & Johnson, 2005). Furthermore, the high level of expertise and training 
required to diagnose a disability increases the presumed scientific credibility that disabilities and 
the difficulties experienced by PWD are solely the result of their medical ailment and not the 
result of social constraints (Smart, 2006).  
Reliance on this medical gaze has unintentionally perpetuated social injustices for PWD. 
Disabilities are more likely to be viewed as solely medical concerns rather than social justice 
concerns. The result of this perception is that healthcare services are often limited to those 
medically necessary with limited consideration of quality of life. For example, Medicaid will not 
financially cover a wheelchair for an individual unless they are physically restricted within their 
home, and their guidelines specifically outline that primary use of a wheelchair is not for leisure 
or recreational activities (CMS, 2004). Similarly, hearing exams, hearing aids, and fittings are 
not covered by Medicaid in 22 states, despite evidence demonstrating its efficacious treatment 
and prevention of other adverse health outcomes like social isolation, falls, hospitalizations, and 
cognitive decline (Arnold et al., 2017). Within oral healthcare, dental treatment for adults 
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covered by Medicaid is often limited and usually limited to tooth extraction (Waldman et al., 
2009). For example, at the time of my observation in Virginia, adult services covered by 
Medicaid are limited to emergency services only, meaning emergency exams or extractions. 
Services like routine exams, preventive cleanings, restorative services, periodontal services, 
dentures, and oral surgery are not covered for adult Medicaid recipients (Shapiro, 2008). By 
limiting coverage, issues like self-esteem, employability, disease prevention, and poor quality of 
life can become additional stressors for a PWD reliant on Medicaid for health insurance.  
Within the biomedical model, the inability to leave one’s home and social isolation are 
not considered medically related conditions because these concerns are not bodily manifestations 
of a disease or disability. In contrast, a social model interprets disability as a result of a social 
system that bars full participation of PWD (Oliver & Barnes, 1998). Services would not be 
limited to the medical and would instead look at systems as opposed to the individual. For 
example, vocational rehabilitation has moved away from a deficit biomedical model where PWD 
were once assessed for employability to a capabilities social model that recognizes the value of 
individualized supports in maintaining employment. PWD who desire to work are provided job 
support services like onsite training, job restructuring, and assistive technology to be employed 
in community-based jobs; this is a departure from previous segregationist models that assumed 
that PWD were not capable of working traditional jobs (Dague, 2012; Migliore et al., 2007). This 
model recognizes that typical human resource systems prevent participation of PWD in the 
workforce. In response, other systems, like supported employment, have been created to allow 
for participation of PWD in the workforce. This model is reinforced by legislation like the 
federal Workforce Innovation Opportunity Act (WIOA) and Virginia’s Employment First policy, 
both of which state that community-based employment should be the first option of employment 
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for PWD (Murthy et al., 2016; Stehle, 2014).  
Furthermore, legislation like WIOA reinforces educational legislation like the Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) (2004), which mandates individualized services to 
students in the least restrictive environment. Gone are the days when students with disabilities 
were segregated from their peers in either specialty schools or hidden classrooms. In special 
education, proponents of a reconceptualization of the meaning of disability and special education 
practices form the basis of Disability Studies in Education (DSE) and argue the need to move 
from a medical deficit model to a social model that addresses the meaning of disability in a 
social and cultural context. Central to their argument is that disability is an idea rather than a 
thing and to place value or identify differences upon a person because of their disability is to 
make a value-based social judgement (Baglieri et al., 2011). DSE scholars recognize that the 
formulation of special education and early legislations was in the early days of disability studies 
and, therefore, the medical model is embedded in much of that legislation (Baglieri et al., 2011).  
Unfortunately, most institutions continue to operate within the biomedical model. 
Furthermore, PWD submit to this construction of disability through their participation and 
reliance on institutions. A 2002 report from The Council of Canadians with Disabilities identified 
that the most common reason PWD went to a physician was to seek documentation of their 
disability to receive supports and services rather than medical treatment itself (in Krogh & 
Johnson, 2005). For example, in the metro Richmond area, PWD who apply for the Greater 
Richmond Transit Company (GRTC) para-transportation service Carevan, must submit a medical 
evaluation from a physician indicating that their disability prevents them from riding regular 
public transportation (ADAride.com). The acceptance and reliance of the biomedical model of 
disability has stunted acceptance of a social construction of disability.  
PROFESSIONAL AUTONOMY AND MEDICAID PWD 31 
 
 
Habermas’s communicative action theory is also applicable to the way disability has been 
conceptualized within the medical field. This is especially noticeable when the historical context 
of Medicaid expansion is considered. Prior to Medicaid expansion in 1973, most PWD were 
reliant on segregated institutions and public charity (Master & Taniguchi, 1996). At this time, 
programs that pushed for the inclusion of PWD were essentially nonexistent, as care was not 
seen as an entitlement for PWD. At the time of Medicaid expansion, there was not a cohesive 
disability-rights movement but the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) decision to include 
entitlement programs for PWD was born out of surveys from 1960, 1966, and 1972, detailing 
how PWD were poorer and had greater out-of-pocket expenses, higher burdens of illness, less 
private insurance, and more unmet needs (Master & Taniguchi, 1996). The political climate 
during Medicaid expansion is important because it reveals not only how disabilities were 
conceptualized but also the theoretical models used to address the amelioration of disparities in 
care.  
Counsell and Agran (2012) describe how the model of Liberal Egalitarian Equity in the 
1960s paved the way for programs like Head Start, Title 1, Bilingual Education Act of 1968, 
Education of All Handicapped Children’s Act of 1975, and Special Olympics. They propose that 
the Liberal Egalitarian conception of distributive justice created programs to assist disadvantaged 
groups by giving them access to previously denied resources. However, the meritocracy ideal 
rooted in American culture continued to place emphasis on individual ability and effort. Once 
resources are equitably distributed, success or failure is entirely dependent on the individual. 
However, when disabilities are viewed within a deficit model, distribution of resources will not 
restore a disabled body to one without a disability. As previously discussed, inclusion of 
previously excluded populations can test and strain policy legitimacy and distributive justice 
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(Yeatman, 2000). This perpetuation of meritocracy ideals and a biomedical model of disability 
results in programs like Special Olympics, which ultimately encourage disability awareness 
without necessarily increasing inclusion. In fact, the personal trial of finding a knowledgeable 
and willing dentist to provide care for Rosemary Kennedy, the sister of Eunice Shriver, is what 
led to the inception of the Healthy Athletes initiative within Special Olympics (Waldman et al., 
2009). Healthy Athletes offers Special Olympics athletes eye, ear, feet, and teeth exams on a 
voluntary basis with no charge. The dental part of the exam is called Special Smiles and 
comprises a dental exam, fabrication of mouth guard, oral health and nutrition education, and 
referrals to community dental providers (Bissar et al., 2010; Waldman et al., 2006). The Healthy 
Athletes program serves as an avenue to provide education and training to volunteer healthcare 
providers on the health needs and best practices for treating PWDs (Waldman et al., 2006). At 
face value, the Healthy Athletes program appears to meet a medical need of the community. 
However, it can also be viewed as a reinterpretation of institutionalized medical care, in which a 
captured audience is provided care rather than addressing how to increase community medical 
access and inclusion. Though an important leap forward at its inception, it can now be argued 
that Special Olympics may be more harmful for PWD. 
 In fact, Counsell and Agran (2012) argue that the segregationist model of Special 
Olympics perpetuates handicapism or the bias that someone’s unequal or unjust state is 
warranted by their disability and that volunteer roles like “huggers” infantilize PWD. This 
process reveals how the medical deficit model can be expressed and perpetuated in social 
programs. Using communicative theory, Counsell and Agran (2012) discuss how the monetary 
and legal systems that sustain Special Olympics have colonized Special Olympics and prevented 
the organization from responding to contemporary lifeway conceptualizations of disability. 
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Despite the movement of disability rights toward a practice of community and social inclusion, 
Special Olympics continues to operate on a segregationist model.  
A similar model can be applied to medical care of PWD. Like Special Olympics, 
Medicaid expansion occurred in response to the Civil Rights movement and operated on a 
distributive justice ideal. The role of Medicaid as a primary insurance for PWD is indicative of 
lifeway values that having a disability should not preclude one from accessing medical care. 
However, the restrictive nature of Medicaid coverage implies the limited societal participation 
expectations of PWD. The administrative and regulatory nature of Medicaid preauthorization and 
reimbursement support and maintain these lifeway values. Over time, the administrative policies 
and practices put in place to administer Medicaid care have created a self-perpetuating system 
that is restrictive and unyielding to changing perceptions of inclusion of PWD. As attitudes about 
PWD shift toward inclusion, the regulatory nature of Medicaid colonizes medical care and 
treatment of PWD away from emerging social models of disability as witnessed in vocational 
rehabilitation and special education.  
The complexities of professional autonomy within a market system trickle down into 
patient care. As demonstrated in this literature review, care of PWD butt up against market 
viability in both the context of insurance profitability and professional market viability. The 
research methodology outlined in Chapter 3 seeks to connect the local setting of dental offices 
with the translocal context of state Medicaid and healthcare economics.  
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CHAPTER 3: Method of Approach 
Research Question 
How does dental professional autonomy in a market-based system affect provision of care 
for Medicaid patients with disabilities? 
Research Design 
This study employed a qualitative research methodology to investigate interoffice 
decisions and bureaucratic constraints that affect Medicaid program participation, access, and 
provision of care to patients with disabilities. A qualitative approach was chosen for this research 
based on the elusive nature of what factors define professional autonomy and contribute to 
decision making and an interest in the lived experiences of individuals working within those 
environments. A primary strength of qualitative methodology is its inductive approach or ability 
to focus on context, people, and language rather than on the numerical emphasis of quantitative 
analysis (Maxwell, 2005). Thus, a qualitative approach helped to elucidate the role of 
professional autonomy in the use and interpretation of federal, state, and office policies. This 
interpretation of policy became the crucial bridge between policy creation and implementation 
that directly affected the provision of care of PWD. If and how market factors affected decision 
making were more readily revealed from data collected through observation and conversation 
with individuals who shared their experiences in their own words, compared to what would have 
been gathered from statistical analysis of predetermined responses. As previously discussed, 
Medicaid participation is relatively inelastic to rate changes (Scheffler et al., 1996); an 
ethnographic qualitative analysis shed more light on economic or noneconomic factors that 
contributed to marginal costs or program satisfaction from a provider’s perspective. For example, 
the administrative difference between private insurance and Medicaid would not have revealed 
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itself had I not been present to observe and talk to participants.  
Furthermore, study participants may not be fully aware of how professional autonomy 
and market decisions drive and perpetuate provision of care decisions. Here, an institutional 
ethnography framework revealed how seemingly individual decisions are driven by institutional 
organizations and powers (Campbell & Gregor, 2004). I do not believe I would have arrived at 
the analysis and conclusions presented in Chapter 6 had I not used an institutional ethnography 
framework, as my analysis hinged on drawing the social relations that participants operated 
within but did not directly express to me. Institutional ethnography is designed as a means of 
understanding how people are subjected to regimes of power and how, in understanding these 
ruling relations, one can identify discrepancies between individual life experiences and 
administrative or categorizing systems (Smith, 2006). The social relations, ruling relations, and 
disjunctures I describe in Chapters 4 and 5 relied on my use of an institutional ethnography 
framework and lens for analysis. 
Data Collection 
The following sections detail unique aspects of data collection when conducting an 
institutional ethnography. Specifically, descriptions and explanations of my chosen standpoint 
and local settings are provided, as well as texts collected at first and second levels of data.  
Standpoint. Rankin (2017a) discusses the need to adopt a standpoint when conducting 
institutional ethnography. By adopting a standpoint, I am identifying “where a group of people 
are positioned, within a complex regime of institutions and governance” (p. 2). From my chosen 
standpoint, I observed the work, tensions, and conflicts that arose for these individuals. It is this 
account of work that I analyzed for social construction and connections to ruling relations. It is 
important to stress that adopting a standpoint is not simply identifying a perspective. In fact, data 
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collection and analysis included accounts of how other people within a regime are organized and 
interact with the chosen standpoint. The standpoint selected for this research study is that of 
dental professionals. This standpoint was selected because the heart of the study rests on 
understanding what policies encouraged or discouraged both Medicaid participation and 
provision of care for patients with disabilities. In Chapter 4, I detail how my chosen standpoint 
contributed to my final analysis and understanding of ruling relations that affect dental provision. 
Local Setting. Because the goal was not to generalize findings to a larger population but 
to more deeply examine the ways that larger forces shape individual decision making, the 
research study is designed as a two-site ethnography and used criterion purposeful sampling to 
identify the appropriate sites for the research question. Inquiry into the problematic focused on 
dentist office staff; their actions; and the use of texts, such as new patient forms, insurance 
authorization requests, and billing documentation that make visible the disjunction described in 
Chapter 2. The research goal was to explicate experiences beyond a local setting and, because 
Medicaid covers two different levels of care for pediatric and adult patients, two observation 
sites were needed. The observation sites were a pediatric dental provider and an adult general 
dental provider. Both of these sites accepted Medicaid along with a variety of other insurance 
plans and had a high population of patients with disabilities. Observations and interviews at these 
locations constituted the first or entry-level data that focused on the local setting and the 
experiences of individuals who interacted in these settings. In addition, I interviewed one general 
dentist who was a non-Medicaid provider in order to compare and contrast the data collected at 
the local settings. 
Accessibility and location were areas of interest based on the literature review identifying access 
to community-based providers as a barrier for PWD. Prior to deinstitutionalization, it was 
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common practice for dentists to attend to patients in facilities. Now, finding and getting to dental 
providers willing to treat patients with disabilities can be difficult (Fisher, 2012; Norwood & 
Slayton, 2013; Waldman et al., 2009). Luckily, the observation sites were in geographically 
different locations. The pediatric dental office was located in a fast-growing suburban area west 
of the metro Richmond area. At the time of this observation, GRTC did not extend as far west as 
the location of this provider, and there are currently no known plans to expand. However, the 
location was accessible for specialized transportation, which expands past the typical bus route. 
The general dental provider office was located in an established area on the southern end of the 
metro Richmond area. The location of this particular office meant that it was accessible to 
patients who lived in the city and relied on public transportation1 and easily accessible for 
residents from more affluent surrounding areas who used private transportation. However, this 
office would not have been easily accessible to patients who lived in the nearby county who did 
not have access to private transportation as the bus route does not extend into the county, and 
there is no county public transportation. Though I did not see the office location of the non-
Medicaid provider, she reported that accessibility, public transportation, and proximity to other 
health and dental safety nets did not factor into her decision on where to set up her practice. See 
Figure 2 for a map of the GRTC system map.  
                                               
1I refrain from saying this location is easily accessible to city residents who rely on public transportation as 
the walk from the nearest bus stop is not pedestrian friendly. It lacks crosswalks across a major road and does not 
have sidewalks. The topography of the location could also present challenges to someone with a physical disability. 
 




2 GRTC System Map 
 
Access to the site was obtained through professional recommendations and formal 
requests. A brief proposal on the nature of the research and my process was developed for 
submission to prospective observation sites. Based on guidelines suggested in Bogdan and 
Biklen (2007) and in Patton (2015), the proposal addressed why the site was chosen, observation 
activities, any disruptions the office may experience, benefits to the observation site, and how the 
research findings will be reported (see Appendix A). I was exceedingly lucky in that the dental 
providers I contacted were eager to participate and did not have the hesitation I expected. In fact, 
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one observation site said they wanted to know what I discovered so they could convince more 
dental providers to also accept Medicaid. Ultimately, one site was secured with the assistance of 
another researcher at VCU, and the other site was secured through professional contacts in my 
vocational rehabilitation work. The last non-Medicaid provider interview was secured through a 
personal connection.  
During data collection, texts such as patient intake forms, patient forms, school notes, 
disclaimers, preauthorizations, and billing forms were collected for analysis. Because the goal 
was to identify how these texts perpetuated ruling relations, blank documents were collected. 
Any documents with patient information were redacted. To map social relations, data collection 
must expand beyond the local setting. Observations of contrasting insurance and patient 
interactions were essential for collecting level two data based on the institutional ethnography 
assumption that settings are organized and ruled in ways that are invisible to participants. 
Therefore, discussion of patient care was not limited to patients with disabilities using Medicaid 
as their primary insurance. To understand the role of Medicaid as a text, it was necessary to 
contrast Medicaid-based interactions with private insurance or cash-based interactions. At both 
observation sites, I observed and clarified differences via conversation with participants between 
Medicaid and private insurance patients, patients with disabilities and those without disabilities, 
and patients with disabilities using private insurance versus using Medicaid. Understanding this 
complex landscape of insurance coverage was key to understanding ruling relations and how 
they extend beyond the local setting.  
Furthermore, data collection cannot be limited to the local setting to answer the question, 
“what are the connections across and beyond the boundaries of this setting and how are they 
enacted by actual people?” (Campbell & Gregor, 2004, p. 61). Therefore, I accessed publicly 
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available events to further enmesh myself into the standpoint of dental providers. I attended a 
training entitled “Special Needs Dentistry—You Can Do It!” organized by Virginia Dental 
Association (VDA), Virginia Health Catalyst (then Virginia Oral Health Coalition), Virginia 
Department of Health (VDH), and Virginia Dental Association Foundation (VDAF) on January 
26, 2019. I observed a public meeting of the Dental Advisory Committee (DAC) on May 17, 
2019, where I listened to stakeholders from Department of Medical Assistance Services 
(DMAS), DentaQuest, VDA, and Virginia Health Catalyst provide updates and discuss Medicaid 
access and use in Virginia. I registered and attended sessions at the 2020 Virginia Oral Health 
Summit. Finally, I registered for the Adult Benefit Update webinar hosted by Virginia Health 
Catalyst, DMAS, and DentaQuest on February 3, 2021. Because these observations were not 
local settings with participants who had consented to participate in my study, I do not include 
any quotes from these observations unless it is information that is available for citation in 
webinars or presentations. These observations assisted with my final analysis by helping me 
draw connections between what I observed at the local setting and what information was being 
shared at the institutional level. Furthermore, research into Medicaid and relevant legislation 
provided level two data, or “the missing organizational details of how the setting works” 
(Campbell & Gregor, 2004, p. 60).  
Observation. In institutional ethnography, data collection cannot be limited to surveys or 
researcher-generated questions as the hope is to understand the everyday life experience of 
participants. Beyond recording conversations and observations, I had to identify the way of 
talking that participants used to convey their expertise—for that is the template through which 
one demonstrates their understanding and belonging to an institution (Campbell & Gregor, 
2004). Recognizing this language allowed me, as the researcher, to dig down to what is actually 
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happening and what triggered those actions. For example, during my observations, I would stop 
and ask participants to explain terminology I was not familiar with. This was the case with 
downgrading or downcoding that I write extensively on in Chapter 4. Though the term 
downcoding has a communicative implication, it was a colloquial term with a specific definition 
to participants. 
Based on best practices suggested in Bogdan and Biklen (2007), I gradually increased 
time in the field for each observation. This slow increase reduced disruption to the observation 
site, maintained discretion, and allowed myself to build rapport with participants. Time spent in 
the field did not exceed what can be noted or transcribed immediately following observation. 
Data continued to be collected until the problematic was made visible and I reached data 
saturation. For both locations, I started my observation at no more than 1 hour and extended it to 
3 hours by the end of my time at each site. Between December 2018 and February 2019, I 
observed a total of 10 hours at the pediatric dental office. Between July 2019 to August 2019, I 
observed a total of 9 hours at the general dental office.  
Participants. To capture a comprehensive representation of the dental offices, research 
participants included administrative staff as well as dentists and dental hygienists. All 
participants were approached in a private setting at the observation sites, where the research 
intent, benefits, and potential risks of participating were shared with them. All but one individual 
agreed to sign the informed consent form to participate in the study. 
At the pediatric dental office, a total of nine individuals participated. They consisted of 
one dentist, one clinical lead, and seven administrative staff. Five of the nine participants were 
approached as key informants while on site. Three of these five conducted an additional 
interview with me. Some participants were observed in their work but their comments or actions 
PROFESSIONAL AUTONOMY AND MEDICAID PWD 42 
 
 
are not included in my final analysis, so they will remain unnamed. The participants who 
contributed to the final analysis have been assigned the pseudonyms: Dr. Calvin, Jessica, Gwen, 
Camilia, and Stella. At the general dental office, seven individuals participated. They consisted 
of two doctors and five administrative staff. Five of the seven were approached as key 
informants on site, and three of these five conducted an additional interview with me. As this was 
a smaller practice than the pediatric office, all participants had either conversations or 
observations included in my analysis. They have been assigned the pseudonyms: Dr. Andy, Dr. 
Grant, Tricia, Karlee, Danica, Alexis, and Katherine. One non-Medicaid provider 
participated in an interview only for this study. This provider has been assigned the pseudonym 
Dr. Karen. Because of the small sample of my participants and the limited number of dental 
providers in the Richmond area that accept Medicaid, I have elected to not associate racial 
indicators with each participant to protect their confidentiality. I will, however, say that as an 
aggregate, my sample was overwhelming White. Out of the total 17 participants, only two were 
racial minorities.  
All observations with participants took place in the natural setting, in this case, a dental 
office. Observations in a natural setting ensured that I was able to collect information and 
observe behavior within the research context. Because of the nature of the observation setting 
and lack of required credentials or education, I was on the observation end of the observer-
participant spectrum. Though I did not participate in administrative tasks, despite offering, I was 
able to observe, take notes, and ask questions as participants went about their daily tasks. My 
observation was limited to the front desk area, and I did not observe clinical treatment. However, 
conversations and clinical notes about treatment were often discussed in the front office between 
dentists, hygienists, and administrative staff. In this manner, I was able to observe the flow of 
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information and text through the offices. The pattern of my interaction was typically to observe 
from afar when participants were interacting with patients and to follow up with detailed 
questions when they did not have customer service duties. These detailed conversations took 
place with key informants on site.  
Interviews. A preliminary script was developed to approach key informants who were 
asked to provide insight into the social patterns and experiences that would otherwise be 
unavailable to me (see Appendix B). In accordance with institutional ethnography, participants at 
each site were interviewed primarily using an ethnographic interviewing or conversationalist 
approach. Key informants approached on site were engaged in conversation to explain office and 
administrative tasks. These information interviews were driven by what was observed on site. 
Emphasis was placed on understanding how one performs their work. To understand how 
decisions were made, justified, and recorded, it was required that I question their work and 
deconstruct the process. In addition, defining and avoiding jargon revealed institutional shortcuts 
that aided me in escaping institutional capture, a phenomenon where I as a researcher begin to be 
“swayed by the apparent rationalities of dominant forms of knowledge—that most often arise in 
a standpoint of ruling” (Rankin. 2017b, p. 2). When captured, one is less likely to understand 
how knowledge is generated or activated and how different forms of knowledge often interact in 
contradictory ways.  
How language is used to interpret policy, including the written record of the interview, 
can be analyzed through a hermeneutic lens. The act of the interview itself creates a text that is to 
be interpreted (Patton, 2015). Therefore, interviews also used social constructionist interviewing 
and hermeneutic interviewing techniques. Social constructionist techniques acknowledge the 
context of each interview and my contribution to the production of knowledge, while 
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hermeneutic techniques will clarify my interpretation of the participants’ responses. To 
encompass all three approaches, the interviews were active so that meaning was constructed via 
interaction. This open active approach meant that instrumentation was informal, conversational 
interviews. As expected, I was able to interview participants in a way that naturally occurred 
during my observations. Because opportunities to discuss institutional procedures can arise 
serendipitously, I followed the advice of DeVault and McCoy (2006) and conceptualized 
interviews more as “talking to people.” During these conversational interviews, I took copious 
notes and occasionally, with permission, audio recordings of our conversations for later 
transcription. I was not able to do this for all conversational interviews like when patient details 
were being discussed or when patients were present, such as when I sat with Tricia and observed 
her assist a patient. 
If it was determined that a key informant was able to provide a deeper level of 
understanding or insight into professional autonomy, office policies, or policy implementations, 
they were approached to conduct a more extensive interview off site. General question topics 
were created for consistency between participants (see Appendix C). To maintain participant 
confidentiality and validity, participants were given the option to hold interviews and discussions 
in private or off site. All participants approached for an interview conducted it either after office 
hours or at a location off site. Consideration for a participant’s comfort was important to 
minimize the chance that participants will simply repeat formal office policies or narratives 
beholden to office politics and power structures. Though the general question topics were 
followed as a guide for consistency, some participants skipped questions that were outside their 
purview or focused their responses on certain topics of their interest. Often, responses to a 
question would generate follow-up questions, or onsite observations were fleshed out in more 
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detail during these interviews. However, data collected from key informants was analyzed with 
the knowledge that overreliance on these data can result in biased perspectives (Patton, 2015). 
With participant permission, interviews were audio recorded for later transcription. The 
following table of key informants provides participant pseudonym, role, location and whether or 






Because this research study focused on the institutional organization of dental practices 
and did not require the interaction or collection of data from a vulnerable population, the 
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research study was approved as Expedited Review according to 45 CFR 46.110 and Categories 6 
and 7 (see Appendix D). 
The problematic of this study focused on organizational factors that affect provision of 
care. Therefore, access to specific patient documents and information were not required. 
However, since I did observe the discussion of patient care, ethical considerations were made in 
the collection and reporting of data. Participants were assigned aliases to protect their anonymity, 
and observation sites are simply referred to as pediatric dental office or general dental office. 
Participant aliases were used in lieu of names during data collection to mitigate potential 
problems with unauthorized access to field notes, which to my knowledge, did not occur. 
Any unique identifying features of either the location or participants were not reported. 
Because dental providers accepting Medicaid in the Richmond and surrounding areas are easily 
researchable online, I chose not to provide participant information beyond an alias that implies 
gender or gender identity. Not identifying the observational site protects patient and staff 
confidentiality and mitigated any potential legal risk assessment that may arise in sharing billing 
processes. Furthermore, I obtained a Certificate of Confidentiality (CoC) (see Appendix E) to 
protect the identity of my research participants. To obtain documents demonstrating insurance 
pre-authorization and billing practices, there were a few occasions in which I collected patients’ 
documents. However, all patient information was redacted by office staff before I was allowed to 
leave the premises with it. All hardcopies of collected data or identifying documents were stored 
in a locked safe, to which only I had access. All interview transcripts, memos, and notes were 
stored on my secure VCU Google Drive. 
To obtain a full picture of the observation site, observations and discussions took place 
not only with dentists but also with their support staff. Participant anonymity was not only an 
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ethical responsibility but also a requirement for an accurate analysis. Anonymity between 
participants was also important so that participants may feel more comfortable openly discussing 
their opinions or frustrations. An administrative assistant will not share his or her feelings about a 
time they disagreed with another employee or dentist if it is possible that information could be 
relayed back to that individual. Therefore, the importance of confidentiality was discussed with 
all participants during the data collection process. However, I found that there was little 
disagreement between my interview participants in overall themes. Frequently, one participant 
would suggest I interview another participant to glean more detail into specific questions or 
observations. Regardless, it is still my hope that this expression increased participant confidence 
and that data collection was not influenced. Existing power relations in the office were taken into 
account, but all participant experiences were equally considered, analyzed, and used to further 
inquiry.  
Data Analysis 
The following section details how my data analysis evolved when using an institutional 
ethnography approach. 
From Ethnography to Explication  
Analysis began and continued throughout the data collection phase. Often data analysis 
began with blank text collected and analyzed in the field. Texts in particular are important 
because texts coordinate a participant’s experience (Deveau, 2009). Unlike other ethnographic 
analyses that seek to analyze how individualized experience can be generalized, institutional 
ethnography analysis aims to explicate the social relations particular to a setting (Campbell & 
Gregor, 2004). Texts and the analysis of texts and their use shed light on their role in controlling 
or perpetuating ruling relations.  
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The analysis of interviews, conversations, observations, and texts began with an initial 
coding to construct how participants observed and described their work. Coding and 
categorization of codes followed analytic memoing, as described in Charmaz (2006) and Saldana 
(2016). This analytic memoing was key in helping me identify my own presumptions, focusing 
on what stood out to me the most prior to reviewing notes and transcripts, and recognizing the 
institution in which I was captured. I go further into detail about my own institutional capture in 
Chapter 4. Special attention was paid to in vivo codes generated by a participant’s language and 
special terms as related to the work they perform. For example, personal responsibility, time, and 
downcoding were all in vivo codes generated from conversations and interviews with 
participants. NVivo software was used to organize field notes and index codes and to facilitate 
analysis. See Appendix F for my codebook exported from NVivo.  
In institutional ethnography, analysis is not limited to the themes generated by people in 
their lived experiences; it expands from the local setting to the translocal setting to identify how 
institutional powers and social relations create the experiences described in the first level 
analysis. Indeed, I found that my analysis process using an institutional ethnography framework 
differed from previous qualitative studies I had conducted. Like previous studies, I used NVivo 
to facilitate my initial coding by indexing codes and assigning text, but my analysis process 
differed when I reached what would have been second cycle coding. Rather than synthesizing my 
codes into categories—as would have been the goal with focused, axial, or theoretical coding 
(Saldana, 2016)—I organized my codes around their relationships with one another. When did 
codes draw relationships to insurance providers, office staff, patients, or (as I was surprised to 
see so prominently in my data) employers? By focusing on relationships between codes, I was 
able to start to see the ways in which social relations were organized. As expected, analysis at the 
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first or local level revealed higher ruling relations at the second or translocal level, and texts 
served as the linking clue. A primary example of this was the two-way street created by 
preauthorizations from insurance companies to dental providers approving treatment plans and 
the billing codes used by dental providers to communicate what treatment was provided to 
insurance companies. Both of these texts used alphanumeric codes to represent treatment 
services and a lexicon that is difficult for most laypeople to translate. For example, how much 
sense does a typical explanation of benefits (EOB) make to most people? These recorded 
experiences of my participants informed what additional research I conducted, such as the public 
observation of advocacy committees, webinars, and conferences and the reading of Medicaid 
member books, ADA-produced literature and legislative agendas, and state bill proposals.  
The goal of this initial analysis was to identify patterns in participant experience at the 
local setting and connect them to larger social relations. For example, Mary Otto (2017) 
describes how oral healthcare has become separated from medical care, and ailments related to 
oral healthcare are seen as the result of poor personal hygiene or prevention as opposed to the 
inevitability of illness or disease. In institutional ethnography, the second level analysis would 
seek to understand the ways in which medical and dental education, insurances, provider 
networks, and patient actions create and perpetuate the concept that a patient alone is culpable 
for poor oral health. This linking of micro experiences to macro institutions is the unique 
analysis approach of institutional ethnography.  
This kind of analysis uses what informants know and what they are observed doing for 
the analytic purpose of identifying, tracing, and describing the social relations that extend 
beyond the boundaries of any one informant’s experience. “An institutional ethnography must 
therefore include research into these elements of social organization that connect the local setting 
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and the local experiences to sites outside the experimental setting” (Campbell & Gregor, 2004, 
p. 90). 
As expected, secondary analysis led to further investigation of Medicaid organization at 
the state level, but it did not extend to the federal level as I had surmised it might. What it 
unexpectedly also led to was further investigation into dental insurance practice, which extended 
to the national level. Concept mapping was used to illustrate the connections between the local 
setting and organizational structure (see Chapter 4).  
Prior to beginning my analysis, I created a list of a priori codes that included concepts 
such as treating care as a commodity, pricing care, and identifying patients. However, my 
analysis did not develop as expected and my deductive codes gave way to inductive codes. For 
example, I had conceptualized care as a commodity as times when participants discuss or reduce 
care to a monetary value. What inductive coding revealed was that opaque managed care plans 
were less likely to make providers see care as a commodity because their reimbursement varied 
from patient to patient depending on their agreed fee schedule with an insurance company. 
Rather, it was providers themselves who were commodified by patients; providers became 
interchangeable units within a patient’s insurance network. Though pricing care had been 
conceptualized as fee negotiation and setting, my observation revealed that this was an area in 
which dental providers had little to no professional autonomy, and this code morphed into 
economic power. Finally, identifying patients had been conceptualized as provider acceptance of 
new patients and identifying patients with disabilities. Returning to the evolution of care as a 
commodity, it became evident during my analysis that this concept was better represented by two 
separate codes: patient selection through insurance and provider selection through insurance. 
This new conception recognized the power exchange between dental providers and patients 
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within an agreed to social relation.  
These inductive codes connected the work performed by staff to the theoretical concepts 
of professional autonomy and market factors. As expected, codes specific to Medicaid providers 
developed during the data collection and analysis process. What was unexpected was how much 
time I would spend combing through and analyzing data related to private insurance. Upon 
entering my research, I expected that I would not be able to tell the story of dental healthcare for 
patients with disabilities without also telling the story of Medicaid. What became evident very 
quickly into my observation was that I could not tell the story of Medicaid without also telling 
the story of private insurance.  
My conceptual framework further informed my data analysis by connecting how 
replicable texts used by dental staff were connected to theoretical concepts like power and 
knowledge, Habermas’s communicative action, and conceptualization of disabilities. Identifying 
ruling relations made it possible for me to connect institutional ways of thinking to the day-to-
day experiences of dental professionals. For example, how professional knowledge of fluoride 
treatment was filtered through insurance as an institution to dictate treatment. Furthermore, these 
connections to institutional power allowed me to recognize the importance of bureaucracy as a 
theme when it came to how work was recorded and redefined by institutional powers. See Figure 
3 for a visual representation of how institutional ethnography was used as a filter to analyze and 
connect data from the local setting to institutions within the conceptual framework.  




3 Concept Map of Data Collection Within Conceptual Framework 
 
Reflexivity  
Because qualitative research is interpretive research, it is important for me, as the key 
instrument, to acknowledge pre-existing biases, personal background, and values that may 
influence data interpretation (Charmaz, 2006; Creswell, 2009; Maxwell 2005). Though I do not 
have personal experience in the dental profession, I do have preconceived notions regarding 
health access and quality of care as a disability advocate in vocational rehabilitation and 
transition research. My professional experience has exposed me to the difficulties PWD have in 
accessing and receiving dental care for reasons ranging from lack of transportation to inability to 
find a Medicaid provider, especially if the person in question is an adult. I knew this experience 
and the frustration and trauma of individuals I worked with would be carried with me into my 
research. 
When engaging in data collection, I memoed my reactions to observations and contrasted 
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it with my own professional experience. Memoing helped me identify a few aspects of my own 
personal experience that could have biased my analysis. First, I realized that my familiarity with 
PWD and a span of disabilities was rather unique. For example, it became very apparent at the 
dental training I attended for second level data collection that interaction with PWD happened 
few and far between for most of the other participants in the training. During data collection, I 
sought negative cases and actively pursued narratives that did not affirm my pre-existing 
prejudices. However, this was achieved primarily during my interviews with key informants, 
mostly because it had been built into my interview tool. When at the observation sites, I did not 
always actively pursue negative cases because I was focused more on simply understanding the 
work that was happening around me. After I completed all data collection and immersed myself 
in analysis, I also took the time to memo my thoughts on where my initial analysis was heading 
and how it related to my preconceived notions heading into this research. In Chapter 4, I detail 
how analysis from the standpoint of dental providers required an epistemological shift for me 
and how my inexperience in dental care was a benefit when doing this.  
Validity  
I employed a number of strategies to help reduce threats to validity, which included 
reflexive memoing, identification of preconceived notions, and collection of rich data (including 
negative cases). In addition to the collection of rich data, triangulation of data collection was 
achieved by conducting interviews, observations, and document review. However, triangulation 
alone is not sufficient to increase validity (Maxwell, 2005). Therefore, I conducted regular 
analytical memoing as a reflexive exercise throughout the data collection and analysis process. 
Respondent validation was also conducted regularly during data collection to confirm that 
researcher interpretations were not limited to confirming world-view narratives. My goal was to 
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achieve validation naturally during the interview process by asking participants if my 
interpretations of responses were accurate. This style allowed for a fluid validation process that 
provided further opportunities for additional discussion. Often discussion of past or present 
legislation arose from such respondent validations. Furthermore, respondent validation was 
frequently used to define jargon. This was how I learned the definitions of predeterminations, 
preauthorizations, downcoding, recalls, and roles and responsibilities among dentists, hygienists, 
and assistants.  
Limitations  
Potential limitations of this study are that this research was conducted as a two-site 
ethnography. Though I did include one non-Medicaid provider as an interview participant, it is 
important to note that the results of my study should not be generalized to all dental providers. 
Other Medicaid providers may have reasons or methods of participating other than what my 
participants shared, and similarly, other non-Medicaid providers may have other reasons for not 
participating than what my participant shared. Furthermore, the context of this study is highly 
dependent on the legislative landscape of Virginia. Other states may have even more limiting 
Medicaid coverage or comprehensive coverage, and the experience of providers in those states 
will be very different from what is reported here.  
As an ethnography, there is also the potential overreliance on key informants. Though I 
had multiple key informants in a variety of positions at each site, their influence in their positions 
could also shape the office culture, and I may have missed additional insights others could have 
provided. However, I will say that the experiences expressed by my key informants never 
conflicted in any substantial way, even across sites. In addition, there is always the risk that 
participants will provide socially acceptable responses, even when confidentiality is expressed. 
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However, responses and observations led me to address in Chapter 6 a need to include cultural 
competency and implicit bias training to dental professionals and their staff. Therefore, I do not 
believe that participants only stated socially acceptable responses to my questions.  
I have already addressed the need to recognize the context of this study occurring in 
Richmond, Virginia. Initially, I was concerned that Medicaid participation would be influenced 
by proximity to Medical College of Virginia (MCV) and the dental school, as MCV’s role in 
providing care to area individuals in need could decrease local participation. Originally, my 
assumption was that Medicaid practitioners in the Richmond area were unique when compared 
to Medicaid practitioners in other areas; perhaps they felt a calling to serve this population more 
strongly than others. However, I do not believe this was the case for my participants as none said 
it influenced their decision to participate, and one site actually frequently received patient 
referrals from the school. This does not, however, mean that other participants in the area do not 
assume that low income or patients with disabilities will be served by MCV or other local 
nonprofits and other federally qualified health centers (FQHC) like Daily Planet. These dental 
providers may feel that there are sufficient or better safety nets for Medicaid patients or patients 
with significant disabilities. However, I must acknowledge that accessing dental healthcare in an 
urban environment like Richmond may be substantially different compared to more rural areas. 
Therefore, the geographic context of this study is also a limiting factor. 
Finally, the timing of my study places my analysis in a very specific context that may or 
may not be relevant into the near future. Beginning in late 2017, Virginia began to offer limited 
dental services to adults who are dually eligible for Medicaid and Medicare through their new 
Commonwealth Coordinated Care Plus (CCC+) program (DMAS, 2017). My research study 
took place primarily in 2018 and 2019 and what I was able to capture was a shaky and 
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uncoordinated rollout that left many providers and patients confused about coverage and how to 
participate in CCC+. Though I did not find the landscape of Medicaid participation tremendously 
altered based on observation and interviews, there is a new change on the horizon that could 
have a resounding impact on Medicaid participation in Virginia: Adult comprehensive benefits 
(Virginia Health Catalyst, 2021).  
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CHAPTER 4: Social Relations and Ruling Relations 
 In this chapter, I will discuss how my chosen standpoint influenced my analysis and 
helped me avoid institutional capture. From this standpoint, I was able to map social relations of 
dental providers, identify the main actors and texts involved in social relations, and describe the 
ruling relations that dictate patient care.  
Standpoint 
When embarking on an institutional ethnography, the goal is to discover and reveal how 
individual action at a local setting is linked to coordinating activities beyond the physical 
location. Unlike many other qualitative methodologies, emphasis is placed on the how rather 
than the why. For example, how is it that people’s actions are coordinated from afar and often 
invisibly to themselves (Rankin, 2017a)? To complete such an analysis, it was imperative that I 
adopt a standpoint in my research and that I stay grounded in that standpoint throughout my data 
collection and analysis. As discussed in my methodology, I elected the standpoint of dental 
professionals to understand how they were encouraged or discouraged from accepting Medicaid 
and how they provided care for patients with disabilities. Furthermore, by selecting dental 
professionals as my standpoint, I was anchoring my analysis in their work, their activities, and 
their interests—and ultimately prioritizing their experiences.  
Choosing this standpoint was an epistemological shift for me, as I have no personal 
background or experience in dentistry or dental care. I do, however, have professional experience 
in transition and employment services for young adults with disabilities. By adopting the 
standpoint of dental professionals, I had to divest myself of my own preconceived notions, as I 
was all too aware of the dental access issues that plague PWD and especially those who rely on 
Medicaid. Prior to beginning my research, my interest was in discovering what constraints 
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prevented dental providers from providing care to PWD, as my perspective was hinged on a 
social model of disability where the deficit lies not within the individual but in social constraints 
that bar full participation (Oliver & Barnes, 1998).  
In my own professional training, I have been taught a social model of conceptualizing 
disabilities, and my professional work involves training educators and employers how to 
incorporate this model into their own practices. However, dental providers have not been taught 
to view disabilities within a social model but rather within a biomedical model, as outlined in 
Chapter 2. To adequately highlight the experiences of dental providers and their staff, I could not 
let my own attitudes eclipse the process of gathering and analyzing their empirical data. Here, 
the act of “talking” during repeated observations and interviews allowed me to build a rapport 
and empathetic bond with participants. This was crucial because, over time, I shifted from seeing 
lack of care as something dental providers did to PWD to something that was dictated to them by 
institutional forces.  
Within the context of dental providers’ offices, the social model of disability had little 
meaning because this form of knowledge is not present in its language or social relations. In fact, 
the institutional language I had to familiarize myself with was not only limited to dental or 
insurance terms but also in new ways of contextualizing disabilities. No longer were they PWD 
or patients with disabilities, they were special healthcare needs (SHCN)2 patients. Unlike the 
social model where the person is prioritized over the disability, here the medical needs and 
disability are linguistically placed first to emphasize its importance. Requiring a new term for the 
                                               
2 In Chapters 1 through 3, I refer to people with disabilities as either PWD or patients with disabilities. 
From this point on, I will switch to the nomenclature familiar to my participants and used in the context of their 
work, SHCN patients, when describing or analyzing their work.  
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same population is a textual example of how I had entered a new social relation with its own 
institutional language, ruling relations, and communicative action. By aligning with dental 
providers, I was shifting my epistemological understanding and acknowledging that dental 
providers and their staff were the experts of their own experiences and knowledge. Furthermore, 
a benefit of immersing myself in a novel standpoint was that it helped me avoid institutional 
capture as I unlearned my preconceived notions and, as I will discuss later, helped me identify 
how I had entered this research institutionally captured. This realization opened up an analysis 
that had previously been hidden from me.  
Observations, conversations, and interviews allowed me to analyze what Smith (1987) 
describes as the “two modes of knowing” (p. 82) of standpoint informants: The knowledge 
gleaned from work in a physical location and the abstraction of knowledge that occurs beyond 
the physical or local setting. This knowledge is to be “examined for its social construction and its 
embedded contradictions” (Rankin, 2017a). By doing so, I was able to construct a map of the 
social relations of dental providers. 
Social Relations of Dental Providers 
Social relations in institutional ethnography have a very particular meaning. It is not to be 
confused with social relationships wherein parties interact with each other in one context. Rather, 
it has a deeper connotation in that it is the concerted actions of individuals that “activate a social 
world of things happening among people” (Rankin, 2017a, p. 3). Social relations are the actions 
and practices that organize people’s lives into social organizations and often happen invisibly to 
the individuals acting them out. Campbell and Gregor (2004) give the example of a bus driver 
and a student passenger. The interaction of a student showing the bus driver a university bus pass 
is an example of an observable segment of a social relation that extends to before and after their 
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meeting (p. 31). In this example, the social relation connects the university student to the transit 
employee, and it can be extended on one end to the student enrollment and accounting system, 
and on the other end to the transit company and its employee practices.  
The goal of an institutional ethnography is to make visible the social relations that 
connect a local setting to the institutions that operate beyond it. This can be done because social 
relations are empirical and can be described ethnographically (Rankin, 2017a). Identifying these 
social relations is important because it is through everyday actions that people enter a social 
relation and their activities become coordinated into social organizations, often without their 
knowledge. Figure 4 provides a visual representation of the social relations of dental providers 
that I deduced through interviews and observation at the local setting.  




4 Social Relations of Dental Providers 
 
At the center of the image are dental providers, specifically the trained and licensed 
dentists who operate their own dental practice. Each line extending from the center is a 
representation of a social relation in which both parties interact voluntarily, but whose actions 
become coordinated purposefully. To demonstrate how the social relation extends past 
interactions at a dental office, the line continues past the actor to other pieces of the social 
relation beyond them that coordinate their action. An example analysis of a social relation 
depicted will explain how work at the local setting is coordinated from beyond its physical 
location. However, before proceeding, it is important to understand how work is coordinated 
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from afar through the use of texts. 
Role of Texts 
 In institutional ethnography, texts are vital to understanding how ruling relations are 
activated by people at the local setting (Rankin, 2017a, p. 3). It is through texts that hierarchical 
powers govern and replicate horizontally, and they are what bind a local setting to larger 
institutions beyond its physical boundaries. In Figure 4, the texts used to coordinate actions 
within each social relation are identified in the blue ovals. For example, a dental patient will 
activate the social relation by interacting with a dental provider through the use of texts such as 
insurance documents, patient medical records, and billing information. These texts in turn 
abstract the patient into an objective account of billable services, health facts, and payment 
information—devoid of the nuances of interpersonal communication. The interaction between 
the patient and dental provider transcends from the physical or experimental way of knowing to 
an ideological way of knowing. The ability to have two simultaneous interactions, one grounded 
in physical interaction and one recorded in text-mediated communication, is what allows an actor 
at a standpoint to have “two modes of knowing” (Smith, 1987, p. 82). 
Coordination of Social Relations 
 For an in-depth analysis of a social relation existing at the location of dental providers, 
let’s use the first social relation that most people would think of for a dental office: the dental 
patient–dental provider relation. An everyday activity that may initiate this social relation would 
be a new patient calling a dental provider to inquire if they are accepting patients and if they 
accept a specific dental insurance. Just asking about accepted insurances activates the social 
relations and, though this occurs at the local setting, it begins elsewhere—perhaps where the 
patient works and what medical benefits their employment confers. Note that the arrows in 
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Figure 5 extend past the patient to their employer and insurance, and that the two are connected 
to one another as well. 
Figure 5 
5 Dental Patient–Dental Provider–Dental Insurance 
 
When I first began data collection, one of the texts I collected from each site was blank 
copies of patient forms. Initially, these documents did not prompt any particular awareness of 
social relations or coordinated action. I was aware of how these texts abstracted a person to lists 
of current or past ailment, allergies, and medications, but it was not until I was updating my own 
personal records for my dentist that I realized how these texts extended beyond my dental visit to 
other nonmedical aspects of my life. I thought it interesting that my dentist needed my 
employer’s contact information, and a review of the documents I collected from my observation 
sites also showed that employer information was collected for responsible parties. Though I had 
assumptions, I was not sure why employer information was collected. Luckily, I was able to pose 
this question during my interview with Dr. Karen, as the answer proved incorrect my assumption 
that it was a way to track down payment. My question initially surprised Dr. Karen, and she had 
to think about why employer information was collected on her forms. After a moment she 
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recalled that it… 
has to do with insurance. I think it has to do with the insurance company; it’s a way for 
my front desk person to know when they go onto the website to figure out which 
insurance company they have. I think in the software, it’ll record how many patients you 
have that come from that company so if you have a lot you can go market more to that 
company. That feature is built into the software I use, ‘this patient works at Capital One, 
and here are all the other patients from Capital One.’ And if it’s a good insurance policy, I 
know I want more patients who work there.  
This description of both the work of her front desk person, and her marketing plan 
demonstrates how this social relation actually begins with the patient’s employer. By selecting a 
particular insurance option for their employees, the business has coordinated the patient’s 
actions—their first step in seeking out dental care is to identify in-network providers who accept 
their insurance. Furthermore, the collection of employer information by Dr. Karen coordinates 
her future marketing efforts; her positive or negative experience with a particular insurance plan 
will drive her to market toward or avoid particular patients.  
The social relation does not end, however, with the dental provider; it continues to extend 
past the local setting of the dental provider’s office to other institutions activated by the textual 
interaction between patient and provider. Let’s assume the patient chooses to move forward with 
a dental appointment with this provider. Once it is determined that their particular insurance is 
accepted, further texts are activated. The office administrator will record basic demographic 
information and contact information and collect an account of why this patient wants to be 
treated and any other pertinent health information the patient decides to share. Using the 
insurance and demographic information collected, the dental provider will now verify insurance 
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coverage and request predetermination from the insurance company to provide dental care. In 
this example, the social relation extends to the insurance company that will now review the 
patient’s insurance policy and remaining benefits for the year and authorize or deny care as 
prescribed by the dentist. Now the dentist’s actions are coordinated from afar by way of 
activating insurance-related texts.  
The social relations that run through a dental office as observed from the standpoint, are 
not limited to the straight pathways depicted in Figure 5. For example, some of the texts 
activated by the patient include Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 
documents and medical release documents that are not mandated by insurance companies but 
rather by other institutional bodies. Dr. Karen shared that for her,  
insurance didn’t influence forms at all. Forms that I have are the forms that are required 
by the board or guidelines like HIPAA. Only influence from insurance is on medical 
history and demographic forms. For those, there is a line they sign which allows us to file 
with insurance. 
In this example, the institutional organizations that coordinate Dr. Karen’s actions are the same 
institutions that grant her the professional legitimacy and authority to practice dentistry.  
In a roundabout way, Gwen from Dr. Calvin’s office also confirmed that these same 
institutional organizations coordinated updates to their office forms… 
based on change in people. Back when we started, parents just brought them to the office 
and left and didn’t ask questions. Now we have to cover behinds more—yes, more 
litigiousness. People are a lot more picky than they used to be, have to explain more. 
Change of the times.  
In this case, though new patient forms were geared more toward keeping liability down, the 
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ultimate goal was still to maintain good standing as a dental provider in the eyes of licensing 
boards. Figure 6 depicts the social relation between dental providers and dentistry.  
Figure 6 
6 Dental Patient–Dental Provider–Dentistry Relation 
 
 
Recognizing social relations is necessary because it is through social relations that ruling 
relations are transmitted. The ability of social relations to extend beyond the boundaries of a 
local setting makes it an appropriate conduit for relaying messages across sites, messages with 
the capacity to rule. Messages that convey priorities and interests that are not those of any 
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individual at the standpoint corrupts the social relation into a ruling relation. The rest of this 
chapter contains an analysis of the ruling relations that systematically moves the interests at the 
local setting away from dental providers and patients to those that rule—the insurance 
companies. How this ruling relation affects and distorts the other social relations depicted in 
Figure 4 will be addressed in Chapters 5 and 6.  
Ruling Relations 
Prior to beginning my data collection, my assumption was that market factors—
capitalism and profit—were a primary contributor to the lack of access to oral healthcare for 
patients with disabilities. Specifically, the reality is that care of patients with disabilities is 
expensive and often not lucrative. My preliminary research and interviews to identify the 
problematic, as described in Chapter 2, did not contradict this assumption. What these interviews 
also hinted at, but that I was not prepared to understand fully at the time, was the sheer 
dominance of insurance in oral healthcare. I recall being struck by a statement from one of the 
dentists I initially interviewed, “insurance doesn’t care about the patient.” As my data collection 
and analysis progressed, I went back to that quote over and over again in my head. What was 
implied in the statement that became abundantly clear is that, true, insurance does not care about 
the patient, but it does decide what kind of care a patient gets.  
Insurance: Customers and Capital  
Even though I had chosen the standpoint of a dental office and not the office of an 
insurance provider, insurance by far had the largest presence in my data. Nearly every 
conversation I had or observed at the dental offices, whether between employees or between 
employees and patients, revolved around insurance. Even though I did not observe patient 
treatment, what I did observe was that every dental visit began and ended at the front desk, and 
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dental insurance was involved in nearly every interaction.  
As detailed in Chapter 2, insurance was initially a solution to address the affordability of 
healthcare and to elevate healthcare as a profession above the market (Stone, 1997). However, 
the addition of a third-party payer created a dilemma. If people were no longer responsible for 
paying for healthcare, they were more likely to use services than someone who had to pay out of 
pocket, and healthcare providers could more easily raise rates without angering patients. A 
solution of insurance companies to address the increased cost of healthcare came with the advent 
of fee schedules (Bodenheimer & Grumbach, 2012). By entering into a managed care plan with 
dental insurances, dental providers are agreeing to provide care at a contractually reduced fee or 
fee schedule. This agreement removes much of the marketing and cost adjustment power from 
dental providers as individual office fees become irrelevant to potential patients and raising fees 
will not change the contractual agreement between providers and insurance carriers (Willis, 
2013). Provider participation in managed care plans becomes one of the determining factors in a 
patient’s choices of where to seek services.  
By controlling the flow of potential patients, insurance companies have forced dental 
providers to engage and activate the social relation that organizationally links dental providers 
and patients to insurance companies. Dr. Karen shared her viewpoint on why dentists participate 
in insurance plans: 
When you start your own business, you need your own patients, can’t just start with fee 
for service, not taking any insurance. When you work with insurance, it allows patients to 
look up who takes their insurance and after they review your resume and [web]page, they 
might call you. That is why you sign up with insurance companies...you can’t compete 
with insurance. People work for a company and get insurance, and they will go to where 
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their insurance is taken. You can have the most dedicated patients, but they will leave you 
if you don’t take their insurance.  
Similarly, Dr. Calvin shared that when he started his practice 33 years ago, he “took anything 
[insurance] that people had.” Though he continues to try to be as inclusive as possible when it 
comes to insurance participation, he is now more selective and participates in insurance plans “as 
long as they are fair to both us and the patients.” As he describes it, fair would be a fee schedule 
that covers his practice’s costs, provides adequate coverage to his patients, and does not create 
difficulties for his administrative staff. Gwen from Dr. Calvin’s office shared that the process of 
becoming an approved provider under an insurance plan is a “long, long, long process” overall, 
but it starts with requesting a fee schedule to see what the participating fee is. Proposed fees will 
vary slightly between insurance plans as will the agreed percentage of coverage for specific 
procedures.  
Typically, dental insurance fees are regionally based on established usual, customary, and 
reasonable (UCR) fees (Willis, 2013). Though the term UCR is defined as “being the amount 
paid for a medical service in a geographic area based on what providers in the area usually 
charge for the same or similar medical service” (Healthcare.gov, n.d.), the reality is that the 
reliance on insurance UCR fees creates a circular logic where dental providers starting a business 
will use UCR fees as the basis for their practice’s out-of-pocket fees, thereby allowing insurance 
companies to set the regional fees for a geographic area. Dental providers are forced to do this 
because asking other dentists to share their fees is potentially illegal under price fixing, and 
patients may receive a notification from their insurance company if a procedural fee exceeds the 
carrier’s UCR fee schedule (Willis, 2013). As an example of this opaqueness, Jessica at 
Dr. Calvin’s office shared that it was only when they joined a dental network, Central VA Dental 
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Care (CVDC), that they “realized the fee schedules we were getting paid on were a lot less than 
some of the other practices in CVDC, so we started negotiating a little bit better.”  
UCR fees, as communicated from the insurance carrier to the dental provider, are a text 
that controls the actions of dental providers from afar, and not in their best interest. These 
circumstances have trapped dental providers and created such inequities between insurance 
carriers and dental providers that Senate bill S.350 and House of Representatives bill 1418 
Competitive Health Insurance Reform Act of 2019 and 2020 seek to partially repeal the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945 to apply federal antitrust laws against health insurance 
companies. In the final months of writing my dissertation, H.R. 1418 passed and became Public 
Law 116-327, The Competitive Health Insurance Reform Act of 20203.  
Contractual managed care plans and fee schedules are vital to the perpetuation of social 
relations and ruling relations that govern dental care. The expectation of coverage by virtue of 
being in-network is the means by which people are hooked into activating their dental insurance 
to find a dental provider. Dental providers are hooked into the “social relations of the economy 
and of ruling institutions” (Smith 1987, 2005, p. 40) because insurance companies control both 
the flow of patients and the monetary reimbursement. However, because the economic control of 
UCR fees is solely in the hands of insurance carriers, the economic autonomy of dental providers 
is significantly reduced and constrained by managed care contracts; office fees contribute little to 
a provider’s bottom line. For example, at Dr. Calvin’s office, sedation is a service not covered by 
most insurance plans, and the office fee is $273. However, there are a few plans from Anthem 
Insurance that cover sedation but only pay $80. Because $80 is paid from the insurance 
                                               
3 Though Competitive Health Insurance Reform Act of 2020 is the bill that was ultimately passed, I 
included Competitive Health Insurance Reform Act of 2019 in my description because this was the version and bill I 
was made aware of during my observation. 
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company, Dr. Calvin’s office has to write off the remaining $193 even though the contractual 
amount is significantly less. Furthermore, Dr. Calvin also bemoaned the fact that the costs of 
running a business and paying his staff rises each year, but contracted fees with insurance 
companies rarely change, and by very small percentages when they do. By engaging in a social 
relation with insurance companies, dental providers and dental care are exposed to the 
vicissitudes of capitalism.  
Capitalism creates a wholly new terrain of social relations external to the local terrain and 
the particularities of personally mediated economic and social relations. It creates an 
extralocal medium action constituted by a market process in which a multiplicity of 
anonymous buyers and sellers interrelate and by an expanding area of political activity 
(Smith, 1987, p. 55). 
Insurance: “Not in the Business of Paying Claims” 
  Medical insurance was meant to address the rising unaffordability of healthcare that 
developed in the United States as a means of ensuring that medical professionals were paid. By 
design, it sought to place medical care beyond the boundaries of capitalism in that healthcare 
could be distributed based on need and not on ability to pay through shared risk or community 
rating (Bodenheimer & Grumbach, 2012). However, the creation and eventual dominance of 
profit-driven insurance companies has dragged care into the capitalist arena.  
Initially, with community rating, all members of varying risk levels pay a premium with 
the expectation that they will receive care in excess of their premium should they fall ill. The 
premiums of the healthy individuals pay for the expenses of the sick. However, the rise of 
commercial insurance companies using experience rating to offer lower premiums to low-risk 
consumers meant that traditional insurance companies could no longer attract enough members 
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to cover expenses. The result was that insurance companies that once used community rating 
adjusted to experience rating to attract low-risk, healthy consumers to offset the expenses of 
healthcare that was paid out for ill consumers. This is a far less distributive concept that left 
high-risk members with either exorbitantly expensive health insurance premiums or the inability 
to obtain health insurance at all (Bodenheimer & Grumbach, 2012). Though Section 1201 of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (2010) (ACA) now prevents insurance companies 
from denying coverage to individuals with pre-existing conditions, the difficulty PWD had in 
accessing insurance coverage contributed to the creation of Medicaid (Bodenheimer & 
Grumbach, 2012). In a way, Medicaid was fulfilling the original intent of insurance, but only for 
those that could not afford private insurance, the chronically ill, and the most expensive 
members—making it an exceptionally expensive program. The divergence between private and 
government-funded insurance further illustrates how the social organization of patients, 
providers, and insurances benefit insurance carriers the most. Insurance companies are not 
responsible for the cost of care of SHCN patients, and their pool of relatively low-risk members 
maintains profitability. The social relation between dental providers, SHCN patients, and 
Medicaid will be further analyzed in Chapter 5, but to understand how the economic concerns of 
insurance act as ruling relations over dental providers, which in turn affect care for SHCN, it is 
necessary to continue to analyze the ways in which this ruling is mediated by texts. 
Besides fee schedules, as described in the previous section, the other way insurance 
companies can regulate their healthcare expenditures is through the control of allowable 
procedures. Based on the presumed legitimacy of the managed care contract, insurance 
companies can dictate to dental providers what type of care they are willing to reimburse.  
“All insurance companies are in the business of selling insurance—of collecting 
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premiums—not in the business of paying claims.” During my observations, nothing underscored 
this statement from Dr. Calvin more than the insurance practice of downcoding4, known more 
formally as the least expensive alternative treatment (LEAT) clause (ADA CDBP, 2007).  
Many dental insurances carry a clause that states when there are multiple treatment 
options for a specific condition, the plan will pay for the least expensive option. This is openly 
described as a cost containment measure by carriers with the justification that LEAT clauses 
maintain dental coverage affordability and are not meant to dictate treatment (ADA CDBP, 
2007). However, patients willingly activate the social relation with an insurance carrier and 
dental provider on the expectation that most of their care will be covered and with little or no 
knowledge of the LEAT clause. Though the cost difference is paid by the patient should they 
elect the more expensive treatment, it still places the burden of education on the dental provider 
and could potentially sour their relationship with the patient, which is made all the more 
precarious by the fact that managed care plans have already commodified the dental provider in 
the eyes of the patient. Though dental offices may have different fees or contractual agreements 
for the same procedure, these differences are not obvious to an insurance member who will likely 
view all in-network providers similarly when it comes to price point; to a patient, dental 
providers are interchangeable. In fact, texts communicating fee for services are absent from the 
patient-provider social relation initiation process because they have been replaced by insurance 
benefit packages, insurance EOB, and dental billing documents. Furthermore, insurance carriers 
do not typically disclose their downcoding policies during the contract negotiation process, 
further obscuring information from the patient and provider (ADA CDBP, n.d.) 
                                               
4 For the remainder of this paper, I will use the more colloquial term downcode over least expensive 
alternative treatment because each dentist I observed and interviewed used the former terminology.  
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The most common downcodes are when composite (white) fillings are downcoded to 
amalgams (silver) or when crowns are downcoded to large fillings (ADA CDBP, 2007), which 
often may feel like an aesthetic choice to the patient. However, there were times when the dental 
providers I observed disagreed with the downcode on the basis of quality treatment. Sometimes 
these examples revolve around implants versus dentures or appropriate diagnostic x-rays. Jessica 
at the pediatric office described many situations where the doctors would be frustrated because 
they felt that the insurance decision was made in the absence of actually examining and talking 
to the patient and family. In these situations, downcoding places the burden on the dental 
provider to justify their chosen treatment plan to the patient and assert their expertise over the 
algorithm or insurance-employed reviewers. The dentists I observed were not alone in believing 
that downcoding negatively affected quality of treatment and care. The ADA has identified the 
practice of downcoding as intrusive and described it as a practice that denies “patients their 
purchased benefits and robs them of their right as informed consumers of healthcare” (The 
Committee on Dental Benefit Programs, 2017, p. 46). 
The process of downcoding is an example of how insurance companies use texts to exert 
ruling relations and control the work and provider-patient interaction at the local setting. Figure 7 
depicts the process of how a plan for dental treatment is transformed into textual communication 
and how insurance companies use that text mediated form of communication to transmit their 
institutional powers to the local setting. As described earlier in this chapter, texts are activated to 
collect insurance carrier information and basic demographics prior to an initial dental visit. After 
that visit, once the patient and dental provider have engaged with one another at the local setting, 
their interaction is transformed into texts, which begins the process of text-mediated ruling 
relations.  




7 Ruling Relation: Downcoding 
 
Institutional ethnography elucidates the ways in which knowledge and ruling are 
objectified when work moves from “knowing in the first hand to knowing in text-mediated 
ways” (Campbell & Gregor, 2004, p. 36). Predetermined organizational categories and language 
are used to describe a patient and situation in a context designed to facilitate coordination. In the 
case of oral healthcare, these predetermined categories are presented as billing codes and clinical 
notes (see Figure 8). Dental care is stripped and reduced to a series of billable lines, represented 
by a series of letters and numbers, from which insurance analysts scaffold and reconstruct an 
exam between patient and dental staff with help only from clinical notes. What this process 
allows for is the reinterpretation of a dental interaction that is bare except for silent procedural 
interaction. It is comparable to expecting that someone reading a scene in a scripted play would 
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be able to imagine the sounds and smell of a theater, the art direction, the costumes, the actors’ 
performances, and the audience engagement. Though a reader may have an image in their head, 
it likely deviates from the actual production.  
Figure 8 
8 Most Used Billing Codes 
 
Yet, this form of sterilized and objectified text is reviewed and analyzed by the insurance 
company. Without firsthand knowledge of the patient-provider interaction, a decision is made at 
the institutional level whether the treatment plan proposed by the dental provider is appropriate. 
As outlined in Figure 7, a follow-up treatment plan prescribed by the dental provider can be 
predetermined or authorized by an insurance carrier or it can be denied or downcoded. If the 
treatment is predetermined, the provider can proceed with the prescribed treatment such as 
restorative work like a filling. If it is denied or downcoded, the dental provider and patient can 
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agree to the new treatment plan or original plan with increased out-of-pocket expenses for the 
patient. The following image, Figure 9, gives an example of a downcode and denial. The 
procedural code D2392 for a composite posterior filling is downcoded to an alternative 
treatment. Furthermore, the disparity between the office charge of $229 and the contracted 
amount of $130 is made all the more glaring when it becomes obvious that the patient is still 
responsible for 80 percent of that agreed fee and, in the end, insurance will pay only $33.60 for 
the filling. The denial of D9230 (nitrous oxide) is because it is not a covered benefit of the plan. 
Yet, it begs the question of when would nitrous oxide be covered if not for a pediatric patient as 
is the case here in Figure 9? 




9 Predetermination: Downcode 
 
 
If the dental provider did not agree with the predetermination, I observed administrative 
staff add information to clinical notes and resubmit the predetermination letter or call the 
insurance company to argue specific points.  
Using downcoding, the pathway in Figure 7 is an attempt to map out the ways in which 
patient care is coordinated from afar by insurance companies. Though the dental provider and 
patient are the ones to initiate and activate this social relation, they conduct the least amount of 
text mediated work. Rather, the majority of the work occurs between dental administrative staff 
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and insurance carriers. The actual dental care provided to the patient is minimized compared to 
the time administrative staff prepare an objectified and textualized description of the patient and 
their time in order to communicate dental care to the insurance carrier in exchange for 
reimbursement. Figure 7 also depicts a pathway for how out-of-network patients might receive 
care and how the impact of text mediated communication has a lesser impact on their treatment 
plan. The inclusion of out-of-network patients is intended to compare and contrast how much 
insurance carriers can coordinate care based on activation of contracted managed care 
agreements. Chapters 5 and 6 will address the implications of the out-of-network pathway in 
more detail.  
Colonization of Institutional Knowledge 
The role of texts in activating social relations and coordinating action from beyond the 
local setting has been demonstrated using insurance plans and medical coding. However, a 
deeper analysis of these social relations reveals an additional role of texts and how texts are 
responsible for the production and reproduction of the ideological apparatus that governs dental 
providers’ work. Smith (1987) describes how society’s image of oneself is created through “the 
specialized work of people in universities and schools, in television, radio and newspapers, in 
advertising agencies, in book publishing and other organizations forming the ‘ideological 
apparatuses’ of society” (p. 17). These ideologies form the backbone of social organization by 
legitimizing modes of thinking. Here, Smith’s concept of text-mediated communication can be 
scaffolded onto Foucault’s conceptualization of discourse. Foucault (1976/2003) describes truth 
as being “produced within discourses that, in themselves, are neither true nor false” (p. 307), but 
their power holds because they are part of a “productive network that runs through the whole 
social body” (p. 307). Both argue that concepts of truth are socially constructed, but whereas 
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Foucault describes the power dyads that govern knowledge, Smith supplies a means for 
knowledge translation—the replicable role of texts to communicate ideology from afar.  
Dentistry, as an institution, governs dental care through the production of dental 
education and guidelines for the dental profession. A dentist is not legitimate or afforded any 
professional autonomy without demonstrating knowledge and ability through a combination of 
education and licensing. For example, Virginia provides two pathways to licensure through either 
examination or credentials (Virginia Department of Health Professions, 2020). Dental education 
is passed down through a power dyad to dental providers through texts in the form of textbooks, 
lectures, and exams. Even hands-on examinations to demonstrate skill are abstracted into exams 
with passing or failing marks. Dental education is part of the ideological apparatus Smith 
describes and the text that connects the social relation of dental providers to the practice of 
dentistry, dental education, and licensing, as depicted in Figure 10.  




10 Dentistry–Dental Provider Social Relation 
 
Furthermore, institutional ethnography offers a means to understand how Habermas’s 
Communicative Action Theory functions in dentistry and dental care. Analysis of text-mediated 
communication makes apparent how institutional knowledge and professional autonomy based 
on Foucault’s concept of power and knowledge are not only limited by resource allocation as 
hypothesized in Chapter 2 but also colonized through Habermas’s communicative action theory 
by way of textual ideology.  
Habermas describes two distinct spheres of social life—the lifeworld and system—each 
with their own distinct rules and institutions. Respectively, they are home of communicative and 
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rational instrumental action. However, for the rational action of the system to be accepted by 
agents, it is dependent on and based on communicative action in the lifeworld (Finlayson, 2005). 
Colonization of the lifeworld occurs when the rational action in systems, once based on 
communicative action, begins to encroach and subsume the functions of the lifeworld. The result 
is that systems become uncoupled from the lifeworld and are no longer attached to validity 
claims that generate the social, marketless lifeworld (Habermas, 1987). The act of colonization 
can be observed in how texts become the tool to objectify and reduce institutional knowledge 
into instrumental reasonings. Smith’s recipe for making ideology in which an abstraction is 
generated from an established fact and then made to be an expression of that fact (in Deveau, 
2008) can be thought of as a method by which texts become the tools of colonization. For 
example, Figure 11 demonstrates how the system, specifically insurance, used text-mediated 
ideology to dictate care. The instance in Figure 11 uses the example of fluoride treatment 
described to me by staff at Dr. Calvin’s pediatric dental office.  






11 Text-Mediated Ideology 
 
The ideological circle in Figure 11 starts with dental education, established institutional 
knowledge based in the lifeworld. Two facts from dental education: that most secondary teeth 
erupt by age 13 (ADADC, 2006) and that there is a benefit of a 2.26% fluoride varnish 
application at least twice a year to prevent caries (ADA EBD Center, 2013) are generated into an 
abstraction, and this knowledge takes on a new expression when reconstituted in the text of the 
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insurance system. The universal benefit of fluoride is repurposed so that the billing code for 
fluoride varnish (D1206) documents patients who receive a fluoride varnish as “moderate to high 
caries risk patients” (Virginia Health Catalyst, 2020). In addition, the norm that all secondary 
teeth erupt by age 13 becomes the rule, and any individual who falls outside this rule is aberrant. 
When these two abstracted versions of knowledge are combined, the instrumental reasoning of 
the system determines that fluoride varnish treatments may only be needed once a year because 
not all children are moderate to high risk, and furthermore, that fluoride treatments after the age 
of 14 will not be covered, even if all secondary teeth have not erupted. Here, insurance texts have 
colonized or uncoupled institutional knowledge from the lifeworld that originally created it, and 
the insurance text converted that knowledge into a ruling relation. Ruling relations rely on 
“selecting, categorizing, and/or objectifying aspects of the social world in order to develop facts 
and knowledge upon which to base decisions” (Rankin, 2017a, p. 3).  
Though dental providers recognize the limitations of the care they are able to provide 
based on an individual’s insurance coverage, their hand is forced by the system that controls both 
monetary resources and patient expectation of coverage. Care beyond the confines of insurance 
coverage is preferable, but patients may balk at the idea of paying out of pocket for this care. The 
creation of text-mediated ideology is the key to explaining how insurance companies have come 
to rule over the type of care provided to patients. If you recall the example of downcoding 
described earlier in this chapter, you can see how the system has abstracted and nominalized 
institutional knowledge to dictate care as a means of minimizing expenses. To the system, which 
operates on profit and cost-effectiveness rather than well-being, the least expensive alternative is 
preferable, and by uncoupling institutional knowledge from the lifeworld, the system’s 
preference for economic conservativeness will outweigh the moral and social consensus of the 




Furthermore, colonization through text-mediated ideology is another way of 
understanding how disabilities can exist simultaneously in two vastly different 
conceptualizations. As introduced in Chapter 2 and discussed at the beginning of Chapter 4, 
disabilities have historically been conceptualized through the biomedical model. Despite societal 
changes and many professions, such as education and vocational rehabilitation, moving toward a 
social model of disability, the biomedical model persists primarily through function. Access to 
services couched in a social model requires medical diagnosis of a disability. This is the 
abstraction, classification, and measurement of bodies that Foucault (1963/1973) called the 
medical gaze. Use of the medical gaze to control access to services reinforces the dominance of 
disability over the individual and perpetuates an assumption of deficiency, meaning even 
services based on a social model are reliant on a diagnosis based on a biomedical model.  
The existence of the social model of disability could be viewed as an example of 
communicative action within Habermas’s lifeworld. Habermas believes actions are coordinated 
through language and speech, and commitments to justify actions are described as validity claims 
that hold both moral and rational status; in short, validity claims become the truth or rightness of 
the lifeworld (Finlayson, 2005). It is in the lifeworld through validity claims that knowledge is 
improved and transmitted, and it is to be expected that all parts of the lifeworld are open to 
change through gradual changes in shared meaning and understanding (Habermas, 1987). This 
conception of a changing lifeworld could also explain the “regime” changes that intrigued 
Foucault (1976/2003), the “modification in the rules of formation of statements which are 
accepted as scientifically true” (p. 302). If rational action in the system is reliant on 
communicative action in the lifeworld to be effective, then the design and basis of regimes of 
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thought are also based on validity claims to truth and rightness. Changing validity claims in the 
lifeworld would require new rational actions in the system to maintain justification of actions. 
Why the social model of disability has yet to become the regime that governs can be explained 
when one realizes that the systems of power and economy, required to coordinate a modern 
society, colonized the lifeworld when the biomedical model was most prevalent. This allowed for 
the uncoupling of the lifeworld from the system and the perpetuation of patterns of instrumental 
reasoning that relied on concepts of deficiency that did not look toward social inclusion of PWD. 
Despite the adoption of the social model of disability in multiple professions, thereby 
demonstrating an evolving concept of disability in the lifeworld, the rational actions of the 
system do not adjust to this new validity claim. Hence, access to services for PWD continues to 
rely on medical diagnosis based on instrumental action. Rather, we witness some of the 
pathologies Habermas claimed resulted from the colonization of the lifeworld, such as decrease 
in shared meaning and increase in feelings of helplessness (Finlayson, 2005). The social model 
of disability will be stymied by systems that continue to function through a biomedical model, as 
dental healthcare does. 
Everyday World as Problematic 
In The Everyday World as Problematic (1987), Smith begins her book with the essay, A 
Peculiar Eclipsing: Women’s Exclusion from Man’s Culture. In this essay, she argues how the 
perspectives and experiences of women have been omitted from institutionalized practices that 
favor a male’s narrative and, therefore, excludes women from a society’s culture. The result is a 
world in which women’s experiences do not conform to societal expectations, their voices lack 
authority, and women inhabit a culture that is not their own. However, Smith later cautions that 
in creating a sociology for women, one must not assume that taking the standpoint of women is 
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equivalent to “an ideological position that represents women’s oppression as having a 
determinate character” (p. 106). Rather, analysis should “create the space for an absent subject, 
and an absent experience that is to be filled with the presence and spoken experience of actual 
women speaking of and in the actualities of their everyday worlds’’ (p. 107). Smith goes on to 
remind the reader that women are not the only class excluded from the ruling apparatus, so too 
are the working class, people of color, indigenous people, and homosexual [sic]5 men and 
women. Each of these groups occupies a unique standpoint, from which, different aspects of the 
ruling apparatus would become apparent (1987).  
What drew me as a researcher to institutional ethnography was how this analysis, 
grounded in activism, gave voice to those caught up in the machinations of a system and drew 
attention to the policies of a system or institution that frequently worked counter to their intended 
mission. In my own personal experience, I saw how direct support service providers to PWD are 
bound by funding streams and how their work has to conform to institutional definitions to be 
considered work, an observation very similar to the research of Ng on job placement for 
immigrant women, as described in Campbell and Gregor (2004, pp. 114–117). I initially viewed 
institutional ethnography as a lens to dissect the ways in which patients with disabilities are 
implicitly discriminated against in oral healthcare. By equating dental providers with direct 
support service providers and relying on my own empirical experience, my working hypothesis 
was that medical coding redefined and commodified care to conform to market factors. However, 
my presumption was an ideological position, informed by the ruling apparatus that educated me 
on the social model of disability and policy analysis. I started my research institutionally 
                                               
5 LGBTQA+ is the current appropriate terminology. 
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captured because I already thought in theoretical terms and had assigned my standpoint 
participants a determinate character, despite Smith’s warning.  
Luckily, I had chosen for my research an area separate from the world that I was familiar 
with through work. This meant that, during my observation and data collection, I was required to 
learn completely new policies, administrative procedures, and, perhaps most importantly, a new 
lexicon. This forced a distance between myself and the data I collected. The conversations I 
pursued were not tainted by my presumptions. Rather, many of the questions inquiring how work 
was completed came from a genuine place of interest and novelty. Once I reached data saturation 
and was ready to embark on my analysis, the data I had to work with developed a line of analysis 
that deviated from the presumptions I had when I started my research. For example, one 
presumption I had was that SHCN patients differed significantly from other patients, partly 
explaining the disparities in oral healthcare. However, when one analyzes the social organization 
of oral healthcare and the ruling relations that coordinate care, what becomes apparent is that 
neither SHCN patients nor patients in general are part of the system. Like women, as posited by 
Smith (1987), patients are not part of the ruling class that operates the ruling apparatus; they too 
are subordinate, their everyday world is also problematic.  
The Absent Patient 
In my preliminary interviews, I identified a problematic, a conflict between market 
factors and care for SHCN patients, to help guide my data collection and analysis. What my 
analysis demonstrates is that those market factor constraints are not limited to SHCN patients. 
Rather, insurance companies maintain profitability by maximizing cost savings with all patients. 
The text-mediated ruling relations described previously reduced and objectified not only the 
dental procedure but also the patient. They too are flattened and reduced to a line of codes and 
PROFESSIONAL AUTONOMY AND MEDICAID PWD 89 
 
 
clinical descriptors, little more than a character description in a scripted play. Because patients 
are absent from the ruling relation of insurance, their interactions with dental providers and staff 
create sticky points in the system where actions do not flow because the ruling relation never 
accounted for them. Within the context of institutional ethnography and ruling relations, these 
experiences or disjunctures become the basis for what someone knows from being and working 
at the local setting, but they are experiences that conflict with what one is presumed to know 
according to ruling relations and work coordinated from afar (Campbell & Gregor, 2004). These 
are the aspects of the social world that do not neatly fit into the categorizations and 
objectifications of ruling relations and, therefore, are not accounted for when problems at the 
local setting are resolved according to institutional knowledge.  
For example, during my observation at the office of Dr. Andy and Dr. Grant, I witnessed 
Tricia spend a significant amount of time with a young female patient. The reduced, objective 
version of this woman based on her account at the office was that she had an outstanding balance 
and was responsible for both the procedure done that day and a significant amount still owed 
from previous procedures. However, the staff were familiar with her and once they saw the 
outstanding balance owed, they knew what was not immediately obvious in the text. She was one 
of many family members on a single insurance policy at the office, and the amount owed was 
from procedures conducted on other family members.  
Tricia went line by line with this patient on what was owed, the date of the procedures, 
and identified what she owed for just herself. The remaining balance was then divided among the 
other family members based on their appointment dates and the individual amounts were written 
down on a sticky note for her to share with her family. Despite the outstanding balance, including 
a small amount for which she was still personally responsible, the patient was allowed to 
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schedule a follow-up appointment for additional work. Tricia made this exception because in her 
experiential way of knowing, she knew the patient would be responsible for both the balance and 
upcoming payment based on previous payment history. In contrast, Tricia shared with me after 
the patient left that she would not have extended the same courtesy to some members of her 
family because they were still chasing payment from them. The time Tricia spent with the 
patient, including educating her on financing options, was undocumented work. 
There is no code for institutional powers to acknowledge customer service, bill 
collection, personal relationship building, and problem solving. This work or experiential way of 
knowing is not transmitted beyond the local setting, thus maintaining the invisibility of both the 
patient and aspects of Tricia’s responsibilities. Because the patient and her relationship with 
dental office staff are invisible to the system, their experience and way of knowing are 
problematic; institutional powers do not account for it. While it is true that dental providers 
cannot bill for additional time spent with an SHCN patient, it turns out that all patients are liable 
to cost a dental provider and their staff additional time or undocumented work. 
Absent Patient; Absent Problem 
When the ruling relation makes a mistake, there are often consequences that have a direct 
effect on patients. Jessica at Dr. Calvin’s office described a situation where her experience and 
knowledge outranked the insurance representative, but she was still dependent on what they said, 
despite knowing they had made a mistake.  
I had an Aetna one that I knew was a mistake. They overpaid. I called them and told 
them, you overpaid. ‘No. No’ [they said]. [I told them,] ‘I need you to confirm this.’ 
Because this mom was getting like $600 back. ‘No, it is right, we will not be asking for 
the money back.’ A good 6 months later they called and asked for their money back... I 
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did my part. I couldn’t leave the $600 sitting there. I called the mother, and it was fine, 
she gave it back to me, but it stinks! 
 Despite knowing that there would be an issue and attempting to reverse it, Jessica was 
helpless once the decision was made by the insurance company. Jessica could not withhold 
money that the insurance company said was rightfully the patient’s even though she knew it was 
an error. If the mother had argued or refused payment, Dr. Calvin’s office may have had to write 
off $600 because of a mistake made by the insurance company that did not consider how to 
recoup overpayment from a patient. When the patient is absent from the formula, problems 
related to them are also absent from the calculation.  
When Ruling Relations Collide 
Though the ruling relations of insurance are activated by patients seeking in-network 
providers, these same patients fade into the background once the system is activated. Beyond an 
object onto which procedures are prescribed and performed, their experience and everyday way 
of knowing are not accounted for in the rational decision making of the insurance company. By 
selecting dental offices as my standpoint, I do not observe and capture all the ways in which the 
patient experience is missing from ruling relations. However, I was privy to how dental office 
staff interacted with patients and how those experiences were often left out or abstracted into 
institutional texts and forms of communication. It also brought to my attention that the patient 
experience in dental care started and stopped at the office doors. Occasionally I observed pieces 
of a patient’s life beyond a dental procedure, such as the teacher who brought Karlee at 
Dr. Andy’s and Dr. Grant’s office pre-K supplies for her son. However, such patient interactions 
were not recorded in patient accounts, clinical notes, or insurance coding. The textual account of 
that patient was limited to the time she spent in the spatial confines of the dental office, devoid of 
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any lived experience beyond the office walls. The interaction between this patient and Karlee 
existed only in the disjuncture, invisible to the ruling relation. 
A single ruling relation in one context can create disjuncture, but when a patient enters 
the local setting of a dental office and brings with them other ruling relations and systems that 
govern their actions, multiple disjunctures are created. The SHCN patient is not more 
problematic because they are more invisible. They are more problematic because their world is 
often governed by multiple ruling relations and systems. Lipsky (2010) described how layers of 
bureaucracy increase as an individual’s level of need rises. SHCN patients are buried in multiple 
layers of abstraction, and disjunctures arise not only from differences between their experiential 
world and institutional knowledge but also from the collusion of different ruling relations.  
Chapter 4 sought to elucidate the social relations, ruling relations, and patient context in a 
dental office. Chapter 5 will examine in more detail the disjunctures that arise when oral 
healthcare is provided to SHCN patients in a community dental provider office.  
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CHAPTER 5: The Disjunctures 
In Chapter 5, I focus on the disjunctures I observed and discussed with dental providers 
and staff when it came to the provision of care for SHCN patients. In institutional ethnography, 
the disjuncture can be described as points of tension where institutionalized knowledge is at odds 
with the empirical experiences of people at the standpoint. These disjunctures are encapsulated 
within the problematic and are the “puzzles to be explicated” during analysis (Rankin, 2017b, 
p. 3). Chapter 5 seeks to analyze these disjunctures specific to SHCN patients and identify the 
various social relations that have a negative or mitigating effect on care.  
Local Settings and Insurance Description 
Because this chapter relies heavily on participant description, I am providing a review 
and description of the local settings observed. As described in Chapter 3, Methods of Approach, I 
observed, collected texts, and interviewed staff at two dental offices. The first site was 
Dr. Calvin’s pediatric office, which accepted Medicaid and a variety of other insurances. His 
office is located in a fast-growing suburban area of Richmond, Virginia. The staff observed and 
interviewed include Dr. Calvin, Jessica, Camilla, Stella, and Gwen. The second observation site 
was Dr. Andy’s and Dr. Grant’s general practice in an established suburban area geographically 
close to the city line of Richmond City. Their office accepts Medicaid patients, though they had 
decided to put a hold on new Medicaid patients when I began my observation. Their practice is 
out of network for all insurance providers, meaning they do not have managed care contracts or 
fee schedules with any insurance companies. They will collect insurance information and bill 
insurance for the patient on the chance a patient’s plan offers out-of-network coverage. 
Otherwise, all patients pay fees established by the practice. The staff observed and interviewed 
there include Dr. Andy, Dr. Grant, Tricia, Karlee, Danica, Alexis, and Katherine. Finally, I 
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interviewed Dr. Karen, who started her career working for a practice that accepted Medicaid but 
has since gone into business for herself. Dr. Karen’s office does not accept Medicaid. The 
interview with Dr. Karen provided additional insight and contrast to the observations and 
interviews conducted at the two observation sites.  
The observations and experiences described by participants are the basis of the 
disjunctures described in this chapter. It is these disjunctures that demonstrate how dental staff 
experiences with SHCN patients are often complicated by the layers of bureaucracy that 
surround an interaction in addition to the economic factors often cited as reasons dental offices 
elect not to participate in Medicaid programs.  
Layers of Bureaucracy  
Titchkosky (2020) describes bureaucracy as “a collection of tasks impartially ordered 
through institutionally established cost/benefit rationality that provides the routines for the 
impersonal workings of mass consumerism” (p. 207). This definition conforms with Habermas’s 
rationalized systems and institutional ethnography’s concept of ruling relations, specifically the 
explanation for how bureaucracy transcends from a routine to a form of governance. From a 
policy perspective, this transcendence emphasizes and prioritizes the operationalized system and 
measures its functionality as an indicator of quality instead of asking how the routine benefits 
individuals in society, for whom it was designed. As discussed in Chapter 4, insurance has 
rationalized the patient out of the ruling relation. Experiences and interactions between patients 
and staff become invisible work that is not captured or calculated by the ruling relation. These 
experiences and invisible work are the disjunctures experienced by dental office staff. For SHCN 
patients, this invisible work at the disjuncture is amplified because unlike more typical patients, 
it may be impossible to leave behind other social or ruling relations at the dental office doors. 
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Chapter 4 described how social relations between dental providers and patients can extend past 
the patient to their employer. However, the social relation that exists between the patient and 
their employer is typically not relevant in a dental visit. A patient’s day-to-day responsibilities 
are likely put on hold once they enter a dental office, where the social relation between the 
patient and dental provider takes priority. For an SHCN patient, it may not be so easy to divest 
themselves of the social relations that continue to control and direct their person. For dental 
office staff at the local setting, these layers of bureaucracy create dissonance and kinks that do 
not conform to the rationalized ruling relation, and it becomes their work to smooth out the 
experience so that the ruling relation can be applied to the situation.  
Lipsky (2010) posits that “the poorer people are, the greater the influence street-level 
bureaucrats tend to have over them” (p. 6). He describes street-level bureaucrats as public service 
workers who interact directly with citizens and have a certain level of discretion in their work. 
This definition includes teachers, counselors, social workers, police officers, and anyone else 
who coordinates access to government programs or services. By this definition and description, 
SHCN are under greater influence from street-level bureaucrats and the social relations that 
coordinate bureaucratic action compared to their peers without special medical needs. People 
with disabilities are twice as likely to live in poverty compared to people without disabilities, and 
more than 65 percent of work-age adults with disabilities rely on at least one safety net or 
income support program (NCD, 2017) and the estimates for PWD using Medicaid is 75 percent 
(Decker, 2011).  
People who use Medicaid to pay for healthcare services are immediately layered in one 
cloak of bureaucracy by accessing this government service. Though fee-for-service Medicaid is 
based on a private insurance model, the ruling relation of Medicaid operates on a more personal 
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level for the patient. The Medicaid eligibility criteria of income and disability status means that 
the body is consistently ruled and regulated. Since changes in life circumstances (marriage, 
divorce, birth, and income) can change those qualifications, these changes must be reported 
(DMAS, 2019); thus reflecting just one example of how SHCN patients using Medicaid are 
consistently layered in bureaucracy, no matter where they are. Following are examples of how 
SHCN patients are saddled with extra layers of bureaucracy from pediatric to adult dental care. 
These examples are not an exhaustive list of the bureaucracies that affect SHCN patients; what is 
represented are the relevant examples from observations and interviews. 
Pediatric SHCN and Bureaucracy  
SHCN pediatric patients are not immune to bureaucracy ruling, especially compared to 
their peers without SHCN. Consider a typical pediatric patient who visits Dr. Calvin’s office. An 
appointment is made for them based on a date and time that is most convenient for their 
caregiver. The relative ease of making this appointment is admittedly highly dependent on the 
caregiver’s flexibility, but that is likely the biggest impediment to scheduling. To acknowledge 
that the student’s dental appointment takes priority over other responsibilities, the student and 
caregiver are offered an excused absence template for school and work, as shown in Figure 12.  




12 School Absentee Note 
 
Though these same parameters would seemingly apply to an SHCN patient, the reality is 
that there may be many other factors that impact scheduling. At school, the patient may receive 
additional services such as speech and language services, occupational therapy, and applied 
behavioral analysis as part of their individual education plan (IEP) under Part B of the IDEA 
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(2004). Caregivers may be loath to take their child out of school and lose precious time in these 
services. Furthermore, students with disabilities also have lower on-time graduation rates. 
Nationally, 65 percent of students with disabilities graduate on time compared to 83 percent of 
students without (Butrymowicz & Mader, 2017). The variance hints that frequent absences 
among other factors can affect graduation outcomes. A higher number of absences may be 
expected depending on the nature of an individual’s disability or, at the very least, make 
caregivers more selective about when to pull students away from educational time. In addition to 
a teacher or school administration requiring an excused absence, a caregiver of an SHCN patient 
may also be coordinating meetings with special education teachers, collaborative teachers, 
occupational therapists, speech and language pathologists, and transition coordinators. Just these 
additional layers of bureaucracy in the school setting can complicate something as mundane as 
scheduling a dentist appointment.  
Dr. Calvin was very aware of how school schedules could complicate recall or routine 
cleaning appointments. On school holidays, Dr. Calvin adjusts his typical schedule so that he 
only sees recalls to maximize the number of patients he sees on those days. Though 
appointments on school holidays or later afternoon hours were the most requested, Dr. Calvin 
was one of the few doctors at his practice who would adjust his schedule on days when school 
was closed. His choice to do so was simply to accommodate, but it was a decision that respected 
the fact that many caregivers were already taking those days off to provide childcare, and it eased 
their burden.   
Transportation can also prove to be a major barrier for pediatric SHCN patients. 
Dr. Calvin’s office is not located near any public transportation, and for students and their 
families with limited transportation options, this can pose a huge barrier. Dr. Calvin recounted to 
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me that before their office moved even farther away from the bus line, one patient and her 
mother used to walk 2 miles on pedestrian unfriendly roads to get to their office. If this patient 
were to be scheduled during a school day, it would necessitate nearly a full day off from school 
and work for the caregiver. The time required to ride various bus lines to the closest bus stop and 
then walk 2 miles is a significant time burden.  
Though some patients using Medicaid would be eligible for nonemergency medical 
transportation (NEMT)6, the use of this service creates a layer of bureaucracy and still requires a 
significant time commitment to both schedule and use the service. The Virginia Medicaid NEMT 
Member Manual details how patients are required to schedule reservations 5 business days in 
advance of an appointment; urgent NEMT appointments can be made 24 hours in advance by 
phone only. Patients are also expected to give return times of when they will be ready to be 
picked up, which I would argue is a somewhat unreasonable request given my personal 
experiences with doctor appointments. Once the request is approved, the patient is given a trip 
reference number that they are responsible for even though the trip reference number does not 
confirm that the reservation has been assigned to a transportation company yet. Cancellations 
also require 24-hour notice, and failure to cancel a trip will result in a no-show documentation. 
The day of the appointment, the patient is expected to be ready 15 minutes prior to the scheduled 
pick-up time as the driver has a 30-minute window to pick up the patient, spanning from 
15 minutes prior to the scheduled pick-up time to 15 minutes after the pick-up time. Finally, the 
member responsibilities page lists as the last item a suggestion that the patient have someone else 
as a backup to provide transportation and receive reimbursement in the event the transportation 
                                               
6
 In Virginia, ineligible Medicaid members are those enrolled in a Medicaid Managed Care Organization 
(MCO). They may still be entitled to NEMT depending on the specific MCO they are enrolled in (DMAS, 2020). 
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provider cancels the appointment or is delayed (Logisticare, 2018). The image in Figure 13 is 
from the NEMT manual and demonstrates how this option is also not without bureaucratic 
difficulties and time commitments.  
Figure 13 
13 NEMT Mileage Reimbursement Instructions 
 
NEMT is an example of a Medicaid-based ruling relation that can have a direct effect on 
the SHCN patient–provider relation (as one would expect, staff at both offices complained that 
these services were notoriously tardy and that patients were often left waiting well after an 
appointment ended). The rationalized system requires that the patient demonstrate multiple 
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layers of compliance between scheduling and riding NEMT, and should they choose 
reimbursement as a transportation option, they must be willing to demonstrate patience for a 
multiple-week turnaround to receive reimbursement (Logisticare, 2018). NEMT can only be 
considered free transportation if one does not value time. Unlike the ruling relation described in 
Chapter 4, the SHCN patient has not been rationalized out of the system, rather the SHCN 
patient has been rationalized into a list of compliance and eligibility requirements. Their body 
and the bureaucratic management of it has become part of the system. 
Bureaucracy as a Mitigating Factor. NEMT demonstrates how Medicaid, as a 
bureaucracy, absorbs the patient into the system by rationalizing them into eligibility criteria and 
compliance measures. This action maintains the “idea” of the patient as part of the system and 
can have a mitigating effect from a care perspective. This is especially the case with pediatric 
preventative coverage. For example, consider the code for behavior management. When a patient 
requires additional time or a high level of staff support to complete a procedure, code D9920 or 
behavior management can be used. In the typical insurance ruling relation, this code would likely 
be denied according to staff at Dr. Calvin’s office. In contrast, Medicaid is one of the few 
insurances that will reimburse D9920 when clinical notes explaining the need for behavior 
management are submitted. Likewise, when this code is submitted with the code for nitrous 
oxide to Medicaid, both nitrous oxide and behavior management will be covered for a pediatric 
patient (DentaQuest, 2020). This is in contrast to the lack of coverage for nitrous oxide by most 
plans, as described in Chapter 4.  
 By covering these procedures often denied by private insurances, Medicaid is 
acknowledging the nature and needs of the patients covered by Medicaid and maintaining their 
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visibility in the dental–insurance relation. Figure 14 visually depicts how Medicaid as a social 
relation does not lose sight of the SHCN patient when reimbursing the dental office.  
Figure 14 
14 Medicaid–Dental Provider–Patient Social Relation 
 
 
This provides a stark contrast to the typical insurance ruling relation where the patient maintains 
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invisibility. As described in Chapter 4, the default was to defer to the patient’s insurance plan 
without consideration of the individual patient. For example, Figure 15 shows a pediatric 
patient’s predetermination where the code D9248 for oral sedation, required in part by the 
patient’s young age, was denied. Because oral sedation was denied, the full cost of $273 falls to 
the parents despite, as Jessica describes it, “Crazy. These 3-year-olds aren’t going to sit still.” 
Figure 15 
15 Predetermination: Behavior Management Denial 
 
Another example, depicted in Figure 16, also denies nitrous oxide treatment but places 
the burden on the dental provider by writing that there was no evidence given to justify its need. 
Even though, again, it was used in part because of the patient’s young age.  
Figure 16 
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16 Predetermination: Nitrous Oxide Denial 
 
Interestingly, Dr. Calvin’s office would code for behavior management when it was 
required, even for private insurances they knew would not reimburse it. Jessica explained that 
though they do not receive payment for this code, it is still used to keep a record should they 
need to charge the parents in the future for a broken appointment because of uncooperative 
behavior from the patient. This action demonstrates how, unlike the ruling relation between 
Medicaid and SHCN patients, insurance is disconnected from the patient. The reality is that the 
dental office becomes not only the dental care provider but also the initial representee of the 
insurance company. Though they are not part of the insurance company institution, their 
participation in the social relation requires that they become the educators to patients on their 
insurance plans; they are now responsible for implementing both the office’s policies and the 
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policies of the patient’s insurance. By recording and coding items they know will not be 
reimbursed, they are attempting to place the patient back into the social relation, if only, at the 
very least, to create a textualized documentation of noncompliance in their own records.  
Though rationalizing the pediatric SHCN patient into the bureaucratic Medicaid system 
can prove to be a mitigating factor when it comes to accessing care, this is not the case with adult 
SHCN patients. Adult care functions under a different set of rationalized systems. Between 
Medicaid coverage for pediatric care and the nature of pediatric dentistry, it is more likely for an 
SHCN pediatric patient using Medicaid to find a community provider. A mystery shopper survey 
conducted in Virginia in 2018 showed that appointment rates between Virginia’s Medicaid 
program, Smiles for Children7, and a private insurance, Delta Dental, were similar (Yarbrough, 
2019). Dr. Grant provided insight when he shared that “pediatric dentistry is a lot of volume and 
you can grow your practice through Medicaid, but as a general dentist, it’s not really going to 
work.” 
Adult SHCN and Bureaucracy 
The bureaucracy adult SHCN patients are beholden to is different from pediatric SHCN 
patients in one fundamental manner: namely, the assumed inability to participate competitively 
in society. Chapters 2 and 4 discussed how SHCN patients are subjected to the medical gaze to 
legitimize their disability to access social supports and services. By doing so, SHCN patients not 
only initiate multiple bureaucratic ruling relations, they are also engaging in a ruling relation that 
“measures and documents people’s lack of function in relation to the possible provision of 
                                               
7 Smiles for Children is Virginia’s Medicaid and Family Access to Medical Insurance Security (FAMIS) 
program name, managed by DentaQuest. I have elected to use Medicaid and pediatric Medicaid throughout this 
study to focus on the institutional organization rather than programmatic names, that are opt to change to avoid 
stigma.  
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services oriented to assimilate or, given a failure to assimilate, legitimized exclusion” 
(Titchkosky, 2020, p. 201).  
One of the most glaring examples of legitimized exclusion is the difference between 
Medicaid dental services for adult patients compared to pediatric patients. Whereas most care for 
pediatric patients is covered, albeit at lower reimbursement rates than private insurance plans, 
only the medically necessary is covered by Medicaid for adult patients (DMAS, 2019). During 
my observation, Virginia Medicaid had rolled out new plans under CCC+ that offered additional 
coverage for adult patients, but their coverage was still severely limited compared to private 
insurance or pediatric Medicaid (VOHC, 2018)8. Furthermore, dental staff reported the rollout as 
being extremely confusing and poorly executed. Staff at Dr. Calvin’s office explained that they 
only learned about CCC+ when their patients started to ask if they accepted it, as they had 
received no information from the state about the program. This meant that participation from 
Dr. Calvin’s office was slightly delayed as the onus was on them to educate themselves about the 
program. In the end, they decided to participate in all but two of the CCC+ plans for economic 
reasons. Staff at Dr. Andy’s and Dr. Grant’s office shared that they, too, learned about the 
program from patients but were not able to participate even though they were very interested. By 
being out of network, they were not eligible to participate in the program even though they 
accept multiple patients with Medicaid. This oversight by DMAS, the agency administering 
Medicaid, demonstrates further exclusionary practices that impact adult SHCN patients at out-of-
network dental providers. These exclusions of services convey the message that adults with 
                                               
8 The cited document was written by Virginia Oral Health Coalition, now renamed Virginia Health Catalyst 
as of August 2019 (https://vahealthcatalyst.org/introducing-virginia-health-catalyst-the-intersection-of-overall-
health-and-oral-health/).  
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disabilities are either not in need of or deserving of preventive and comprehensive coverage. 
An example of how adult SHCN patients are layered in exclusion bureaucracies is how 
many of them combat the limited coverage of Medicaid by continuing to be dependents of their 
parent’s insurance. Though the ACA (2010) expanded the age to which dependents could stay on 
their parents’ insurance to 26, dependents with disabilities can continue to be on their parent’s 
insurance past this age. This allowance is a good thing from a pragmatic perspective, but it is 
also a textual and bureaucratic infantilization of SHCN patients. Rather than graduating to their 
own individual adult insurance plans, they maintain their dependent status—furthering the 
narrative that adult SHCN patients are incapable of full autonomous participation in society. 
While observing at Dr. Andy’s and Dr. Grant’s office, staff discussed SHCN patients who 
were able to be on their parent’s employer-sponsored insurance plan and Medicaid. In these 
situations, Medicaid would be the secondary insurance or payer of last resort. Though these 
patients usually had comprehensive coverage, they were subjected to the ruling relations of both 
insurance and Medicaid, which could result in additional administrative time for the staff. These 
complexities were especially complicated when the SHCN patient lived in a group home facility, 
a facility subjected to its own bureaucracy and ruling relations. Tricia shared an example where a 
patient’s group home and poor communication resulted in confusion for the family and office 
staff. The group home assumed the patient had Medicaid, but the family had two additional 
insurances that were not reported to the office. As a result, the family had contacted the office to 
ask why they were receiving billing statements because they believed insurances should have 
covered the cost of a cleaning, which Medicaid did not. To further complicate the situation, the 
patient had gotten a cleaning at the local university hospital that was not disclosed to the office 
prior to his appointment, meaning the cleaning received at their office would be denied based on 
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frequency by both the primary and secondary insurance because he had received two cleanings in 
less than 6 months. Under Medicaid’s ruling relation, a cleaning is not a medical need and 
therefore not covered. The ruling relations of the private insurances gave no consideration to the 
patient and conformed only to the system. Coverage for a cleaning is determined solely on 
insurance plans even if it is recommended that an SHCN patient come more frequently than 
6 months. Katherine, a hygienist at Dr. Andy’s and Dr. Grant’s office shared that patients often 
won’t come more than every 6 months because of insurance limitations even when they are 
recommended for shorter intervals because “they aren’t brushing their teeth as much as they 
should, and they may not have the help they need to brush their teeth as well as they should.” 
My standpoint from the dental office setting did not allow for an in-depth analysis of the 
ruling relations and bureaucracy within a group home setting, but it did allow for an observation 
of the social relation between dental staff and SHCN patients and group home counselors or 
administrators. Furthering the narrative of exclusion bureaucracy, the decision for an individual 
to live in a group home is rooted in the expectation that this individual is not able to live 
independently as a fully contributing member of society. This exclusion plays out when the 
individual is left out of or unaware of medical decisions made on their behalf. Why, if the patient 
had an established relationship with Dr. Grant’s office, was he also taken to the university 
hospital for a routine cleaning? I observed how both group home staff and dental office staff 
elected to remove the patient from these discussions, perpetuating a system of exclusion 
bureaucracy. For example, I witnessed a male adult patient attend his appointment with a 
counselor from his group home. He seemed comfortable in the office and was excited to show 
the hygienist, with whom he was familiar, his t-shirt showing a graphic of a favorite cartoon 
character. At the conclusion of his appointment, he and his counselor left without discussing 
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payment or insurance information. Karlee explained to me that payment information will be 
forwarded to the billing department at the group home because they were not able to identify the 
responsible party. The presumption that neither party, including the patient, could answer 
insurance questions was a foregone conclusion, one based on experience as these independent 
living skills were not expected of patients living in group homes.  
The difficulty of working through the layers of bureaucracy that surround adult SHCN 
patients led to specific office policy decisions. Like Dr. Calvin’s office, as in the earlier example 
provided by Jessica, an overpayment would typically be returned to the patient. However, staff 
learned that in multiple past occasions, these overpayments were not returned to the patient or 
their families. Therefore, the practice now is that Medicaid patients who reside in group homes 
will have a credit on their account because “they will always come back.” This decision was 
made both on the recognition that finding a dental office that accepts adult Medicaid patients is 
difficult, group home staff would hopefully ensure that dental appointments are kept, and that 
this was the best way to protect the overpayment funds of SHCN patients.  
SHCN adult patients and access. The difficulty that plagues adult SHCN patients in 
accessing oral healthcare is another example of exclusion bureaucracy. Though access difficulties 
are not a planned part of the rationalized ruling relation imposed by insurance, it is a 
consequence. The textual message conveyed through insurance coverage that SHCN adults 
deserve less oral healthcare is absorbed by community dental providers and results in few feeling 
a sense of obligation to treat this population. There is no moral imperative to counteract the lack 
of financial incentives.  
Chapter 4 demonstrates how ruling relations dictated by insurance companies create an 
economically tenuous situation for dentists, between low UCR schedule fees and limiting 
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approved services. In this context, it is difficult to make care of SHCN desirable when many rely 
on Medicaid, which has both lower reimbursement rates and fewer covered services. Even for 
pediatric coverage, which is much more comprehensive, Dr. Calvin expressed that Medicaid 
reimbursement rates for cleanings barely covered costs, and he did not make a profit off of one 
procedure. Beyond the low rate of reimbursement, which was her primary reason for not 
accepting Medicaid, Dr. Karen shared that her reasoning for not taking Medicaid patients was 
that she did not like feeling limited in the care she could provide.  
The problem with Medicaid is you have to do a lot of volume. It is hard to maintain a 
proper schedule. It’s not the ideal type of environment to do good dentistry...Compared to 
other insurances, you get paid $90 but maybe $30 for Medicaid; so, you need more 
volume. Put two or three [patients] in the same amount of time for one patient so you 
have less time per patient...You can’t do quality general work...With Medicaid there is no 
room for error, no room for late appointments. 
When asked under what circumstances she would accept Medicaid, Dr. Karen exclaimed, “Boy!” 
and took a minute to respond before relating it back to her own experience working with foster 
kids and teens using Medicaid early in her career. Ultimately, she decided if she were working 
for someone else, like a nonprofit instead of running her own business, then she would be willing 
to work only with children using Medicaid. 
Procedures with kids are quite simple as long as you have behavior management. With 
adults, it’s more complex, I would not be doing it. I give myself plenty of time in my 
practice because I don’t like to be rushed. I need to have time and take my time, and I 
like to pamper my patients. A preference in how I do dentistry...With adults, the tooth is 
good and it can be saved, but Medicaid would only pay for the cheaper option. I don’t 
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want to take out good teeth as a dentist. Down the road, it could lead to more problems. 
We are more aware now of how oral healthcare affects the rest of our body. The ones who 
have more problems later are the ones that have a really bad bite, and that puts more 
pressure and problems on the teeth they have left, and they end up with more work later 
on. Teeth become more stable after orthodontic care; take out a tooth, things move, 
become less stable. We know more now.  
Dr. Karen’s example illustrates again how Medicaid’s exclusion-based rationalization prioritizes 
the medicalization of disability over an individual’s long-term quality of health—implying that 
long-term health is not consequential to SHCN patients.  
Regardless of the reasoning, it is much more difficult to find an adult provider who 
accepts Medicaid. For children, the oral health status between Medicaid-enrolled children and 
non-Medicaid-enrolled children is insignificant, whereas double the percentage of Medicaid-
enrolled adults compared to non-Medicaid-enrolled adults who do not plan on seeing a dentist in 
the next 12 months. Medicaid-enrolled adults identify lack of covered services and difficulty 
finding a dentist who accepts Medicaid as the two primary reasons they do not plan to visit a 
dentist office (Yarbrough et al., 2014). Therefore, it is no surprise that the office of Dr. Andy and 
Dr. Grant has a well-known reputation for being one of the few community dental offices to 
accept adult SHCN patients with Medicaid in their area. In fact, when I started my observation, 
they had just made the decision to suspend their acceptance of new Medicaid patients because 
they were inundated and were having difficulty scheduling all of their patients, especially the 
ones that required general anesthesia at a nearby hospital for care. This was not a decision they 
took lightly, as both Dr. Andy and Dr. Grant felt it was their responsibility to take SHCN patients 
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and were frustrated that more dentists in the area did not accept them.  
When asked about his decision to accept Medicaid, Dr. Andy said, “Medicaid doesn’t 
make us money. Haven’t looked at it analytically but [accepting it was] what we were going to 
do no matter what.” Dr. Grant expressed frustration that they were often on the receiving end of 
referrals from the local dentistry teaching university.  
...places like that should be training and are instead turning [SHCN] patients away 
because they aren’t a good educational experience. Chicken and Egg problem. If you 
aren’t training, you won’t have people who can treat them. Claim they are not a good 
education experience because they aren’t sitting still, but that is the educational 
experience!  
In this manner, perceptions of what makes a good educational experience were contributing to 
access issues. Though not fully analyzed for the purposes of this paper, a future textual analysis 
of what constitutes dental education could reveal how ruling relations within dentistry and 
education shape access to care for SHCN patients. Dr. Grant shared that their practice is 
approximately 90/10 SHCN Medicaid patients to Medicaid patients who are financially eligible. 
He does feel that some people are hesitant to take on SHCN patients and, because they cannot 
legally say they will not treat SHCN patients, they end up not accepting Medicaid at all, thereby 
limiting access for all Medicaid patients.  
Considering how difficult it is for adult SHCN patients to find community dental 
providers, it is not surprising that many pediatric SHCN patients fail to transition to dental 
providers for adults. Dr. Calvin continues to provide care to quite a few adult patients and cover 
what expenses he can. When asked if they had a transition plan for patients aging out of pediatric 
PROFESSIONAL AUTONOMY AND MEDICAID PWD 113 
 
 
care, Dr. Calvin responded, “No. What we do is we will take care of them as long as they want to 
be treated here. Unless it becomes a risk or requires services we can’t provide, like adult crowns 
and periodontal surgeries that would be better handled by general dentists who have practice 
with people with disabilities or hospitals who can handle medically compromised.” Not 
surprisingly, Dr. Calvin confirmed that it was very hard to find general practices that would 
accept and treat adult patients who had aged out. Similar to Dr. Andy and Dr. Grant, he described 
accepting Medicaid patients as a moral obligation and extended that to his adult SHCN patients. 
Echoing Dr. Andy and Dr. Grant, Dr. Calvin also shared that he believes he received much more 
clinical education on how to work with SHCN patients than dentistry students currently in 
school.  
By accepting Medicaid patients, Drs. Andy, Grant, and Calvin are all fulfilling what they 
see as a moral obligation of their profession. Though low reimbursement was discussed candidly 
in their interviews with me, what I observed and felt was the most interesting aspect were the 
ways in which Medicaid policies mirrored or differed from private insurance and the effect those 
differences had on dental office staff and their work. By completing insurance paperwork and 
sending bills to patients, administrative office staff became the conduit through which 
institutional powers were transmitted via text. They flattened and objectified patients into textual 
accounts and reanimated predeterminations, downcodes, and bills into clinical and monetary 
exchanges. To patients, they are the bureaucratic representatives of dental insurance despite 
having no official association with either private insurance companies or Medicaid.  
 Dental Staff as Bureaucrats 
What has been implied thus far in this chapter is that by agreeing to participate in a 
PROFESSIONAL AUTONOMY AND MEDICAID PWD 114 
 
 
managed care insurance plan or Medicaid, dental practitioners are agreeing that they and their 
staff will become de facto bureaucrats of the program. Figure 17 depicts how the ruling relations 
of insurance and Medicaid are filtered through dental providers, and how it is specifically dental 
staff who interface with patients and insurance representatives.  
Figure 17 
17 Staff as Bureaucrats 
 
Insurance information is not only collected during the initial patient interaction that 
activates social relations, it is also monitored and tracked by administrative staff throughout the 
lifespan of a patient. This work becomes a primary responsibility for administrative staff, and as 
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insurance policies and billing become more complex, the time requirement grows. Jessica shared 
that when she first started at Dr. Calvin’s office 24 years ago, insurance was much less complex. 
Back then, the insurance wasn’t so crazy. Not as many options, and it was pretty much 
they brought you a card. Now no one has cards, you have to research what kind of 
insurance they have. But they brought you their card, and we put it in. There was no 
estimate or debating. They got a bill, and they paid it. Now they want to know to the 
penny what they are going to owe. It’s a lot more complicated. The insurance part of it 
has really grown from what it was when we started.  
The growing complexity of insurance has also meant that the administrative team has grown 
from two to the eight individuals I observed at the office. Jessica also detailed how some staff 
responsibilities were broken up based on insurance activities. Camilla at the front desk checks 
and verifies insurance information, Stella is in charge of surgery predeterminations, and Gwen 
does credentialing. It should be acknowledged that the office as a whole has grown in both 
number of partners and patients, so this increase in staff cannot be contributed to insurance alone.  
Any observation of a dental front office will demonstrate the amount of time dedicated to 
monitoring insurance. I observed staff at Dr. Andy’s and Dr. Grant’s office verify insurance 
information before appointments to confirm it was still active. They shared that changes to 
insurance statuses happen all the time, especially at the beginning of the calendar year or policy 
year. Frequently patients change jobs and forget to inform staff of changes to their employer-
based insurance. Sometimes patients are not aware of limitations of their insurance prior to 
interacting with dental staff. Alexis at Drs. Andy and Grant makes it a point to also confirm that 
there are no insurance waiting periods for new patients who may not be aware that they are not 
eligible for coverage until a certain amount of time has elapsed. Staff also described one time 
PROFESSIONAL AUTONOMY AND MEDICAID PWD 116 
 
 
when an employer insurance plan dropped dental coverage, and their patients using that plan 
weren’t even aware of the change. In that case, it became the staff’s responsibility to inform the 
patients.  
The role of staff doubling as bureaucrats is not limited to enrolling and monitoring 
patients’ participation in insurance or Medicaid. Lipsky (2010) states, “a defining facet of the 
working environment of street-level bureaucrats is that they must deal with clients’ personal 
reaction to their decision, however they cope with their implications” (p. 9). Jessica describes 
how even when decisions are facilitated by insurance policies, it is she who has to manage 
customer expectations and ire. “Even if it was the estimate insurance gave us, but when the final 
claim comes in, it’ll be different and the parents will call us. Even though it’s an insurance thing, 
they [parents] will call us, and we get the angry phones calls and things like that, so it’s 
difficult.”  
In their role as bureaucrats, dental staff are also fulfilling the responsibilities described by 
Lipsky (2010) to socially construct and educate the client on bureaucratic expectations. 
However, staff perform work for two different bureaucratic systems, a private insurance system 
and a public safety net system. Where the patient has been rationalized out of the private 
insurance system, staff responsibilities focus more on constructing the patient into textualized 
formats that can be conveyed to insurance administrators and on educating patients on their 
benefits and allowances. For Medicaid, staff become responsible for “teaching the client role” 
(Lipsky, p. 61) or confirming patient compliance. Operating in these two systems requires both 
different work and different patient interaction.  
Private Bureaucracies 
Chapter 4 detailed how insurance policies operate as a ruling relation dictating patient 
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access and care. Unlike government aid programs where consumers can be described as 
nonvoluntary and expendable (Lipsky, 2010), insurance acceptance becomes the main driver by 
which patients select providers. This means that dental office staff not only become the public 
interface of a bureaucracy, they are also expected to provide customer service and satisfaction for 
the economic viability of the dental office. Various office forms include lines for signatures to 
acknowledge an understanding of office and patient responsibilities, as depicted in Figure 18.  




18 Office Text: Patient Responsibility 
 
These expectations include patient responsibility to know individual insurance benefits. 
However, it is acknowledged by dental staff that this simply does not happen. Even when 
discussing the benefits of being out of network for a provider, Jessica admitted that as a parent or 
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patient, she would not go to a doctor who was out of network if it would require her to file her 
own insurance claim. “It’s a lot of work. If I were shopping around that [provider filing] would 
be a big plus. You are paying for someone to help you.” 
The ruling relations of insurance and its role in patient choice are so prevalent that even 
the staff of Dr. Andy and Dr. Grant, who have chosen to be out of network, are still liable for 
patient education and plan explanations. For them, they often find themselves explaining the 
limitations or maximums of an insurance plan in the context of being out of network at their 
office. Dr. Andy feels that patients don’t understand the way insurance in dental care functions, 
which he feels is more akin to a benefits plan versus an insurance plan. “People believe 
insurance means access to care...good dental insurance means you get $1,500 maybe $2,000 
coverage and a lot of money goes into propping up insurance companies who move pennies 
around.”  
The ability for patients to move from provider to provider means their transient nature 
can come at an economic loss for dental providers. In addition to patient education, I observed 
lots of patient advocacy during disputes with insurance companies. This included my 
observations at Dr. Andy’s and Dr. Grant’s office despite their out-of-network status. For 
example, I observed Tricia speak with the patient, insurance representative, and administration at 
an oral surgeon’s office when a treatment plan had been denied by insurance. Tricia believed that 
the insurance claim had been improperly submitted at the oral surgeon’s office, causing 
insurance to deny it based on frequency because they had not processed the claim for extractions 
yet and were denying implants based on recent denture coverage. Tricia received information on 
how to resubmit the claim and worked with the oral surgeon’s office to start the resubmission. 
Tricia willingly performed all this work for the elderly patient and his wife as an act of added 
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customer service. This work is in addition to the time spent filing claims for patients and fielding 
questions from patients.  
A good illustration of how dental offices have to balance both patient and insurance 
interaction comes from another example given by staff at Dr. Andy’s and Dr. Grant’s office. On 
one particular day, I observed that the phones were ringing much more frequently than during my 
last observation. Danica explained that a lot of them were questions for billing statements that 
had just been sent out. Many of these billing statements said “90 days overdue” and for many 
patients this was actually the first time they were receiving a bill. This quirk arose because the 
bills were not processed until after insurance paid, which was after 90 days since the procedure 
was completed. There is no late fee for the patient because it is just the leftover balance, and they 
usually explain this at check out, but they still get phone calls about it each month. Here, the 
insurance company controls not only capital but time as a resource as well. Office staff reported 
that it usually requires 3 to 4 weeks for a claim to be processed, and when it does take more than 
90 days it is because a claim has been denied at one point or another. This back and forth 
requires a lot of administrative time and gets to a point where it may no longer be worth the 
frustration. Underscoring my observation at Dr. Andy’s and Dr. Grant’s office, Dr. Calvin shared 
that they had recently dropped participation in some insurance plans for this exact reason. 
Some plans they would pay fairly well or they would say they would pay fairly well and 
[you] jump through hoops to get authorization numbers and preauthorize it. And then you 
would submit the claim with the authorization number, and they would deny it even 
though they already said that they were going to approve it. And they would play this 
game for 4 to 5 months before they finally paid, and we finally told them, “this really 
isn’t worth it to us even if you pay our full fee because it takes 6 months to get the money 
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and all this administrative time to do it so we are going to drop you because we were fair 
to you. We gave you our honest opinion on what we were going to do, we performed the 
work for your patient, and then you strung us along. 
The time insurance companies were willing to spend disputing or denying claims was especially 
frustrating for staff not only because it was withholding capital, but because of its seeming 
hypocrisy as some insurances require a claim to be filed within 90 days or it will be 
automatically denied on the basis of lack of timely filing.  
 Not officially being part of private insurance companies can position staff to be in an 
awkward position in their bureaucratic role. Earlier I described the chaotic rollout of CCC+ as a 
new plan from Medicaid. Such situations are not limited to public bureaucracies and can be more 
problematic when attempting to balance customer service with rationalized ruling relations. 
Jessica shared an example where a woman claimed that Dr. Calvin’s office was listed on a 
website as a location participating in discount plans. She was very upset when the office said 
they did not participate but decided to continue with treatment for her child as there was a 
discount for self-pay. Later, the office learned that they were indeed listed on the website without 
their knowledge because they are Anthem providers and under an umbrella group loophole, were 
unknowingly also participating in other Anthem programs. Jessica was since able to get the 
office taken off the website, but she did call the mother back to explain and apologize, “I want to 
make you happy. It was a mistake on the [part of the] insurance company, signing us up for 
something we didn’t sign up for, but I want to honor this discount to you, and we will leave it on 
for the next time you come in.”  
The added level of patient education and customer service puts additional work on dental 
administration. For these reasons, the ease or difficulty working with different insurance 
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companies became a large component of interviews and observations. One thing that came up 
frequently in my conversations with Jessica was whether or not a company’s website was easy to 
navigate.  
The websites are very important...We like to take the main ones where we know we can 
get online, get their benefits, and call it a day. If you cannot, and someone is waiting on 
you, it can be an easy 10- to 30-minute call...any other questions or claims that have been 
out too long, I put aside. Thursday is my insurance day, and I dread it. Because I’m on 
hold or my ear starts hurting. We are at their mercy. 
The flow of textual information from insurance companies to dental providers depicted in 
Figure 17 is evident in the example provided by Jessica. After the office has submitted a 
textualized objectification of the patient to insurance, they are now responsible for retrieving the 
insurance company’s benefits available to that patient. Calling the insurance company requires 
relying on an insurance representative’s understanding and knowledge, which Jessica shared that 
she frequently does not trust. Furthermore, Jessica mentioned that when she does find a good 
representative or point of contact at an insurance company, they don’t stay there for long because 
of the high turnover in those positions. Rather, accessing policy benefits and information from a 
website is more convenient and streamlines the flow of information or ruling relation from 
insurance to the dental office.  
 In contrast, Dr. Andy explained that the office’s decision to be out of network was 
primarily due to a desire to have less ruling relation in how they provided care. Though they are 
not able to escape all aspects of insurance’s ruling relation as they continue to bill insurance for 
patients with out-of-network benefits, they are not as reliant on insurance’s control of resources, 
both in terms of patients and insurance coverage.  
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We felt like the insurance companies were coming between our relationship with our 
patients by disallowing things and at the clerical level. There was a financial part, too, the 
cost of doing business with them. We were losing money by the time we accepted their 
fee. When we did this [go out of network], one of the benefits was you have a filter. Now 
we hardly ever hear about what insurance will pay. 
During my observation at Dr. Andy’s and Dr. Grant’s office, I learned from Tricia and Karlee 
that many of the office’s patients had initially come for a second opinion and stayed when they 
learned that some of the original treatment plan they had been prescribed was heavily dictated by 
what their plan would or would not allow. In many cases, the treatment plan proposed by their 
offices required less work, and it ended up being either a similar cost or cheaper even out of 
network. Dr. Grant shared, “people come in for a second opinion and every little thing is charged 
out. When we have people, who come to our office from other places, they are surprised when 
we don’t charge for certain things. It’s because, now we don’t have to.”  
 By choosing not to participate in insurance plans, Drs. Andy and Grant were opting to 
focus more on customer service over rationalized bureaucracy. They could provide care without 
consideration of treatment benefits, and this provided them more leeway in how to provide care. 
Though the nature of their profession still puts them under the yoke of insurance ruling relations, 
their position is more tangential and indirect compared to Dr. Calvin’s practice. In addition, 
Dr. Andy provided another reason for why they decided to go out of network. He shared a 
specific example of a self-pay patient who required a lot of work. The fact that this patient, who 
was paying cash, paid entirely different amounts from patients with insurance bothered him.  
It didn’t sit well with me to have two different systems. Now everyone gets charged the 
same. Charging someone without insurance more than someone who has a corporate C-
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suite health insurance plan didn’t seem fair. Besides, it’s not insurance, it’s a benefits 
program. Insurance is a different concept. Insurance is against loss. Better without 
[insurance], but we need to have something else, like Medicaid. 
Dr. Andy’s and Dr. Grant’s decision to be out of network allows them to be more transparent in 
their prices and equitable to their patients. There are no differences in payment structures 
dependent on agreed insurance contract fee schedules. Furthermore, their decision to be out of 
network may have made being a Medicaid provider easier. “In a way, being out of network 
subsidizes but does not directly affect the setting of our fee schedule; indirectly it may.”  Ways to 
encourage increased participation in Medicaid is an area that deserves attention given its 
importance to the treatment of SHCN patients and patients who cannot afford private dental 
insurance. Though there are unique disjunctures that arise because of a dental provider’s decision 
to participate, there are also some surprising ways in which Medicaid eases the process of being 
a public bureaucrat.  
Public Bureaucracy  
Agreeing to participate in Medicaid is not simply agreeing to participate in another 
managed care plan. It is agreeing to become a bureaucrat of a government subsidy program and 
to take on the additional responsibility of coordinating with other bureaucracies that 
simultaneously manage the bodies of SHCN patients. Dr. Calvin, Dr. Andy, and Dr. Grant all 
describe accepting Medicaid as a moral obligation. In fact, Dr. Andy and Dr. Grant bemoaned 
that the ADA did not emphasize it more in their code of ethics. They both recalled that their 
decision to participate in Medicaid stemmed from a campaign by the VDA, the “Take Five 
Initiative.” This initiative corresponded with raising reimbursement rates and encouraged dental 
providers to take five Medicaid, preferably adult, patients. Dr. Andy shared that their office 
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already had SHCN patients, so the decision to participate made sense and was best for their 
existing clients anyway.  
Though accepting pediatric Medicaid patients is more prevalent compared to adult 
patients, Dr. Calvin goes a step further to state that he used Medicaid to build his business. When 
he first started his business, he needed to build up his clientele and actively sought out patients 
who were being turned away from other local safety nets. This required him to become a 
Medicaid provider and helped him build a reputation for treating SHCN patients and accepting 
Medicaid.  
We have patients that [sic] come from Emporia. When I started, I treated a family that 
[sic] owned a taxicab company, and for years they would bring…every day, they would 
bring a cab full of Medicaid kids from Emporia.  
The increased coverage afforded to pediatric Medicaid patients and types of procedures makes it 
easier to build a pediatric practice using Medicaid. In contrast, Dr. Grant states that it would be 
much more difficult for general practitioners to grow their practice through Medicaid. However, 
he declares that “if you can make money doing it, dentists would do it.” Indeed, Dr. Andy shares 
that during the 2008 recession when a lot of other providers were suffering, they were doing fine 
because they could rely on their SHCN Medicaid patients.  
 Providers are prohibited from billing Medicaid members for any Medicaid-covered 
service (Lewin Group, 2009), even if out of network. This means that unlike private insurance 
plans, providers like Dr. Andy and Dr. Grant cannot charge a patient for fees not covered by the 
managed care plan. Therefore, there is no incentive to take on Medicaid patients with low 
reimbursements and limited coverage. What Drs. Andy and Grant have done to make their care 
of SHCN patients economically viable, though, is to provide hospital-based care in addition to 
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routine recalls or cleanings. Patients who are not able to be treated in an office or who require 
extensive treatment are put under general anesthesia for cleanings and extractions. Dr. Grant 
shares, “even with Medicaid, you could generate $1200 to $1500 in a couple of hours.” He does 
not, however, advocate for hospital-based treatment as a first option for a variety of reasons. If a 
patient only needs one extraction, that would be a reimbursement of $70 and would not be worth 
it for the patient or provider. Hospital treatment also precludes some procedures like a root canal 
and crown, which are two-step procedures and would require being put under and charged twice 
for a hospital fee.  
 Hospital-based care, however, is an excellent example of the multiple layers of 
bureaucracy that providers must navigate through. Many of the patients Dr. Grant treats in the 
hospital are covered by Medicaid and Medicare, and this frequently presents confusion to 
hospital administration. Though Medicaid will cover dental treatment in the hospital as a medical 
necessity, it is not uncommon for hospital staff to question Medicare coverage of the hospital 
visit, which is important because the operating room charges $60 per minute. Dr. Grant reports 
getting pushback from the local hospital where they take their patients because the procedure is 
dental and not perceived as medical. When this happens, they are able to contact the CEO of the 
hospital who will push through hospital approval, but this pattern “rears its head every couple of 
years when there is new staff.” If they require additional assistance, they are able to contact 
Medicaid directly, which is another way in which Medicaid differs from private insurance 
companies. 
Dr. Grant reports that when they have needed assistance from Medicaid, they do have a 
point person that they can contact. This person was responsive and helpful when they needed to 
get hospital approval for procedures. Dr. Grant also recalls this individual at local professional 
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meetings promoting her role and services to Medicaid providers. Jessica from Dr. Calvin’s office 
similarly reports that they know who to call at Medicaid if they ever have an issue. Not only is 
this in direct contrast to private insurances, where high turnover prevents the cultivation of such 
a relationship, they also trust and hold their Medicaid contact in high regard. Furthermore, this 
relationship provides them with a sense of autonomy in their relationship with Medicaid. 
Unlike private insurance companies, where participants report feeling like they are “at 
their mercy” or powerless to influence policies, all participants described some way in which 
they felt more autonomy in their relationship with Virginia Medicaid. In addition to having a 
direct contact at Medicaid, Dr. Andy reported going to the General Assembly (GA) to advocate 
the raising of Medicaid reimbursement rates. Dr. Calvin sits on an advisory committee that 
coordinates work between DMAS and the VDA and gives examples of how his advocacy over 
the past 15 years has helped to make Medicaid easier to use for providers.  
One of the first things we did was make the dental part, make it look like any commercial 
carrier...It used to be 15 years ago each HMO ran their own dental part, and the patients 
could switch once a month. So, it could be a child needed six cavities and needed to go to 
the operating room, and they had CareNet and now they have VA Premiere, and they 
didn’t honor each other’s preauthorizations. So, it was a nightmare, and you would go the 
day before surgery, [and be told] we can’t do that now! So, we have gotten that straight.  
Gwen gives another example of how Dr. Calvin’s influence can be used with Medicaid, 
“Dr. [Calvin’s] voice is heard. If I’m working with my specific rep, who is wonderful, if there is 
a push-pull situation, all I have to say is, ‘Dr. [Calvin],’ and it matters.” 
 In addition to an increased sense of autonomy, participants reported that Medicaid was 
easier to work. When asked the difference between Medicaid and private insurance, Gwen shared 
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that administratively there was a “lack of downcoding, more black and white. There isn’t a big 
difference at all, sometimes Medicaid is easier to work with.” Jessica echoed these sentiments 
during observations and said that Medicaid took much less administrative time compared to 
other insurances, “you know what they will approve and what they will not.” After observing 
Camilla review predeterminations, I asked if she had any for Medicaid. She responded that they 
don’t really have to do predeterminations for Medicaid because they know what procedures will 
be covered. Dr. Andy described working with Medicaid as “liberating” because he did not have 
to worry about insurance and could focus on care, especially for pregnant and postpartum 
patients. Dr. Calvin acknowledges lower payments but pointed out that “Medicaid will pay for 
[behavior management] that private insurance will not.”  
Though the more streamlined nature of Medicaid bureaucracy is administratively 
beneficial for dental providers, the decision to rationalize the patient into the system creates other 
bureaucratic responsibilities for dental staff. For example, dental providers are not allowed to 
charge Medicaid patients for missed appointments (DentaQuest, 2020). Though a nominal fee 
can be applied to patients with private insurances to both offset the expense of a missed 
appointment and provide a disincentive for breaking appointments, this is not allowed with 
Medicaid patients. Missed appointments or no-shows are a significant problem for Medicaid 
patients. Nationwide, it is estimated that 30 percent of Medicaid patients miss appointments 
(McPherson, 2008), and this can have a deleterious impact on oral health for the patient. For the 
dental provider, missed appointments can be extremely costly, and the high rate of missed 
appointments among Medicaid patients is often cited as a reason to not participate as a Medicaid 
provider (Decker, 2011; Kennedy, 2009). Dr. Calvin spelled it out in economic terms for how 
detrimental no-shows were for his bottom line.  
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I like to give this math example. The ADA overhead is 65 cents on the dollar. So, for a 
procedure that costs $100, you should have $35 in profit...Well okay, the patient doesn’t 
come that day. It still costs you $65 because you reserved that spot for that patient. The 
patient comes the next time, it still costs you $65 again for that patient. You have paid out 
$135 to get $100 off one no-show.  
To combat missed appointments, strict office policies are created to ensure compliance. 
Figure 19 shows Dr. Calvin’s office policy toward missed appointments for their Medicaid 
patients. Considering the difficulty that many patients have finding dental providers who will 
accept Medicaid, the threat of dismissal from the office is one of the strongest weapons available 
to them.  




19 Medicaid Office Polices 
 
Here, dental providers and their staff are using their bureaucratic role and power to 
control access to oral healthcare. Though they are not allowed to charge for missed 
appointments, they are able to flex their power and authority to maintain consumer compliance, 
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thereby reinforcing expectations of a proper consumer. Furthermore, the preceding image and 
text clearly state that lack of transportation will not be considered a valid excuse to miss an 
appointment. The earlier analysis of NEMT demonstrates the considerable time burden required 
to access and use this transportation, but these outside barriers do not factor into the policies set 
up by dental providers to work within the confines of the rationalized system handed down to 
them from Medicaid. Though these are developed office policies, true to their nature as street-
level bureaucrats, staff commonly demonstrate autonomy as to when to actually enforce such 
policies. Though the language of the office policy communicates set and objective parameters, 
the reality when speaking to staff was that they did consider past patient behavior and 
circumstances. In fact, during my observation I saw only one dismissal letter to a family that had 
missed a total of 16 appointments, depicted in Figure 20.  




20 Dismissal Letter 
 
Nonetheless, the role of dental staff as bureaucrats means that they are responsible for the 
creation and implementation of policy (Lipsky, 2010), and their role as such can be especially 
impactful for SHCN patients who may be limited when it comes to accessing care. Indeed, if the 
rationalized system of an institution is not favorable to a client, the best source of resistance may 
in fact be the street-level bureaucrat that engages with the client on a personal level. The 
disjunctures that arise from conflicts between the experiential way of knowing and the 
institutional ruling relation, may become the impetus for a dental provider to subvert or 
circumvent the rational system. Farmer (2005) proposes that bureaucrats should engage in 
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thinking as playing, justice as seeking, and practice as art when attempting to stand against 
systems. By doing so, bureaucrats can “contribute to transforming those systems into 
‘arrangements’” (p. 136) and begin to deconstruct textualized forms of bureaucracy. Chapter 6 
will analyze the ways in which study participants have used their professional autonomy to resist 
ruling relations. 
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CHAPTER 6: Professional Autonomy as Acts of Resistance 
When I first began to formulate my dissertation research, I had already decided that I did 
not want to investigate the experiences of PWD accessing oral healthcare. The literature review 
revealed what I already knew to be true: PWD had difficulty finding providers, especially if they 
relied on Medicaid. My decision to adopt the standpoint of dental providers was an attempt to 
understand which factors contribute to a provider’s decision to participate in Medicaid and 
thereby increase access to care for SHCN patients. The ability for a dental provider to decide 
whether or not to participate in Medicaid is a direct example of their professional autonomy. My 
initial hypothesis was that providers primarily used their professional autonomy to navigate a 
capitalist health market, with the unfortunate side effect being that those decisions often resulted 
in the exclusion of SHCN patients. What developed from my observation and analysis was a 
mapping of ruling relations and the ways ruling relations dictate care for all patients. What added 
to the burden of providing care for SHCN patients was the need to navigate multiple layers of 
bureaucracy in addition to insurance ruling relations. Furthermore, what was revealed in my 
analysis is that though it is true that participant providers did have to navigate a capitalist health 
market to maintain economic viability, they wielded their professional autonomy more as a 
weapon against insurance ruling relations. These acts of resistance actually became the means by 
which providers fought not only to maintain economic viability but also to provide care to their 
patients, including SHCN patients. This chapter concludes my analysis by demonstrating how 
professional autonomy becomes acts of resistance and provides suggestions for future policy 
implementation.  
Where There Is Power, There Is Resistance 
Chapters 4 and 5 use institutional ethnography to map ruling relations and demonstrate 
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how those ruling relations are communicated from insurance companies down to the local setting 
by way of insurance policies, billing, and coding texts. The disjunctures described in Chapter 5 
demonstrate how these ruling relations exemplify rationalized systems that have become 
uncoupled from the lifeworld as described by Habermas (1987), creating systems of technical 
rationality that conflict with experiential and ethical ways of knowing.  
Habermas (1987) describes how the uncoupling of systems from the lifeworld results in 
autonomous organizations that rely on forms of communication removed from communicative 
actions central in the lifeworld. These forms of communication, such as money and power, create 
a social intercourse and communication that are largely disconnected from norms and values. 
This creation of autonomous organizations or bureaucratization is a symptom of laws replacing 
ethics and the rationalization or colonization of the lifeworld. Furthermore, employees in 
bureaucratic roles “detach themselves from lifeworld contexts and adapt themselves to formally 
organized domains of action” (Habermas, 1987, p. 321). This detachment can create an ethical 
dilemma as “ethical obligations to one’s calling give way to instrumental attitudes toward an 
occupational role that offers the opportunity for income and advancement” (Habermas, 1987, 
p. 323). Here we encounter the heart of the disjunctures experienced by dental staff and can 
examine how insurance ruling relations conflict with the ethical provision of care for all patients. 
Consider for example the Medicaid policy of disallowing charges or fees for missed 
appointments. As detailed in Chapter 5, no-shows are detrimental to a provider’s operating costs. 
This insurance ruling relation creates a rationalized system in which office policies are put in 
place to mitigate no-shows, and Medicaid patients who miss appointments are threatened or 
punished with dismissal. An office staff member who aligns strictly to office policies has every 
right to dismiss patients who do not adhere to office policies, and it would be in the best 
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economical interest of the dental provider, yet their decision to do so has ethical ramifications 
and potentially dire consequences for the patient. Considering the difficulty in finding a provider 
who accepts Medicaid, especially if the patient is an adult with SHCN, a dismissal could mean 
the inability to access future dental healthcare.  
Adams and Balfour (2009) detail how this adherence to technical rationality can lead to 
what they describe as administrative evil. By conforming to one’s organization role and 
responsibility, individuals perform acts of evil without any awareness of the damages caused by 
their action, and they may even justify these actions through moral inversion. Through the lens 
of technical rationality, their actions are redefined to convince them that they are doing 
something good, and the administrative evil becomes masked. By dismissing Medicaid patients 
because of no-show appointments, they are saving the provider money and opening up a spot for 
another Medicaid patient, a patient who has been better socialized to their patient status—a more 
deserving patient.  
It is often the bureaucrat who stands between technical rationality and masked 
administrative evil, specifically, it is their ability and discretion to make decisions and 
judgements that do not adhere entirely to organizational ruling relations—their street-level 
bureaucracy, as described by Lipsky (2010). This ad hoc power affords bureaucrats the 
opportunity to separate themselves from the system and reassert their individuality. Farmer 
(2005) advocates that “standing against” systems, applying a “deconstructive attitude,” and using 
“hesitation” prevent practitioners from becoming cogs themselves in the bureaucratic machine 
(p. 135). In this manner, professional autonomy offers more than just power; it also offers 
resistance. From a policy perspective, these acts of resistance must be analyzed and collected as 
it becomes a means to combat colonization of the lifeworld and reclaim power from ruling 




Foucault (1976/1978) wrote “where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather 
consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power” (p. 95). 
Because power relationships rely on institutionalized knowledge and authority, and mutually 
agreed to social relations, there is no single sovereign for external forces to overthrow. Instead, 
resistance and activism come from within. Foucault (1976/1978) describes these points of 
resistance as a swarm that can be found at any point in the power network, social stratification, 
and individual unit. Because my research is centered from the dental provider’s perspective, the 
points of resistance I observed were all at the local setting and acting against its ruling relation. 
From my observations, these acts of resistance materialized when the technical rationality of 
ruling relations revealed systemic inequities that harmed dental providers and their patients. 
Following are descriptions of such examples of resistance. 
Resistance to Levels of Care 
Throughout Chapters 4 and 5, examples were given to describe and explain how 
insurance as a ruling relation had a direct effect on provision of care. Beyond how care is 
provided, these ruling relations also dictate varying levels of care provided to patients. Because 
private and public insurances express different ruling relations at the local setting, the 
mechanisms in which levels of care were dictated differed depending on whether an individual 
relied on insurance or Medicaid. Therefore, the forms and acts of resistance I observed or had 
described to me also differed depending on whether or not a patient used private or public 
insurance.  
Medicaid 
The most obvious example of Medicaid dictating varying levels of care is how Medicaid 
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coverage results in dramatically different levels of care depending on the age of the patient. 
Whereas preventative care is covered for pediatric patients, medically necessary or limited 
treatment only is provided to adult patients. Dr. Grant bemoaned how the exclusion of 
preventative treatments, like cleanings or scaling, but allowance of diagnostic panoramic x-rays, 
biopsies, and extractions (without replacement) meant that, as a practitioner, he had to wait until 
the patient’s quality of life suffered. “If you see a tooth with a hole, but it’s not infected, you just 
have to wait until it hurts.” The limited coverage and allowances for adult patients also result in 
what is described as the Medicaid mill model, in which the total volume of patients seen offsets 
the low reimbursement values. Dr. Karen implied this was the only way to make caring for 
Medicaid patients economically viable when she described how she did not like to be rushed. 
Dr. Grant further explained that this model is incompatible with SHCN patients, too. “Seeing 
people in 15 minutes, that’s the time it would take just to move someone from a wheelchair to 
your chair.” However, both observed providers worked with Medicaid patients to provide care 
outside the confines of covered care. This meant working with patients to pay cash for care, but 
by performing the transaction outside of insurance reimbursements, there was flexibility in 
payment. 
Both offices used Care Credit and provided information to patients on how to sign up if 
they wanted to finance treatment. Drs. Andy and Grant explained that their decision to do so was 
to avoid becoming the bank and assuming that financial risk. For patients, they have 1-year 
interest free to pay off their credit and, even though that meant the dental office was essentially 
paying the interest for that year, it was easier because, “If they don’t pay we don’t have to pay 
for collections. We avoid the time required and avoid damaging our reputation—trying to keep 
up with people—there are people who do that full time.” However, partnering with Care Credit 
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did not mean they did not offer other options to patients when necessary. During one of my 
observations, Tricia reviewed and explained to me a SHCN patient who had been on a monthly 
repayment plan. However, funds had not been recovered and payments had ceased over a year 
ago. If they sent the bill to collections, it would be the patient and not the caretaker whose 
account would be sent to collections. Instead, Tricia decided to cancel the upcoming appointment 
and notify the patient and their family that they would not be able to return until payments 
resumed. Though the technical office policy is to send anything past 90 days to collections, they 
elected not to in this case because it would harm the patient who was not the responsible party 
and would be futile because social security insurance cannot be garnished to pay past due 
balances. In addition, the office did not have a hard policy about when to release patients for no-
shows or missed payments as they try to be as lenient as possible. Tricia even went on to express 
that had the family communicated with them regarding payment, they may not have canceled the 
upcoming appointment.  
For Dr. Calvin’s office, as a pediatric office, Medicaid is much more comprehensive and 
his staff worked with parents of SHCN patients to sign up for Medicaid to receive coverage 
beyond private insurance. Sometimes this meant overcoming cultural barriers and 
misconceptions. “A lot of the Hispanic parents are, they are worried about applying for benefits, 
even if they are legal9...but that is what the patient needs, and we can talk them into getting the 
benefits they need.” For Medicaid SHCN patients who aged out of pediatric coverage, as 
previously mentioned, Dr. Calvin would retain them if they wanted to stay and continue to 
provide treatment for them at the cost of what Medicaid would have reimbursed. Though this 
                                               
9
 Though “legal” is not the preferred terminology for documented immigrants, I kept its use as this is a 
direct quote, and I believe its use here adds weight to my later section on implicit bias and cultural competencies.  
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still required an out-of-pocket cost to the patient, it was an option outside of covered services. 
However, other services that Dr. Calvin could not provide were affected by varying levels of care 
tied directly to age.  
We got a letter from one of the bigger ortho surgery practices this week, and they are no 
longer going to see Medicaid SHCN patients over the age of 18. They were only getting 
paid 30 percent of their costs. “We do lots of indigent care and pro bono work, but we 
just aren’t going to take this on.” They said something like that to justify their decision. 
Also described in Chapter 5 was the example of patient dismissal. Though Dr. Calvin’s office did 
have a written policy and warning of dismissal for missed appointments, the fact that I only saw 
one dismissal letter for a family that had missed 16 appointments demonstrates that they, too, 
were lenient in their policy, as they knew patient dismissal had a direct effect on care. 
These described acts of resistance occurred in the local setting under the professional 
authority of providers and their staff, and these acts did not directly subvert the ruling relation of 
Medicaid so much as they worked outside the confines of coverage, especially for adult patients 
since care for pediatric patients is comprehensive. Furthermore, I surmise that their tactics may 
not have required as much calculation or subversion because there were other means for them to 
leverage their professional authority. As described in Chapter 5, the structure of local 
management provided them with a direct contact at Medicaid as well as advocacy through 
advisory boards. Even more, staff reported that Medicaid would provide training and 
consultations to dental staff on how to submit claims in order to reduce denials. In fact, when 
asked what factors would make them change their minds about being Medicaid providers, the 
responses were if reimbursements were lowered significantly, if it became much harder to work 
with administratively, or if Medicaid adopted a capitation form of reimbursement. Low 
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reimbursement rates have frequently been given as reasons to not participate in Medicaid and 
lowering those rates would make it nonviable. Removing the ease of working with Medicaid 
would remove one of the primary benefits of working with Medicaid described in Chapter 5. 
Dr. Calvin’s response to capitation payments was based on the premise that capitation would be a 
disincentive to providing care. 
 In actuality [capitation] makes more sense to provide palliative care at the beginning and 
then as the patients get older down the road and you’ve got more capitation fees, then to 
provide the filling and the crowns. It’s a little bit dishonest, because it provides a 
disincentive to treat the patients, and we want to treat the child’s needs now.  
However, none of the participants treated my question as an imminent fear and all had to think 
about what would be the most damaging change to Medicaid in their eyes. This question was 
treated more as a thought experiment because they have seen rates go up over time; the ease of 
working with Medicaid is often described in direct contrast with private insurances; and 
individuals, like Dr. Calvin, have direct access to DMAS to advocate their position. These acts of 
resistance fell more in line with professional discretion to use or ignore the systems as needed. In 
contrast, the acts of resistance leveraged toward private insurance took on a substantially more 
subversive tone. 
Private Insurance 
For private insurance, the insurance plan textually transmitted what were allowable 
procedures, annual maximums, downcodes, and schedule fees, all for the goal of achieving cost-
saving measures. The prioritization of cost-saving measures meant the level of care provided to 
individuals is highly dependent on what kind of insurance plan and managed care agreement they 
and their provider had with a particular insurance company. For example, during one of my first 
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observations at the office of Drs. Andy and Grant, I observed a conversation between clinical 
staff and Karlee. The hygienist and Dr. Grant asked Karlee to confirm whether the patient was 
using the same insurance since their last appointment and to check with the insurance company if 
the patient had any remaining treatment amount on their plan for the year, even though their 
records said the patient has used all of their treatment amount. When it was determined that there 
was no remaining treatment amount, the clinical staff decided the best course of action was to 
move ahead with scheduling a cleaning next and to conduct additional procedures in a new 
policy year. Despite the office’s out-of-network status, patients with out-of-network benefits may 
still rely on coverage for care that they cannot afford out of pocket. As this was the case for this 
particular patient, the clinical team’s plan for care was entirely reliant on insurance coverage.  
Tricia at the office of Drs. Andy and Grant expressed that insurance often dictates care, 
both from the patient perspective and provider perspective. It is not uncommon for a patient to 
want to have only covered procedures performed and, from her previous experience at other 
dental offices, doctors will also supply care based on what a patient’s insurance will cover. Tricia 
gave the examples of annual x-rays and pointed out that patients accept the idea of annual x-rays 
as part of their care but wondered if it was really necessary. “What is a patient being exposed to 
that is unnecessary just because a doctor is trying to collect payment for a treatment?” In fact, 
this reasoning is partly why Drs. Andy and Grant have used their professional autonomy to make 
the decision to be an out-of-network office. This means that they are less beholden to insurance 
dictates for both coverage and levels of care. There are always patients, such as the example 
above, who will still take insurance coverage into consideration when it comes to agreeing with a 
care plan, but Drs. Andy and Grant are not held under those same ruling relation conditions. In 
fact, they have built a reputation and grown their business by offering treatment plans that are 
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often less invasive. The level of care they provide is dictated by their professional training and 
expertise and is not influenced by insurance policies.  
When insurance allowances and plans influence care decisions, the results are varying 
levels of care highly based on market factors rather than health factors. Here, patients with 
generous coverage are liable to be overtreated, and patients with less coverage are likely to be 
undertreated. To this point, Tricia gave an example of a patient who had been told she needed 10 
fillings and extractions, but when she came for a second opinion at Drs. Andy and Grant’s office, 
their treatment plan called for scaling, performing two extractions, and watching the wisdom 
teeth for potential future extractions. Dr. Andy shared, “We don’t have the financial pressure of 
writing off [costs]. We have all seen treatment plans that we flat out disagree with...a lot of it 
comes from management.” Katherine, a hygienist at the office of Drs. Andy and Grant, 
moonlights at other offices and is able to provide a direct comparison. 
We don’t look at a policy detail and decide what care is needed based on insurance. I’ve 
worked at another office that is totally different. They are really, really on top of 
insurance and overtreat...We know that technology has improved a lot, why expose an 8-
year-old to a full set of x-rays who doesn’t have any extensive dental needs? We do 
what’s needed [at Dr. Andy’s and Dr. Grant’s].  
Returning to the idea that patient care is directed by insurance policy, Katherine discussed how 
patients have been habituated to expect annual x-rays, even if it is not necessary or doesn’t fit 
with their needs.  
Special needs patients, a lot of them have strong teeth, it’s more about periodontal 
disease. They don’t need to do x-rays every year, they need more frequent cleanings, not 
x-rays. But they get annual x-rays because insurance is covering it. At other offices, if 
PROFESSIONAL AUTONOMY AND MEDICAID PWD 144 
 
 
you don’t get your x-rays regularly, then the doctor won’t see you for your exam. 
Being out of network allows Drs. Andy and Grant to not only focus on treatment without 
reimbursement considerations, it also allows for an honest conversation with patients about 
needs, wants, and affordability.  
Even if you can’t afford dental implants, maybe you can do a partial denture. We like to 
present different choices and say here are your treatment options. For example, dental 
financing through Care Credit. If it’s not a health risk to stage treatment over time, we 
can get to B over 2 to 3 years and take more time versus affording it all now. If there is no 
way to afford optimal treatment, then we look at alternative options. I have heard we are 
more willing to space things out. People have said that they [other providers] wanted 
them to sign this document that it all has to be done now. We believe in disease 
management first, and if you are missing teeth, we can restore those things over time. 
(Dr. Grant) 
The decision of Drs. Andy and Grant to be out of network is a direct response to 
insurance ruling relations and an attempt to distance themselves from technical systems that 
direct level and type of care. In fact, some insurance policies may be viewed as a direct attempt 
to prevent dental providers from going out of network by making the administrative process 
difficult. During my observations, I observed one patient during their checkout process. Though 
an insurance claim was filed for them by the office, they were responsible for the full treatment 
costs, and they confirmed that the insurance reimbursement check would be sent to them rather 
than the dental office. Staff did confirm that this could be a barrier to some patients who would 
not be able to pay for their care upfront. Dr. Andy explained to me that this one insurance 
company, Delta Dental, had gotten around the Virginia law (VA code § 38.2-3407.13.) that 
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patients were allowed to assign benefits to an out-of-network provider because this insurance 
company was based in another state. He goes on to state, “Our appeal to the GA is it’s the 
patient’s right to appeal their benefits.”  
Here, there is a direct contrast to the professional advocacy available to providers when 
combatting insurance policies compared to Medicaid policies. Instead of advocating their 
position directly to the organization, dental providers are banding together through advocacy and 
trade organizations and relying on state legislators to pass laws that will curtail the company’s 
business practices. For example, Dr. Calvin described how silent preferred provider 
organizations (PPOs) operate to undermine the managed care plans providers believe they have 
agreed to.  
Say Anthem can sell part of their network to someone else, and you might not participate 
in Anthem, but they…let’s use Circuit City. Say Circuit City bought this insurance, which 
is administered by Anthem, and you take that insurance. All of a sudden you find out you 
are taking Anthem patients too. So, there is legislation in this year’s GA to prevent that. 
It’s a gotcha, you have to follow this fee schedule as opposed to the one you agreed to 
before...VDA is a good source for this stuff. Anthem and Delta aren’t going to fight 
because they said they don’t do that.  
In fact, VDA’s primary legislative goal of the 2019 GA session was successful and HB 1682, 
limiting the sale or granting of access to third-party carriers, was passed (Virginia Dental 
Association, 2019).  
This is not to say that state changes to Medicaid have not occurred through channeled 
advocacy, as The Virginia Oral Health Coalition (now Virginia Health Catalyst) was vital to 
Medicaid expansion in 2018 and the recent budget amendment approving adult Medicaid 
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benefits (Budget Amendments HB 30, 2020), but this advocacy is built on a coalition of 
stakeholders, including dental providers, trade associations, state agencies, and nonprofit partners 
(Virginia Health Catalyst, N.D). In contrast, the examples provided to me during interviews were 
trade associations lobbying legislators to intercede on behalf of dental providers against the 
ruling relation in which they operate. These internal resistances coalesced into a strategic 
movement.  
Dr. Calvin provided another example when he described how legislation was used to 
combat insurance companies that “were trying to do an end run on [being out of network]” by 
not allowing providers to charge for non-cover services if a patient had insurance. “That was 
them dictating treatment, and now, unless they can demonstrate a reasonable and customary fee 
then they can dictate it, but they can’t say that they won’t pay for this filling and you can charge 
a penny. They have to justify.” In terms of power, individual dental providers exhibit 
significantly less power with insurance companies compared to Medicaid. In fact, when I posed 
the question of how much negotiation power he has with insurance companies, Dr. Calvin 
responded, “absolutely none.” 
What Drs. Andy and Grant have accomplished, being out of network, was what was 
described to me as an ultimate goal in one of my preliminary interviews. Being out of network 
means being free partially from insurance policies and systems, still having access to the 
economic resources of insurance companies, and all while operating in a fee-for-service market. 
In this manner, professional autonomy becomes a means of resistance to institutional powers by 
defying expected institutional practices. The social relation out-of-network providers enter into 
with patients is not dominated by insurance ruling relations. Though Dr. Calvin’s office 
continues to enter into managed care plans with insurance providers as a means of securing 
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social relations with patients, they too made professional decisions to resist ruling relations they 
saw as unfair. 
Dr. Calvin said he did not have any negotiating power as a single provider, but he did 
share that he had more clout as part of a collective of dental providers. A few years prior, 
Dr. Calvin’s office had been invited to join CVDC, a collective of dental providers that had 
originated in the Tidewater region of Virginia. Their initial reason for forming was to band 
together to increase their bargaining power against an insurance company. As previously 
described in Chapter 4, the ruling relation that exists between patient and provider often extends 
past the patient to their employer. This social relation was the catalyst that initiated the formation 
of CVDC, as many people in that area are employed by shipyards and the military. Dr. Calvin 
explained when the military switched insurance companies from MetLife to United Concordia 
for cost-saving measures, dental providers in the area suddenly got 30 percent less on their 
managed care agreements than they had with MetLife for the majority of their patients. The 
dental providers banded together to boycott participation with United Concordia until they 
collectively argued for a better managed care agreement. Here, dental providers used their 
professional autonomy strategically to avoid coercion into a social relation they found 
unsustainable.  
The CVDC collective is an example of professionally resisting an unfair arrangement that 
resulted in the employer–patient social relation. Though CVDC was effective because of the 
scale of the resistance, sometimes small acts of resistance can be localized to a single provider’s 
office. Dr. Calvin expressed the importance of patient education and the role his staff had in 
educating and explaining dental insurance benefits to their families.  
Patient will pick Plan A if it is the cheapest. But get them to talk to their HR specialist, 
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and they will realize that Plan B really isn’t that much more expensive and you get 
services out of it. So, it’s actually a better deal even though it has a bigger premium. 
[Jessica] is very good about this. She will explain which insurance company is the better 
one during open enrollment. She’ll look at past claim history and explain, “Yes it pays us 
more, but you also have less out of pocket too.” 
 Dr. Calvin goes on to express that some dentists really like to battle with insurance companies 
and some tell patients they have to figure it all out on their own. He believes it is their 
responsibility to educate their patients and their parents. By educating patients about employer 
benefits, Dr. Calvin is influencing the social relation initiated by patients, the social relation in 
which he must operate to mitigate insurance ruling relations the best he can.  
Within the typical insurance ruling relation, insurance companies control access to both 
patients and the economic resources on which dental providers are reliant. If dental providers 
were completely subservient to this ruling relation, they would participate in all insurance plans 
to have access to as many patients as possible—similar to what both Dr. Karen and Dr. Calvin 
described as necessary for providers starting out in their early career. However, eventually 
economic and business saliency make this subservience impractical, and providers exercise their 
professional autonomy by electing to not participate in some insurance policies. Such as the case 
of Dr. Calvin, who proudly declared that he had grown his business to the point where he had 
staff to deal with insurance. As a practitioner he had become successful enough that he only 
focused on patient care and did not have to worry himself about the day-to-day battle with 
insurance. This also meant that he listened to his staff and agreed to drop plans that were too 
onerous to work with. Dropping plans that require too much administrative time or are 
consistently late with payment is an act of resistance that specifically addresses another resource 
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insurance companies tend to monopolize: Time. Refusing to participate in such managed care 
plans allows Dr. Calvin and his staff to regain time that was spent arguing with insurance 
representatives and focus instead on customer service and care. Insurance selection was not the 
only means by which Dr. Calvin resisted ruling relations, he also cultivated a staff trained to 
work within the system for his and his patients’ benefit.  
The Resistance is Administrative 
Both sites I observed had an arsenal of administrative staff whose primary role was to 
mitigate insurance interference through textual means. They reviewed preauthorizations, claims, 
and policy benefits, all with the goal of abstracting the patient and preparing them to be textually 
documented. Though one could view this work as simply preparing the patient to be rationalized 
into the technical insurance system, it can also be viewed as a resistance to the system, played 
from within its confines. For example, Stella at Dr. Calvin’s office would review clinical notes 
post-treatment but before claims were filed for insurance. Her role was not quality control from a 
clinical perspective but to make sure that clinical staff had written notes to fit institutional 
language so that claims could not be denied. Administrative staff accompanied patients as they 
traverse the dental office to prepare them to be adequately abstracted in an effort to reduce 
administrative battles with insurance companies. By devoting staff and resources to this task, 
dental providers are learning the technical language of the rational system to fight them on an 
equal battleground. Though claims to Medicaid also required medical codes for billing in a 
systematized format, the training and consultation they provided staff was meant to mitigate 
denials, as cost-savings was not prioritized over patient care. During my observations and 
interviews, staff never mentioned training offered by insurance companies on correct filing 
procedures. In fact, they were more likely to complain about changing codes or policies that they 
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were not informed of until after a claim was filed. At Dr. Calvin’s office, administrative team 
members had actually taken the time to create Microsoft Excel spreadsheets with common codes 
to prevent filing errors or with formulas to calculate copays based on various insurance managed 
care plan agreements. These artifacts were handed down and, in the case of the formula 
spreadsheet, that employee was no longer at the office but staff continued to use the document.  
Smith (1987) points out that this invisible work of “mediating the relation of the 
impersonal and objectified forms of action to the concrete local and particular worlds” has been 
predominantly assigned to women (p. 108). This was definitely the case at both dental providers’ 
offices I observed, in which all administrative roles were filled by women. Smith’s focus on 
women was to point out the invisibility of women’s work in a world in which work and culture 
had been created and dominated by men. From a feminist perspective, there is a perpetuation of 
this male-female power imbalance that can be extended to the power relation between dentists, a 
predominantly male profession, and administrative staff, a predominantly female position. 
Though this power relation would be an interesting aspect for a future study, I point it out here 
because it demonstrates the invisibility of women’s work not only at the local setting but also in 
the resistance.  
Figure 21 
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21 Provider–Staff Social Relation 
 
When concepts of resistance focus on the professional autonomy of dental providers, the 
work and role of administrative and office staff are overlooked. Though dental office staff are 
often seen as an extension of the dental professional, Figure 21 shows that they are a separate 
body engaged in a social relation with their employer. A dental provider that has chosen to 
become a Medicaid provider dictates the work of his staff through this choice, and their work is 
to abstract patients to prepare them to receive care and receive payment for that care. As 
described in Chapter 5, this is largely the invisible work at the heart of the disjunctures, where 
“knowledge generated from ‘being there’ is abstracted into something else” (Rankin, 2017a, 
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p. 3). As street-level bureaucrats, administrative staff are capable of resisting ruling relations 
daily. Their decision to advocate or not advocate to insurance companies can have a direct effect 
on the care of patients. Yet, one of the additional disjunctures I observed did not exist in the gap 
between patients and insurance companies, but rather between patients and empathy. 
Considering administrative staff’s key role in resisting insurance ruling relations, their work 
must not only be acknowledged but also nurtured to not let implicit bias rule their bureaucratic 
decisions. 
Implicit Bias and Medicaid 
Though all staff I spoke to were committed to treating SHCN patients, it was still obvious 
that they held conceptions of who were deserving patients, specifically, deserving Medicaid 
patients. The concept of deserving patients is ubiquitous in our society and can be linked back to 
1980s political attacks on federal welfare policies painting dependents as overdependent and 
abusive of aid (Whittle et al., 2017). In fact, as Figure 22 shows, one does not need to look 
farther than Medicaid’s own frequently asked questions (FAQ) document for an example of this 
thought process.  
Figure 22 
22 Frequently Asked Question: Medicaid Fraud 
 
The concept of a deserving patient demonstrates how Medicaid’s bureaucracy of exclusion also 
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plays out for society’s poor, individuals who qualify for Medicaid based on income. Like adult 
SHCN patients, total reliance on Medicaid presumes an inability or unwillingness to participate 
fully in society. Legislation like the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996 used market-based work incentives to capitalize and perpetuate this 
attitude that recipients of government aid programs should be punished for their inability to 
participate in society (Whittle et al., 2017). Individuals can qualify for Medicaid under a variety 
of categories, including low-income families, qualified pregnant women and children, and PWD 
(DMAS, 2019; Schneider et al., 2002), and these eligibility criteria have created categories of 
deserving patients versus nondeserving patients. Children and infantilized adults with SHCN are 
deserving, the able-bodied poor are not. 
Often comments revealing this implicit bias were made in passing and, because of the 
nature of these comments, quotes will not be attributed to specific participants. For example, two 
different participants on separate occasions mentioned how it could be frustrating that Medicaid 
patients had designer purses that they themselves did not have. “It can be irritating when a 
patient with Medicaid comes in with a Coach purse.” Complaints about no-shows from 
administrative staff were frequently followed with statements that there was no reason to miss 
appointments because Medicaid paid for transportation. One participant felt that not paying was 
in fact what contributed to these no-shows. “They don’t have to pay, so they don’t want to come, 
they don’t come.” These comments bring into focus the fact that there is a cultural stigma against 
Medicaid and reliance on government benefits.  
Often, within the context of market-based healthcare, there is an assumption that poor 
people lack the personal responsibility required to attain and maintain proper health. This 
generalized assumption blames them for not using preventive care, following drug regimens, 
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keeping appointments, or managing their finances (Mani et al., 2013). 
Accepting Medicaid can change your business’s image. Parents who come in and there 
are grease spots on the walls because they have been sleeping there waiting for 
transportation for 2 hours, with five kids in tow for one appointment. For no good reason, 
they could have put them on the bus but just didn’t do it. We have had parents who say, 
“we like you guys but don’t feel like it’s healthy here enough for my child because you 
see all these Medicaid patients.” Almost direct quote from a physician’s wife. On 
occasion, we have lost patients. But we treat and provide healthcare to children. If you 
treat us with respect, we will treat you with respect. That won’t make me change 
accepting Medicaid.  
Another participant simply stated, “for some reason they don’t take care of their teeth.” These 
quotes demonstrate how there is a recognition of the needs of this population but also an 
underlining disdain. The focus on patient decisions and personal responsibility allows for the 
recasting of poor people with healthcare needs as financial risks that need to be managed 
(O’Daniel, 2018). In other words, poor people are wasteful, undeserving consumers who take 
Medicaid-covered healthcare for granted. By reframing access to healthcare as a personal 
responsibility and Medicaid recipients as financial risks, a moral inversion is created where 
bureaucratic systems are needed to protect resources. Adams and Balfour (2009) point out that 
such moral inversions are more likely to lead to administrative evil and policies of elimination 
when “surplus populations,” those who seem undeserving, are involved (p. 113). To this point, 
Schweik (2009) details how individuals who occupied multiple surplus populations (Black, 
immigrant, disabled, and poor) contributed to the proliferation of “ugly” laws in the 19th century 
that sought to regulate deviant bodies with the intent of keeping them from public spaces. The 
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racialized comments of “grease spots on the walls” and implication of unsanitary conditions 
from the mere presence of Medicaid patients reveals that those biases are still very much present 
in our society, and that the intersection of race, poverty, and disability cannot be easily dismissed.   
Indeed, personal responsibility, or rather lack of personal responsibility, was implied 
when staff complained of no-shows and having no excuses to not use NEMT. However, these 
complaints did not take into account the bureaucratically demanding tasks involved with using 
NEMT outlined in Chapter 5 or how these requirements potentially conflicted with other aspects 
of a patient’s life outside of the confines of the dental office. For example, the quote above 
addresses parents bringing other children along during appointments as an unnecessary 
inconvenience. However, this need may have resulted from the family only having one vehicle 
available for transportation, or how the time required to attend the doctor’s appointment and wait 
for transportation may have meant that they were not available for after-school pickup. Perhaps, 
the living environment is not one in which parents feel comfortable letting their children walk 
home or be home unsupervised. Perhaps bringing all children along was simply easier than 
coordinating schedules and care. There is an expectation from many institutional organizations 
that clients must conform to bureaucratic standard hours of operation: 9 a.m. to 5 p.m., Monday 
through Friday. These expectations see failure to attend meetings or appointments as failure in 
personal responsibility and time management and do not recognize the cognitive load required to 
conform to these expectations when someone is poor. Furthermore, evidence suggests that 
poverty itself can impede cognitive function. Mani et al. (2013), found that decision making was 
reduced for low-income participants when financial concerns were triggered. They determined 
attention capture to be the primary explanatory mechanism and that the very context of being 
poor reduces one’s cognitive capacity. This perspective changes the narrative from personal 
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responsibility to the ways in which policy can reduce cognitive burdens on the poor or recipients 
of government aid.  
Turning the argument from personal responsibility provides street-level bureaucrats with 
the opportunity to ease the cognitive burden of their clients. Instead of requiring extensive 
documentation and understanding of complex policies, administrative bureaucrats can assist 
clients in completing forms, scheduling, and providing reminders. For dental provider offices 
and their staff, this means abolishing the concept of deserving patients and instead focusing on 
how to make sure all patients are supported. Lipsky (2010) notes that there is an assumption that 
biases are cultural and brought into the workplace by employees. Therefore, any implicit bias is 
rooted in the individual employee. However, Lipsky (2010) also points out that this assumption 
does not consider that an employee’s individual experiences in the workplace shape their beliefs 
and that in fact the employee may be relying on stereotypes as cognitive shortcuts for deciding 
how to allocate limited workplace resources. In the same way dental providers influence the 
social relation with dental staff by choosing specific insurance participation, they can also 
influence the cultural competency of their staff by providing education and awareness and by 
reducing the circumstances in which staff rely on cognitive shortcuts or create administrative 
burdens that tax the cognitive load of their patients relying on Medicaid. Such efforts by dental 
providers should acknowledge disability, poverty, ethnicity, and race given the interrelatedness of 
all three categories. For example, some of the racialized comments shared may reflect the 
context of Richmond, Virginia. In 2015, 65 percent of the Richmond population living in poverty 
were Black (Moeser et al, 2017), and one of the dental offices is located in a growing suburb that 
is the home to major employers who have attracted a large immigrant population.  
My observations underscored that awareness and education are potentially strong 
PROFESSIONAL AUTONOMY AND MEDICAID PWD 157 
 
 
indicators of empathy. I observed fewer comments about personal responsibility or cultural 
stereotyping at Dr. Andy’s and Dr. Grant’s office compared to Dr. Calvin’s office. I would 
hypothesize that it was related to one key difference as none of the participants interviewed were 
personally familiar with the application process for Medicaid or details about how eligibility was 
determined. Dr. Andy and Dr. Grant worked primarily with adult SHCN patients rather than 
pediatric SHCN patients, and this meant that they were more privy to the administrative burden 
these patients and their families endured. Reconciliation of accounts and appointment reminders 
were often navigated through a dizzying array of case managers, group home employees or 
administrators, and caretakers. Their workplace experience was more conducive to creating a 
culture of empathy by exposing staff to the lived realities of patients and, if anything, I observed 
a protective attitude toward their patients. Consider their policy to hold credits for their patients 
rather than return overpayments to the group home since they had no guarantee that the 
overpayment was in fact going to the patient. This lends credence to Lipsky’s (2010) claim that 
workplace experiences can be the place where biases and stereotypes are formed that have the 
most impact on a street-level bureaucrat’s treatment of clients. For example, one participant did 
share that, despite not knowing the process, she was aware that it was not an easy process.  
I do know that a lot of families will be ineligible because they haven’t turned their 
paperwork back in or aren’t responding to paperwork they get in mail. Something I think 
they don’t understand it, or don’t have time to answer it. I have never done the process 
myself. I know they have caseworkers but they are overloaded generally. I don’t know, I 
just know there are income categories, but I am not familiar with how they determine 
who gets what benefits. 
It would be easy to argue that someone who has applied for Medicaid but was denied failed in 
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their responsibility to complete the application correctly or on time. If instead, it was reframed 
that this administrative burden overtaxed someone’s cognitive load, it can engender more 
empathy, especially when one considers not only the burdens of poverty but also the cognitive 
load of having a disability or a family member with a disability. The layers of bureaucracy 
described in Chapter 5 are extensive for SHCN patients. Families who qualify for Medicaid on 
the basis of disability alone likely succumb to attention capture as well and would benefit from 
supportive dental office administrators. The participants from this study who accepted Medicaid 
were emphatic about continuing to accept Medicaid to offer access and care to SHCN patients. 
Removing the cultural stigma of Medicaid could erase the view of non-SHCN Medicaid patients 
as an inconvenience for current Medicaid providers and increase the number of Medicaid 
providers in general. For that, we may need to consider other institutional powers. 
Resistance and Policy Implications 
First, I must acknowledge that as a small-scale ethnography, my study is not meant to be 
generalized. However, I do believe I can speak to the nature of resistance and policy implications 
as observed with the participants of this study and extrapolate how professional autonomy may 
increase other providers’ resistances to insurance ruling relations. The specific nature and style of 
other providers’ resistance will likely look different from what I observed. However, all these 
different forms of resistance are needed to collectively make a change in the dental care 
landscape.  
The concept of professional autonomy as resistance revealed itself as I worked on 
identifying the social and ruling relations that dictated oral healthcare for SHCN patients. As I 
worked through the data to compile themes and link these themes to social relations, the pattern 
of resistance started to emerge. I realized that my hypothesis for how professional autonomy is 
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used had been turned on its head. Yes, dental providers did use their professional autonomy to 
select patients through insurance participation, and yes, for providers who chose not to 
participate in Medicaid, they were choosing not to work with many SHCN patients, especially 
adult SHCN patients living in poverty. Yes, this sort of patient selection was based on economic 
viability, thereby placing profit over care. However, the image that presented itself from my data 
was one where participants and their staff used their professional autonomy to work in and 
between social and ruling relations to provide care the way they wanted to. Even Dr. Karen, who 
had chosen not to participate in Medicaid, did so because she had a very specific concept of the 
type of care she wanted to provide. She wanted to “take her time and pamper her patients.” 
Professional autonomy was not the weapon I had expected it to be against SHCN patients. 
Rather, for study participants, it was a weapon against insurance ruling relations.  
Let’s return to the research question: How does dental professional autonomy in a 
market-based system affect provision of care for Medicaid patients with disabilities? The 
answer this study provides is complicated. From the standpoint of this study, professional 
autonomy is how SHCN patients were able to access care. On the most basic level, dental 
providers who elect to become Medicaid providers open the door for Medicaid patients who are 
likely to include a high percentage of SHCN patients. What professional autonomy also allows is 
the ability for dental providers to train staff to better prepare them to work with SHCN patients 
and their families and to support administrative staff as they navigate the layers of bureaucracy 
that complicates the SHCN patient’s access to care. The professional autonomy of administrative 
staff is often how SHCN patients access the level of care desired, beyond what may be dictated 
by ruling relations. Whereas I once saw professional autonomy as power that prevented access to 
care, I now also see professional autonomy as the means by which SHCN patients access care. 
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From a public policy perspective, we should be increasing professional autonomy in ways that 
encourage more providers to take up the resistance against insurance ruling relations and provide 
care to SHCN patients using Medicaid.  
Foucault (1976/1978) expressed that the points of resistance to institutional powers can 
strategize and create a revolution. Because they are organized much like institutional ruling 
relations, connected through shared institutionalized knowledge and authority, there is no single 
point of resistance. This implies that no single piece of legislation or policy will be the panacea 
that resolves access issues for SHCN patients. Instead, we need to focus on a multitude of 
policies and legislations that in concert can have a positive impact on the provision of care. 
Furthermore, we must be looking forward rather than considering ways in which to undo our 
current social relations and systems of rationality, for they are the result of modernity and 
complexity. Habermas does not believe in abandoning the gains that have come with modernity 
but rather embracing and appropriating the cultural and technology systems that can bring 
society into a “secular humanitarian” ideal (Finlayson, 2005, p. 67).  
Consider how some businesses have set themselves apart from their competitors not only 
in the goods and services they provide but also in the commitment they make to their employees, 
their local communities, and the charities they support. They use their professional autonomy in 
a market system to make a statement about their secular morals, and as customers, we know our 
participation with this business supports these endeavors, and it is our decision to engage or not 
engage. Chapter 4 revealed how opaque dental insurance is and how dental providers and their 
services have become commodities. To the patient, in-network dentists are interchangeable in 
terms of insurance coverage. Future policy implications should look toward how we can provide 
dental providers and their staff more autonomy to break free from their commodity status and 
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reestablish their professional authority to provide care outside of what ruling relations dictate. 
Perhaps, if dental providers were afforded more professional autonomy, they would not make 
decisions based on market factors that result in limited care for SHCN patients. Following are 
some current policies and policy ideas that may provide more points of resistance to be 
strategized. This is not an exhaustive list; the policies presented here are based on my 
conversations, interviews, and observations. They are included as either issues discussed or 
legislation for which participants advocated or expressed a desire. 
1. Comprehensive Adult Medicaid Benefits 
 One of the biggest barriers to access for adult Medicaid patients, and therefore adult 
SHCN patients, is the lack of comprehensive benefits. In Virginia, Budget Amendment SB 30 to 
expand Medicaid to include comprehensive adult benefits passed in 2020. Comprehensive 
benefits will begin July 1, 2021, and the hope is that this expansion of coverage will encourage 
more providers to participate in Medicaid. However, as my conversations with dental providers 
about CCC+ implementation revealed, provider awareness and understanding could be a huge 
implementation hurdle. In a webinar hosted by Virginia Health Catalyst, DMAS, and DentaQuest 
on February 3, 2021, it was acknowledged that they expect individuals using Medicaid to 
increase from 670,000 to 830,000, and this increase will create a potential access issue. Currently 
2,000 or about 34 percent of dental providers in Virginia participate in Medicaid10. A focus of the 
implementation of comprehensive benefits will be to ensure that current providers are ready to 
accept new patients and that new dentists and specialists are recruited.  
                                               
10 This number includes providers who only accept pediatric or pregnant patients. Provider awareness will 
include encouraging these providers to accept adult Medicaid patients 
(https://vahealthcatalyst.org/adultdentalbenefit/).  
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In keeping with my previous analysis that Medicaid, unlike private insurance, rationalizes 
the patient into the system rather than rationalizing them out, these new benefits will include 
coverage for three cleanings during a year as opposed to the more traditional two cleanings per 
year. This additional cleaning was included to acknowledge that this is a population that may be 
entering dental care with less maintenance and more oral healthcare needs. However, these 
comprehensive benefits do not address missed appointments. Providers will still not be able to 
charge for missed appointments (Virginia Health Catalyst, 2021). Therefore, alone, 
comprehensive adult benefits may not address the cultural stigma associated with Medicaid 
regarding personal responsibility and nondeserving patients as financial risks.  
2. Cultural Competency Training in Dental Education11  
The American Dental Education Association (2008) lists competencies in domains of 
critical thinking, professionalism, communication and interpersonal skills, health promotion, 
practice management and informatics, and patient care. What is missing from this list of 
competencies is a cultural awareness or diversity and inclusion competency. Considering that a 
dental provider’s professional path will lead to interaction with people of all backgrounds, I 
believe that a cultural competency requirement would assist dental students to see and address 
the ways in which implicit bias can affect their role in promoting health. As outlined earlier in 
this chapter, implicit bias and concepts of deserving and nondeserving patients undermined even 
providers who felt they had a moral obligation to accept Medicaid patients. Dental providers who 
emphasize cultural awareness and diversity and inclusion will create a work environment that 
could positively shape their employees’ experiences and avoid stereotyping as cognitive 
                                               
11 The use of cultural competency here includes the concept of poverty as a cultural competency. 
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shortcuts as suggested by Lipsky (2010). During my analysis, I reached out to a committee 
member with knowledge of the local university’s dental education curriculum to ask if cultural 
competency was addressed. She responded, “It happens a few places but not done extremely well 
as a topic of its own. It appears in their patient communication curriculum and dental ethics.” 
Increasing the focus on cultural competency in dental education could work in tandem with 
legislation increasing Medicaid benefits to increase the number of participating providers. 
3. SHCN and Dental Education  
One common refrain I heard from the participants who treated SHCN patients was that 
they all felt they had received more clinical training on how to work with patients with 
disabilities during their residency compared to current students. Dr. Calvin described learning 
how to make molds using a tiny teaspoon for babies with cleft palates. Dr. Andy and Dr. Grant 
both had most of their exposure during their residency, and Dr. Grant described this method as 
one of the best ways to learn how to work with SHCN patients. “You just go in there and get it 
done, with some advice on how to position yourself. It’s all pretty much hands on.” Based on the 
2018 issue brief from the National Council on Disability, “Neglected for Too Long: Dental Care 
for People with Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities,” the Commission on Dental 
Accreditation will now require predoctoral programs to teach students how to “manage patients 
with intellectual and physical disabilities” (ADA, 2019). I have chosen to quote this line directly 
because the term manage does not mean treat. According to the ADA, managing SHCN patients 
can range from treatment to referral on the basis that care may be beyond the capabilities of 
some. Though this is an advancement from simply denying treatment on the basis of inability to 
provide appropriate care (which falls into professional discretion and autonomy), the new 
standard is a small incremental change and may not address access if dental providers are not 
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afforded adequate hands-on opportunities to train with SHCN patients.  
As it is likely that a Medicaid provider would have a high number of SHCN patients 
seeking treatment, this new standard of education is targeting providers who would likely not be 
Medicaid providers or have a small percentage of their clientele as Medicaid recipients. When 
considered from this perspective, this education standard does not address economic concerns a 
provider may have even treating SHCN patients with private insurance. Recall in Chapter 4 the 
description of how patients have been rationalized out of the insurance system. Private insurance 
companies will likely not cover behavior management like extra time or personnel to assist with 
SHCN patients. Therefore, the term manage still allows providers the ability to punt the patient 
down the line to another provider on the basis of capabilities, even if the main influence is 
economical. This new standard augments the professional autonomy of dental providers by 
limiting it, or providing new directives, but I do not believe it will have a significant impact 
unless a change to the economic landscape also happens.  
4. Competitive Health Insurance Reform Act  
During my observation, the repeal of the McCarran-Ferguson antitrust exemption for 
medical insurances had not passed yet. In fact, this law passed as I finished writing my analysis 
on January 13, 2021. Chapter 4 discusses extensively the power that insurance companies have 
in setting fee schedules, dictating regional UCRs, and limiting dental provider economic control. 
Under the current ruling relation, dental providers have to rely on insurance companies to set fee 
schedules and reimbursement rates, and dental providers submit to this relationship in order to 
access insurance members as potential patients. This is an opaque process to both patient 
consumers and dental providers. Recall that Dr. Calvin’s office was not aware that their fees 
were set lower than competitors until they were invited into the CVDC collective. Once armed 
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with this knowledge, they were able to advocate and negotiate for better fees. The ADA 
acknowledges that there will not be an immediate change from the passage of this law, but the 
hope is that it will “open up more opportunities for new insurance companies to enter the market 
and compete in offering better and more affordable coverage to consumers and better terms to 
doctors, hospitals, and providers’’ (ADA, 2021). Increasing a provider’s ability to negotiate 
better terms and rates could reduce the economic yoke that has pressured dental providers to 
make decisions for purely economic reasons, like not participating in Medicaid. Perhaps if 
economic restraints were loosened, more providers would choose to participate in Medicaid. Dr. 
Andy points out that very few dentists are at full capacity, and therefore there is an economic 
advantage to Medicaid when you want to grow your clientele. This coupled with more favorable 
fee schedules could be the incentive some dental providers need.  
5. Assignment of Benefits 
In my interview with Dr. Andy, he clarified an exchange I had witnessed in which an individual 
with out-of-network benefits still had to pay the full amount for services upfront with the 
expectation that her insurance would reimburse her directly after her claim had been filed by the 
office. Dr. Andy explained that though Virginia was one of the states with legislation respecting a 
patient’s right to assign benefits, allowing an insurance company to pay the health provider 
directly, this insurance company was headquartered in another state and therefore did not need to 
comply with Virginia’s public law. The motivation to not honor a patient’s assignment of 
benefits is directly related to this carrier’s belief that assignment of benefits is a “value of 
network participation and a method of reinforcing patient selection of dentists within the 
established dentists network” (ADA CDBP, 2008, p. 2). In this manner, even patients with out-
of-network benefits are punished by selecting an out-of-network provider, thereby enticing 
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members to stay in-network to persuade more dental providers into participating in managed care 
plans. This strong-armed approach to insurance participation may dissuade dental providers from 
going out of network for fear that they will lose access to potential patients, thereby taking away 
their professional autonomy. In addition, not allowing patients to assign benefits can have a 
negative effect on the patient. Forcing patients to pay upfront may be prohibitively expensive 
and, for patients in more rural areas with limited dental providers, not having access to an in-
network provider can have a negative effect on care. Consistent legislation from state to state 
respecting a patient’s right to assign benefits would increase patient autonomy and, thereby, 
provider autonomy as well. Making it easier for more dental providers to operate out-of-network 
releases them somewhat from the ruling relations of insurance. 
6. Geographic Access, Remote Supervision, and Teledentistry 
I have chosen to link these concepts together because I feel they are inextricably 
intertwined. As previously disclosed, a limitation of my study is that access to providers in urban 
areas is different from access to providers in rural areas. Therefore, geographic access also needs 
to be addressed before one can seriously tackle comprehensive access for SHCN patients. During 
my interview with Dr. Calvin, he was very clear that he did not believe the creation of a mid-
level dental provider would solve geographic access issues. In fact, he believed it would “create 
more people in debt who are going to charge the same amount as you so it’s not really going to 
help anything.” His main reservation was that in training mid-level providers or dental providers 
who promise to practice in more rural areas, those commitments are rarely permanent as they 
eventually leave, as it is their professional autonomy right to do so. His comments speak to an 
inequitable distribution of dentists creating different problems in different areas. However, the 
literature and conversations with participants reveal that even in an urban area with an excess of 
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dentists, SHCN patients simply have trouble accessing community providers. Therefore, 
geographic access is not limited to urban/rural dynamics. Two policy concepts that could address 
geographic access issues are teledentistry and remote supervision of dental hygienists.  
Teledentistry and remote supervision of hygienists require a relinquishing of professional 
control by dental providers to let dental hygienists work to the full extent of their knowledge and 
abilities. Teledentistry can be used to communicate virtually with patients and remote dental 
teams in areas with access difficulties (ADA, 2020). This requires a trust in the abilities of the 
remote team to provide in-person services and documentation. Remote supervision of dental 
hygienists operates under a similar principle in which dental hygienists are able to provide care 
in the community under remote supervision of a dentist. Virginia began remote supervision as a 
pilot project in 2010 and expanded it in 2017 with the hope of improving access issues (Raskin, 
2020). I have already addressed earlier in this chapter how the professional autonomy of 
administrative staff can have a significant impact on access of care. I would be remiss if I did not 
also address the potential gains that could come with increasing the professional autonomy of 
allied personnel like hygienists. A unique advantage of teledentistry and remote supervision is 
the ability for hygienists to meet patients where they are rather than requiring them to come to 
the dental office. In this manner, providing care to SHCN patients in schools, long-term care 
facilities, and group homes would be one way to reduce the cognitive burden of finding 
transportation and reduce the financial burden of no-shows. In fact, one silver lining of the global 
COVID-19 pandemic is that teledentistry has been given an opportunity to demonstrate how it 
can triage, provide care, and keep patients out of emergency rooms (Castelaz, 2020). I do have to 
note a personal hesitation I have about overreliance on teledentistry or remote supervision for 
SHCN patients, which is a fear that care for SHCN patients would revert to institution-based care 
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as opposed to being community-based care. Therefore, as these practices grow, bureaucrats and 
policy administrators should take heed to recall the lifeworld communicative actions that brought 
them into existence, lest the system colonize it and institution-based care once again becomes the 
norm for SHCN patients.  
Concluding Remarks and Future Research Recommendations 
In my quest to understand how care is provided to SHCN patients using Medicaid, I 
discovered that a narrative of care for SHCN patients is impossible to tell without also giving an 
account of dental insurance. Using the perspective of institutional ethnography, I was able to map 
the social and ruling relations that dictate the dental care of SHCN patients (and all patients). 
This mapping elucidates the role that insurance has in abstracting patients, commodifying 
providers, and dictating levels of care by creating systems of technical rationality through 
managed care plans, downcodes, and restricting professional autonomy by controlling economic 
resources. The result is an abstraction of patients to the point that they are absent from the ruling 
relation and the technical system that provides them care. For SHCN patients, the complexities 
and conflicts of other bureaucracies that rule over other aspects of their lives conflict with the 
technical rationalities of dental insurance—thereby creating disjunctures experienced by dental 
staff. These layering of bureaucracies include education, transportation, and group home or 
independent living dynamics. SHCN patients are more problematic because the layers of 
bureaucracy that shroud them cannot be abstracted away as easily. However, it was surprisingly 
easy for dental staff to work with the bureaucracy of Medicaid.  
Dr. Calvin described how dental Medicaid was designed to mirror private insurance as 
much as possible to reduce the administrative burden for dental staff. Ironically, it may have 
proven how administratively arduous private insurance actually is. Compared to private 
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insurance, key informants of this study described over and over how much easier it was to work 
with Medicaid. Unlike private insurance, which has an incentive to increase profit margins, 
dental staff do not spend administrative time appealing downcodes or denials for Medicaid 
patients. They know simply what will be approved and what will not. Though reimbursements 
may be less compared to private insurance, there was less administrative burden and when they 
did have issues, they had a direct and trusted contact. However, the comprehensive coverage of 
pediatric Medicaid compared to the limited coverage of adult Medicaid creates two distinct 
systems. The results are that adult patients access care in an exclusionary bureaucracy whereas 
pediatric patients are able to access comprehensive care beyond what is often offered to pediatric 
patients using private insurance. For pediatric patients, Medicaid retains the patient as part of the 
technical system. However, the recent expansion of comprehensive coverage to adult patients 
using Medicaid could result in a drastic change to the landscape of Medicaid providers in 
Virginia. 
My analysis in this concluding chapter revealed how study participants have and can 
resist insurance ruling relations by exerting their professional autonomy. The role of dental staff 
as bureaucrats for both private and public insurances revealed where and how the dental offices 
in this study primarily used their professional autonomy. Often staff used their roles to education 
patients about their insurance policies, guided them in making insurance decisions such as 
switching policies or applying for Medicaid, and educating them about financing options. In fact, 
it was often through administrative means that dental staff resisted ruling relations. Sometimes 
these resistances took the form of textual interference through billing and appeals, and 
sometimes they applied their street-level bureaucracy to determine when to enforce or not 
enforce office policies.  
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Though this study focused on the power dynamics and acts of resistance between dental 
provider offices and insurances, an area for future research consideration would be how the 
themes of advocacy and resistance play out for actors of varying authority levels or roles within a 
local setting. For example, the administrative resistance I witnessed was conducted solely by 
administrative staff, but they did not report any legislative advocacy related to insurance 
administration to me, despite being the experts of this form of resistance. Similarly, issues related 
to geographic access were only discussed with me by dentist, despite much of the work required 
for teledentistry or remote supervision falling on the shoulders of hygienists. As previously 
mentioned, successful implementation of either teledentistry or remote supervision would require 
an expansion of hygienists’ professional autonomy and a surrendering of some of the 
occupational territory currently held by dentists. An analysis of internal power dynamics may 
have further implications for how to increase access to care for SHCN patients and Medicaid 
patients.  
Just like how the story of Medicaid could not be told without also addressing private 
insurance, I found that Medicaid could not be limited to SHCN patients. My analysis included 
the implicit bias directed at nondeserving Medicaid patients compared to their SHCN 
counterparts. In order to encourage more dental providers to participate in Medicaid, the cultural 
stigma of poverty must be addressed. Eligibility for Medicaid requires activating and consenting 
to the social relation between Medicaid and a patient, and as a patient, allowing the abstraction of 
their body into the bureaucratic system. When these systems of bureaucracy are also based on 
poverty classifications, their restrictiveness on the SHCN body can create experiences for dental 
staff that become the basis of cultural and racial bias. For example, failure to use NEMT assumes 
a shortcoming and lack of personal responsibility of Medicaid patients who do not have access to 
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private transportation, rather than a critical analysis of the administrative burden and unreliability 
of NEMT. When a predominant portion of Medicaid patients relying on NEMT are minorities, 
the cognitive short cut created is that minority patients using Medicaid lack personal 
responsibility.  
This study focused on market factors that contribute to care for SHCN patients using 
Medicaid and though some of the implicit bias expressed by participants were potentially 
racialized, race as a theme did not emerge from the coded data. However, systemic racism in 
Medicaid, disability, and dental access are areas that deserve further attention and analysis. 
Especially, given the historical interlocking of race, poverty and resulting poor health from 
discriminatory policies. Considering the context of this study, Richmond, Virginia—the capitol 
of the Confederacy, it would be noteworthy to analyze the racial make-up of Medicaid patients, 
where most Medicaid patients live, and the availability or access to dental treatment along those 
geographic and public transportation lines. As previously mentioned, both dental offices in this 
study were not easily accessible by public transportation alone. Furthermore, the aforementioned 
relationship between race, poverty, and poor health may contribute to the disproportionality of 
Black children diagnosed with a disability. However, Artiles (2011) points out that these 
simplistic explanations do not explain disproportionate diagnoses that do not correspond with 
patterns of poverty in geographic areas like Chicago, Illinois. Rather, he suggests “shifting the 
analytic lens from individuals or groups of students to constellations of influences that force 
local actors’ decisions about who is able and disabled” (p.442). In short, I believe an institutional 
ethnography of the ruling relations that dictate disability diagnosis and Medicaid eligibility 
would lend additional insight into the barriers preventing SHCN patients using Medicaid from 
accessing care, and in particular illuminate the systemic racism inherent in these institutional 
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systems and power relations.  
Included in my concluding chapter are policy implications of new legislation and policies 
that may increase provider autonomy—and additional resistance against ruling relations. It 
should be noted, though, that my analysis of new legislation is not exhaustive and analysis of 
implementation beyond passage needs to be considered for these policies to take root and hold. 
For example, consider the potentially most impactful legislation: Comprehensive adult benefits. 
Without proper implementation resulting in an increase in Medicaid providers, this legislation 
will do little to increase access to care for adult SHCN patients. Furthermore, my analysis was 
conducted from the standpoint of dental providers, and by doing so I am highlighting the 
disjunctures of their day-to-day experiences. Any future analysis of the legislation and policies 
discussed in this study would benefit from a comprehensive examination from multiple lens, and 
include implications for patients, dental providers, insurance companies, and Medicaid.  
As a final remark, I feel I must address the elephant in the room when discussing market 
factors and health insurance: Single payer universal healthcare. As my study sought to 
understand how care to SHCN patients was provided in the context of insurance profitability and 
professional market viability, single payer insurance was not a focus of my study. However, I 
will leave you with this quote; for who better to have the final word in an institutional 
ethnography than a participant?  
Sometimes, it’s almost like we wish that everyone had the same, had this insurance 
[Medicaid] because then we can do what we need to do for the child and we don’t have 
to worry about them. We know what they are going to cover. We know what they won’t 
cover. We can make the right clinical choices without thinking something will be denied 
or they will want us to do an alternative treatment.   
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Letter of Introduction to Observation Sites  
 
Dear [identified participant]: 
 
 My name is Stephanie Lau; I am a Training Associate at Virginia Commonwealth 
University (VCU) Center on Transition Innovations and a Ph.D. student at VCU in Public Policy 
and Administration. I am interested in learning how dental providers establish office practices 
and policies and about the role that insurance requirements, training, and other factors have in 
making office decisions, particularly when treating patients with disabilities. I am interested in 
observing your practice to learn about how dentists provide care to patients with disabilities for 
my dissertation research. Your office was chosen because it was referred to me by [referral] as a 
location that treats patients with disabilities. By participating, you would be helping to identify 
how dental offices can provide quality care for patients with disabilities.  
 Observation will involve my visiting your office a few times, with visits never exceeding 
3–4 hours, over the course of 3 months maximum. During these observations, I would like to 
observe interoffice interactions as well as interactions with patients with and without disabilities. 
For my observation to be successful, it is important that I be as unobtrusive as possible. No 
excessive demands will be placed on your office, and I will be respectful of your offices policies, 
including patient privacy. All observations will remain confidential, and any identifying 
information about staff, patients, or your practice will be removed. Findings from these 
observations will be used for my dissertation research, which will be supervised by researchers 
familiar with dental care and vulnerable populations. A potential benefit to your office of 
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participating in this study includes my assistance in administrative work, if desired, during, 
before, or after my observation time. Thank you for your consideration; I will follow up in 











Script to Key Informant 
 
I am interested in learning how dental providers establish office practices and policies 
and about the role that insurance requirements, training, and other factors have in making office 
decisions, particularly when treating patients with disabilities. Because of my interest in how 
dental office practices are established, I feel that you are in a key position to offer insight and 
explain the process. Your knowledge would be very useful to me, as a layperson, to understand 
how your office decides on and implements policies and practices. I would like to schedule an 
interview and time to shadow you during a typical workday for no more than 3 hours. I am 
interested in observing your day-to-day tasks and interactions with patients with and without 
disabilities. In exchange for letting me observe and interview you, I would be glad to perform 
administrative tasks in the office to offset any time allotted to my interview or observation.  






Research Background: I am interested in learning how dental providers establish office 
practices and policies and about the role that insurance requirements, training, and other factors 
have in making office decisions, particularly when treating patients with disabilities. I have some 
questions that I hope will help me gain further insight, but please feel free to explain anything 
you think will help me gain a deeper understanding of your work and the work this dental office 
does with patients with and without disabilities. 
Background questions: 
1. How long have you been practicing [dentistry]? 
2. What made you decide to get into this line of work? 
I would like to learn more about your office and have some questions about staff 
roles. 
3. Can you describe the roles and responsibilities of staff in this office?  
 
A. My understanding is that communication and billing insurance are the bulk of 
administrative time at a dental office. Because of its importance in your operations, I 
would like to learn more about insurance participation and how it affects your practice. 
1. First, I would like to talk about insurance participation and how those 
decisions are made. What insurances does your office currently accept and 
how did you decide which types of insurances to accept? 
2. Can you explain the process of being an approved provider for an insurance 
company?  
3. What characteristics describe the insurance providers you most like to work 
with? What characteristics describe the insurance providers you least like to 
work with? 
4. What, in your experience working with insurance providers, has been easy? 
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What has been hard? To what do you attribute these differences? 
5. In what ways do you feel that you have been able to influence negotiating fees 
or other insurance company policies and practices? 
6. What factors were the most influential or important in your decision making 
to become an approved provider? 
7. Do you accept out-of-network patients? Are there benefits for doing so and 
what are they? 
8. What options are available to patients who do not have sufficient insurance 
coverage for treatment?  
9. Have you ever not been able to serve a patient because of insurance 
limitations? What are some of your concerns when you have to turn a patient 
away? 
 
B. I would like to ask some questions about Medicaid and your experience with Medicaid. I 
am interested in what factors contribute to a dental office’s decision to be or not to be a 
Medicaid provider. 
1. I am interested in learning more about what motivates a dental office to 
become a Medicaid provider. What factors influenced your decision to 
become a Medicaid provider? 
2. What are some of the differences between working with Medicaid and other 
insurances?  
3. How, if at all, did your geographic proximity to other Medicaid providers, 
medical institutions, or other safety nets factor into your decision about 
becoming a Medicaid provider?  
4. How, if at all, did accessibility and public transportation factor into your 
decision about becoming a Medicaid provider? 
5. Can you think of a scenario or situation where you would decide to no longer 
accept Medicaid? How would that decision affect your practice? 
6. Can you please describe the process for accepting new patients? 
7. Does the new patient process differ between insurance types or insurance 
PROFESSIONAL AUTONOMY AND MEDICAID PWD 187 
 
 
companies (self-pay vs. private vs. Medicaid)? 
 
C. Now I would like to talk about insurance policies and the forms your office uses. I am 
interested in how insurance policies might shape office practices. 
1. How, if at all, does documentation between insurance providers differ? How 
are they similar? 
2. When accepting new patients, what demographic information do you collect? 
For example, how do you collect disability diagnosis information? To what 
extent do insurance requirements dictate collection of this information? 
3. What is the process for creating your office documents? How have you 
considered insurance requirements during the creation of these forms? 
4. How have insurance requirements and documentation affected your office 
policies and administrative practices? 
 
D. I have some questions about your experience treating patients with disabilities.  
1. What factors contribute to the decision to accept or not accept new patients 
with disabilities?  
2. Please describe your experience treating patients with disabilities.  
a. How have their needs differed from the needs of other patients? How 
are they similar? 
b. How has your experience treating patients with disabilities differed 
from treating other patients? How was your experience similar? 
c. Are there any insurance considerations for this population that are 
different from other patients? 
i. Patients with private insurance? 
ii. Patients with Medicaid? 
I would like to ask you some questions now about any training or education 
you received around treating patients with disabilities. 
3. Did you receive formal training on best practices for working with patients 
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with disabilities? Could you please describe your formal training? Are there 
opportunities for you to engage in informal or continuing professional 
development on how to work with patients with disabilities? Please describe 
your participation in these programs. 
4. Are there any particular accommodations for patients with disabilities you are 
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Bureaucracy  Administrative tasks or duties that stem from accessing dental 
care or dental care reimbursement, all in an effort to maintain 
system uniformity  
Staff as Bureaucrats Dental office staff fulfilling bureaucratic roles for insurance 
companies, Medicaid, and dental office 
SHCN Bureaucracy Systems requiring their own administrative tasks which are 
exercised on SHCN bodies; may or may not be related to 
accessing dental care.  
Poverty Bureaucracy Systems requiring their own administrative tasks which are 
exercised on able-bodied persons in poverty; may or may not be 
related to accessing dental care 
Group Home Experiences and disjunctures related to a patient living in a group 
home 
Cultural Competencies Statements or comments revealing stereotyping or implicit bias 
Dentistry Discussion of dentistry as a field, including legislative agendas 
Levels of Care Factors contribute to disparate levels of care between patients 
Downcoding Insurance act of changing prescribed dental procedures to 
cheaper alternatives 
Access How dentists access patients or patients access dentists 
Exclusion Bureaucracy  Bureaucratic systems that result in exclusionary practices 
Autonomy as Resistance Professional autonomy is used to subvert policies and system 
bureaucracy 
Staff Autonomy Dental staff exercise street-level bureaucracy decisions 




Text Resistance Professional autonomy is exercised through textual 
communication 
Dental Education What dental providers were taught during their education 
Employer insurance Influence of group employer-based insurance 
Patient Selection: 
Insurance 




Patient status related to in or out of network status of provider 
Medicaid  Decision to participate in Virginia Medicaid program 
Medicaid Bureaucracy Medicaid related administrative tasks or duties that stem from 
dental care reimbursement 
Life Experiences Personal experiences that affect perception of patients 
Personal Responsibility Expectations for patient to shoulder administrative burden 
Economic Power Dental professional power or lack of power to be economically 
profitable 
Money Economic resource of money 
Time Economic resource of time 
 
